Close Calls: Building Collapse And Members Trapped - Part 1

April 1, 2015
Incident began as vehicle fire in commercial building

In January 2014, Greensboro, NC, firefighters responded to a fire that will not soon be forgotten. Actually, the leadership of the Greensboro Fire Department (GFD) wants no one to forget this fire and they are sharing their story through this column so that all firefighters can learn what they went through. The GFD experienced this extreme close call when a roof collapsed during a large fire at an auto shop in downtown Greensboro.


My sincere appreciation to GFD Chief Greg Grayson and Captain Thomas Suddarth (who you will read about in this article) for their gracious cooperation and assistance in preparing this article. Equally, our thanks go out to Captain William Shane Boswell and Firefighters Matthew Clapp and Bryan Bachemin, who also sustained injuries. Additionally, thanks to all personnel who operated on the scene, including Guilford County Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and the Greensboro Police Department.


A special thanks to Kevin Roche and Gordon Routley from FACETS Consulting. You may recognize Gordon’s name, as he led the highly respected investigative Routley Report following the tragic line-of-duty deaths of nine firefighters in 2007 at the Sofa Super Store in Charleston, SC. Kevin was also an integral part of that investigation team. Both Gordon and Kevin, with decades of experience, are among the most respected fire protection and firefighter life-safety subject matter experts in our industry.


FACETS Consulting was retained by the GFD to provide a thorough analysis of this incident, and this article is based on the findings from that report. It is commendable that Chief Grayson and the GFD solicited an open and straightforward “outside” professional analysis of this fire to ensure the future safety of his members and the community.


The fire department
The City of Greensboro is in the central Piedmont of North Carolina and is the largest city in Guilford County and the surrounding Piedmont Triad metropolitan region. Greensboro has a population of 275,879 and the fire department protects 144.14 square miles. The total population protected by the department, including its rural fire districts, is 277,755. The daytime population is estimated to be 334,796. The department protects very diverse areas that have population densities ranging in excess of 6,951 people per square mile to less than two people per square mile!


The GFD provides fire, medical, hazardous materials and technical rescue response within the geographic boundaries of the city and first-responder medical support to Guilford County EMS providers. Fire protection is provided by 543 uniformed personnel operating out of 24 fire stations, 23 engine companies (BLS equipped), 10 ladder companies (quints), four battalion chief vehicles, a heavy rescue company, two hazardous materials teams, a commander and necessary support equipment and personnel annually responding to more than 30,000 emergency calls for service.

Overview of the fire
To be clear: this fire resulted in one critical firefighter injury and four less-serious firefighter injuries; however, it had the potential to result in six fatalities.


On Jan. 30, 2014, the GFD responded to reported fire at 811 South Elm St. Initially reported as a vehicle fire inside a business, the fire had already spread within the structure before the first fire department unit arrived.


The first GFD units arrived on the scene approximately three minutes after dispatch. Upon their arrival, firefighters began to attack the fire and search the structure to ensure that all occupants had evacuated and prevent additional fire spread. A ladder company was assigned to climb to the roof to provide vertical ventilation to reduce the amount of heat and smoke in the building.
A structural collapse occurred approximately nine minutes and 40 seconds after the arrival of the first GFD unit. Six firefighters were inside the structure when the collapse occurred. Three firefighters, although injured, were able to escape to the exterior and two firefighters who were close to the building entrance were not trapped. One firefighter, the captain of the first unit to arrive, was trapped under the debris.


Firefighters immediately began efforts to rescue the trapped captain. A group of firefighters literally lifted the debris off of the captain by hand and he was removed from the building. The captain and other injured firefighters were transported to a hospital by Guilford County EMS for treatment. All of the injured firefighters have been or are expected to return to full duty after recovery from their injuries. Captain Suddarth is on light duty with a current mission of teaching the GFD members about this incident.


As rescue and treatment of the injured firefighters was taking place, other firefighters continued firefighting activities. Fire consumed much of the structure and its contents. The fire was caused when fuel leaked from an automobile and was ignited by an electrical drop light being used within the business.

In-depth review
The following is an in-depth review of the facts related to this fire with a focus on:
A. What went wrong that allowed the situation to occur, in spite of all of the positive and progressive attributes of the GFD.
B. What went right that made the difference between a close call and a tragedy.


Like all incidents we write about in Close Calls, the incident that occurred at 811 South Elm St. should be viewed as a learning experience and evidence of the reality that fire departments must be prepared for high-risk/low-frequency situations where circumstances can overwhelm even the best-prepared firefighters. This incident resulted in one critical firefighter injury and four less-serious firefighter injuries; however, it had the potential to result in six fatalities.


This fire was both an unfortunate occurrence in the sense that it happened and a very fortunate experience in the sense that the outcome could have been much worse. Five GFD members managed to extricate themselves from a situation that easily could have been fatal.


