Close Calls

Dec. 1, 2001
We have been asking readers to share their accounts of incidents in which firefighters found themselves in dangerous or life-threatening situations, with the intention of sharing the information and learning from one another to reduce injuries and deaths. These accounts, in the firefighters' own words, can help others avoid similar "close calls." We thank those firefighters who are willing to share their stories. We will not identify any individuals, departments or communities. Our only intention is to provide educational information and prevent future tragedies.

We thank Contributing Editors William Goldfeder and Mark McLees for helping compile these reports. We again invite readers to share their experiences. You may send them to Chief Goldfeder at [email protected].

"Feel Ahead ... Way Ahead"

My department responded to a report of a structure fire in a 11/2-story wood-frame dwelling, assisting another fire department as a part of the first-alarm assignment. When we arrived on scene, the first thing noticed as a part of our size-up were the black-stained windows and light smoke coming from the eaves of the home. Neighbors stated that the owners and occupants were not home. We had to force entry through a side door into the kitchen.

Upon making entry, we encountered billowing, brown, thick smoke throughout the home. The heat was extreme as we crawled into the kitchen that was next to a living room. I held my men behind me, and looked around at what I was seeing, or at least feeling. I was feeling heavy heat while attempting to determine where the fire was in relation to our position. The heat was surrounding us, and I knew fire had to be heavily burning.

I looked above me and could see orange glowing on the ceiling ... it was starting to roll above us. I believe had I not looked around and watched above us, a flashover could have been inevitable. The crew backing us up were ordered to ventilate immediately - and they did that by horizontal venting, breaking open windows. We then started to flow water. What happened next haunts me all of the time.

As we advanced, I took my axe and pounded the floor in front of me. Suddenly and without warning, it gave way and I fell through. I was now partially through the floor, with my feet and lower body in the basement. I also "personally" discovered the location of the fire ... the basement. I screamed bloody murder and the crew pulled me out. Incredibly, I suffered only from first-degree burns. The rest of the fire went without further incident.

Among the lessons learned:

  • Pay attention: Read the smoke, its colors, its veracity. Feel the heat, monitor conditions.
  • Smoke rises. Leave no area unsearched. Expect a fire in the basement of a dwelling with these conditions. A thorough search is essential.
  • Ventilation is critical. It should never be an afterthought.
  • Ventilation should be an automatic task, based on conditions.
  • Always feel your way, way ahead.
  • Use a thermal imager.
  • Establish a trained rapid intervention team on a structural fire.

Trapped - No Help!

Our department responded to a commercial structure fire, one block from the station. Upon arrival, we discovered the originally reported business had a residence adjoined to it, which turned out to be the primary location of the fire. Construction was a wooden roof on block walls. One wouldn't know that there was a residence within, if you looked at the exterior of the structure. The residential part was fully involved and commercial part had heavy smoke throughout.

My lieutenant and I (we were first due) decided to enter the commercial section (with an 13/4-inch line) of the building to keep the fire from entering the store section. We took a stand at a wall, at the one door separating the two areas. The commercial section was used for country-and-western clothing and accessories. The residence was formerly occupied by the owner and at this point was vacant, but still set up as a makeshift apartment.

Within minutes of our entering, the shift commander arrived and had command. After approximately 15 minutes, we decided that we were not doing much good and decided to leave and communicated that with command. He acknowledged and affirmed our decision. As we turned to go out, the store became fully involved - we believe it was a flashover near where we were positioned.

When we tried to hold heat off of us to protect ourselves with the hoseline, we discovered that we had no pressure in the line! We were unable to make radio contact with the outside units, despite several attempts - they had no idea we were in trouble. What we found out later was that our hoseline had burned through and the pump operator had no idea, due to no gauge fluctuation.

As we tried to follow the hoseline to get out, the ceiling collapsed 10 feet from the door on side A (where we entered) and we were unable to follow that line out. The collapse occurred deep enough inside as to not be obvious to exterior firefighters. We were trapped. By this time we were both also getting burned. In a last effort to get out, we tried to find the north wall (side B), but we became separated. Finally, I was able to find my way out through a window on side A, just north of the door.

As I climbed out, I was greeted by a dozen unaware firefighters standing in the street, but I was still not sure my lieutenant got out. Thirty seconds later, he also got out - both of us, on our own. I spent two weeks in the burn unit with 16% of my body sustaining second- and third-degree burns. The lieutenant spent one week there with second- and third-degree burns on 10% of his body.

The lessons learned:

  • We were burned due to our own hoseline being burned as well as a protective clothing problem. When the hoseline burnt through, the water and steam were actually spraying on us, which caused the steam burns. We should have realized the pressure was gone from our line.
  • The lack of a good portable radio. No one heard our calls for help. The water soaked and damaged our radio as tested after the incident.
  • We couldn't follow the hoseline out and had no simple secondary means of egress.
  • In a working fire, tracking of your personnel must be top priority. No one realized we were in trouble. We had no accountability system.
  • We had no rapid intervention team.
  • Our protective clothing was made of a material that's been "recalled" by other manufacturers, but apparently not by the manufacturer we were using. It is essential that all firefighters know exactly what is in their gear and what the liners (moisture barrier, thermal barrier and exterior shell) are made of. We learned a big lesson here and urge all firefighters to personally as well as professionally have gear inspected and tested biannually.

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