One fire department member was saved from a situation that very likely would have been fatal, if not for five critical factors:
1. A well-executed Mayday procedure.
2. A well-executed rapid intervention crew (RIC) activation and rescue operation.
3. The incident occurred in an area of Greensboro with sufficient fire department resources
4. The immediate availability of advanced life support (ALS) from Guilford County EMS at the incident scene
5. Excellent medical care

What went wrong?
Six members of the GFD were operating inside the fire area when a roof collapse occurred. With 20/20 hindsight, it is evident that they should not have been inside that part of the building at that time. They were engaging in offensive interior attack operations under circumstances where they should have been conducting defensive operations from exterior positions.


The error of conducting offensive operations in a situation that called for defensive strategy is one of the most frequently identified causes of firefighter fatalities. This most often occurs when there is a failure to recognize an imminently dangerous situation and to apply the appropriate strategy.


The primary duties and responsibilities of an incident commander include providing for the safety of all firefighters who are involved in an incident. The determination of the appropriate operational strategy (investigative, offensive, defensive, marginal) is a cornerstone of this responsibility, because it regulates the level of exposure to the most critical risk factors at a fire incident. The declaration of defensive strategy at this incident would have prevented the firefighters from entering an imminently dangerous area or caused them to withdraw as soon as the danger was recognized.


While the incident commander has overall responsibility for operations on an incident scene, it is also a duty of every firefighter to be on the lookout for situations that could present imminent risk factors, to make the incident commander aware of the dangerous condition, and to take action to provide for the safety of all firefighters at the scene of an incident. In this case, the potential for roof collapse was recognized and a warning was transmitted, but the message did not reach the crews who were under the section of the roof that collapsed less than 60 seconds later.


The actual operations that were performed at the fire scene demonstrated an excellent application of general operating guidelines and operational skills. Although there were a few minor miscues, the operation was managed and conducted “by the book.” The “what went wrong” question leads to one fundamental conclusion: Inadequate size-up and inappropriate strategy resulted in firefighters being under the roof when it collapsed.

Initial response
Engine 11 was initially dispatched for a vehicle fire. Before Engine 11 left the firehouse, the assignment was upgraded to a structure fire. The verbal dispatch message stated only “Call has been reconfigured as a structure fire.” While the units were responding, the Communications Center provided additional information that “It was originally reported as a vehicle fire and they are now reporting it is inside a building.” At the same time, a large column of heavy smoke was visible to the units en route.


The heavy volume of smoke coming from multiple openings into the building was evident to units arriving on the scene, along with the obvious characteristics of the building (single-story, brick, commercial occupancy, approximately 100 by 100 feet). Aerial photos taken from a Sheriff’s Department aircraft as units arrived and began operations provide documentation of very heavy smoke issuing from the large roll-up doorways at the front and rear of the north section of the building as well as the front of the south section (A/B, B/C and A/D corners). Flames were also visible at the top of the door at the northeast (A/B) corner. There is no doubt from the photos that there was heavy fire involvement in the north section of the building when Engine 11 arrived and assumed command. The visible smoke and fire conditions combined with the size of the building should have been sufficient to question whether an offensive strategy was appropriate at that point.


The arriving firefighters did not know that:
• The fire had been burning for several minutes before the first call to 9-1-1
• It initially involved a fuel cell that had been removed from a car on a lift
• The fire had spread to additional vehicles and contents inside the building and to the structure itself by the time Engine 11 arrived
• The callers to 9-1-1 had confirmed that everyone was out of the building, so there was no life hazard
• Most critically, the roof was supported by unprotected steel trusses

The initial incident commander, the captain of Engine 11, stated that in spite of his observations of heavy smoke on approach, he was still thinking that the situation was a car fire, or possibly several cars on fire, inside the building. His perceptions caused him to believe that a solid offensive attack should be successful in controlling the fire. Moreover, he was thinking that it was imperative to get inside the building to conduct a primary search for potential occupants. He called for a 2½-inch attack line to provide a high-volume flow of water, based on his perceptions of the magnitude of fire. At that point, he became focused on assisting in stretching the initial attack hoseline and preparing to make entry through the large door at the A/B corner.


One of the findings worth mentioning here, from in the analysis of this fire, is that the GFD’s standard operating guidelines (SOGs) do not adequately address the importance of conducting a thorough and systematic size-up. The subject is treated in a manner that infers that size-up is a very brief and routine step in the command process. The SOGs do not establish a structured process for conducting an appropriate size-up and leave too much to the discretion of the fire officer on the scene. This provides a great opportunity for readers to compare their department SOGs to see if it is clear what is expected upon your arrival.


Several essential considerations for a size-up are described in “The Incident Commander’s Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety” produced by the Safety, Health, and Survival Section of the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC). This document refers to the initial size-up and determination of strategy as well as the continuing responsibility to re-evaluate conditions and change the strategy if the critical factors have changed.


Whenever possible, the initial size-up should include a 360-degree view of the fire building, although this is not always feasible. In the case of the fire on South Elm Street, the initial size-up should have included a rapid assessment of the A, B and D sides of the building, because fences prevented rapid access to the C (rear) side.


When confronted with an obvious working fire, there is often a temptation to initiate action without taking the time to conduct a thorough and appropriate size-up. In his initial size-up report, the captain of Engine 11 called for an offensive strategy. This was based on the dispatch information, the visible smoke column, a brief view of side D on approach and the conditions that could be observed at the front of the building (side A). The arrival report calling for offensive strategy was transmitted while the supply line was being laid from the hydrant to the front of the building. His basic attack plan had been formulated before Engine 11 stopped in front of the building.

Transfer of command
Battalion Chief 2 (BC2) arrived while Engine 11 was laying the supply line to the front of the building and positioned his vehicle in a parking lot on the opposite side of the street, in line with the A/D corner of the building. The arrival and rapid assumption of command by BC2 relieved the captain of Engine 11 of the direct responsibility for command of the incident. The transfer of command by radio was appropriate at that point, because the initial incident commander had not had time to obtain any additional information or to make any assignments except for his own company. This allowed the captain of Engine 11 to assist his firefighter in advancing the attack line toward the entry point.


The detailed timeline indicates that BC2 officially assumed command of the incident 65 seconds after the captain of Engine 11 transmitted his arrival report, but the radio log shows that BC2 began attempting to contact Engine 11 within 21 seconds after the arrival report was transmitted. The initial strategy had already been selected and announced as offensive and the new incident commander did not see the need to re-evaluate that decision.


Within the radio exchange, BC2 reported that he had a visual on “heavy fire on Division A side”. From his vantage point inside his vehicle, BC2 could see smoke and flames, but he could not see the large doorway where the initial attack team was preparing to make entry into the building. His view was obstructed by the front portion of the building and by the Ladder 11 apparatus, which was positioned between BC2 and the building. At that point, BC2 determined that he could not reposition his vehicle to obtain a direct view of the north half of the building where the first attack line would be entering without diverting his attention from immediate command tasks.

Command positioning & strategy determination
It is always preferable for the incident commander to have a direct view of the area where the most critical fireground action is occurring. If it is not possible to position (or reposition) the command vehicle to obtain this view, the incident commander could assign another officer to conduct a reconnaissance and assume a position to provide reports back to the incident commander. In some areas, Division A assumes the role of “operations,” which gives command the needed eyes and ears. Another option would be for the incident commander to temporarily leave the vehicle to conduct a more complete size-up and obtain a direct view of the attack point. Leaving the command vehicle may also render the incident commander less effective as attention is diverted from the task at hand – but allows for better understanding of the incident. Like in most fires, it depends on conditions, goals and resources at that moment – and the moments ahead.


In spite of the obstructions, BC2 could see the volume, color and movement of the smoke as well as flames above the entry door. These observations should have been sufficient to question the selection of offensive strategy. A better view of the fire conditions inside the doorway and within the northern portion of the building probably would have led to the conclusion that there was heavy fire within a large portion of the building and no realistic potential for rescue of anyone who might have been inside that area. A more direct view of the front of the building may have led the incident commander to allocate resources for a quick search of other portions of the building while the fire in the auto shop area of the building was controlled from the exterior.


Based on the principles of “risk nothing to save nothing,” as well as the “Rules of Engagement,” this should have been sufficient information to change the strategy to defensive for the northern section of the building.


At this point, the captain of Engine 11, now assigned as Fire Attack Group Leader, was in the best position to re-evaluate conditions within the building and reconsider the decision to conduct an offensive attack. The captain of Engine 11 was preoccupied with stretching a hoseline and preparing to attack the fire.


It is significant to note that none of the additional company officers or command officers who arrived prior to the roof collapse questioned the offensive strategy. The same conditions were observed by everyone arriving at the fire scene, yet no one felt compelled to suggest a change to defensive strategy.


Based on the written statements and interviews that were conducted with all of the members who were present at the scene of the fire before the roof collapse occurred, it is clear that a more appropriate mode of attack for the fire in the auto shop would have been a defensive (exterior) attack. After the fact, there is near total agreement among the firefighters that were on the scene that the fire on the north side of the building was too large and too advanced to justify an offensive attack from the moment the first companies arrived at the scene – yet no one made the call at the time of the incident.

Interior attack
The first 2½-inch attack line was positioned at the roll-up door at the A/B corner, ready to be advanced into the fire building by the captain and one firefighter from Engine 11. Their entry was delayed by sections of the roll-up door that were falling and obstructing the entrance and by the heavy fire that was rolling out the top of the opening. The hoseline had to be operated from an outside position for approximately two minutes before it could be advanced inside.


By the time the first line was advanced into the building, six additional companies had arrived and initiated actions. Ladder 11 had been assigned to provide vertical ventilation; Engine 7 had been assigned as RIC at the front of the building; Ladder 7 was assigned to assist with ventilation; Engine 5 was advancing a 2½-inch line into the south side of the building; Ladder 5 was searching the occupancy in the front section of the building; and Rescue 5 had been assigned to establish a second RIC at the rear of the building. All of these assignments were made by the incident commander within the context of an offensive fire attack and following general operating guidelines.


Next: Warning signs

Voice Your Opinion!

To join the conversation, and become an exclusive member of Firehouse, create an account today!