In the April issue, I reviewed a January 2014 fire in Greensboro, N.C., which resulted in an extreme close call when a roof collapsed during a large fire at an auto shop. We looked at the incident overview, the initial response, interior attack, what went wrong and more. This month, we review the incident’s warning signs and the rescue operations that ultimately prevented multiple line-of-duty deaths.
Warning signs
The first attack line was quickly followed by a 1¾-inch line operated by the captain and two firefighters from Ladder 7. Both crews reported heavy fire in the north section of the building with rolling flames at the roof level. The members from Ladder 7 told the investigators that they observed the glowing red roof trusses overhead—a sign that should have prompted an immediate retreat from the interior of the building.
Approximately one minute after the two attack crews entered, the lieutenant of Ladder 11 reported to the incident commander (BC2) that the roof was beginning to collapse over the middle part of the building. This radio transmission was not heard by the crews inside the building, and the IC did not order the interior crews to evacuate at that time.
Approximately 30 seconds after the warning from Ladder 11, the safety officer (BC1) reported heavy fire inside the building in Division B and recommended immediate removal of all personnel from the roof. This was confirmed by the IC; however, neither the safety officer nor the IC called for the interior crews to withdraw.
Roof collapse
The roof collapse occurred less than 60 seconds after the initial warning from Ladder 11 and less than 30 seconds after the order was given for Ladder 11 to come down from the roof. The interviews indicated that none of the key individuals (the IC/BC2, safety officer/BC1 and the lieutenant of Ladder 11) realized that the interior crews were operating directly under the section of the roof that had been the subject of the warning from Ladder 11.
Six members were under the section of the roof that collapsed. The captain from Engine 11, a firefighter from Engine 11 and the engineer of Ladder 7 were between the entrance point and the first truss that collapsed, while the captain and two firefighters from Ladder 7 were beyond the first truss. It is extremely fortunate that none of these members were directly under the truss when it collapsed.
The captain of Engine 11 was trapped on his back with two of the 2 x 10 wooden roof joists across his body. He was unable to move, and the weight of the roof may have compressed the hose between the first- and second-stage regulators of his SCBA, cutting off the air supply to his facepiece. After inhaling the air that was already in the second-stage regulator and the facepiece, his efforts to breathe created a vacuum that caused the facepiece to collapse against his face.
The firefighter from Engine 11 managed to extricate himself and crawl to the doorway where he transmitted the initial mayday. He was immediately able to report that his captain was trapped and indicate the location, approximately 15 feet from the doorway. The captain’s feet were visible from the doorway, protruding from under a section of the collapsed roof. Both of the assigned rapid intervention crews (RICs)—Rescue 5 and Engine 7—were immediately deployed to extricate the trapped captain.
The engineer from Ladder 7 was knocked over by the force of the collapse and was able to point out the location of the captain of Engine 11 to other firefighters and assist with the rescue.
At the same time, the captain and two firefighters from Ladder 7 were briefly trapped in a void space under the roof deck, just beyond the first fallen truss. All three of them managed to extricate themselves by crawling out of the extremely confined space and through the spaces between truss members.
An additional mayday was transmitted by Ladder 7, referring to the crew of Ladder 7 as well as the captain of Engine 11. The message that members of Ladder 7 were also trapped was not understood; no one else realized that they had also been trapped until after they had self-extricated.
The effort to extricate the captain of Engine 11 took approximately six minutes and was accomplished primarily by brute force. Ten to fifteen members of the Greensboro Fire Department managed to lift a section of the roof just enough to pull the captain out from under the debris and out of the building through a door on the B side. Airbags and jacks were being prepared when the captain as the captain was removed from the building.
At this time, the captain was in respiratory arrest due to asphyxiation by compression. He was resuscitated by EMS personnel en route to the hospital.
Key factors and discussion points
Following are several key factors that combined to produce a successful firefighter rescue for all members operating under the roof at the time of collapse.
- The GFD had trained extensively in both mayday and RIC procedures. All of the members were well prepared for the actions that were necessary to conduct a successful rescue operation. How prepared are all the riding members at your fire department for an incident like this?
- In the months prior to this incident, every GFD firefighter, including the fire chief, completed classroom and practical training on self-rescue from confined spaces. This training undoubtedly came into play at this incident. Are all of your riding members trained in self-rescue?
- In addition to assigning Engine 7 to satisfy the minimum requirement for a single RIC team, the IC designated Rescue 5 as a second RIC prior to the collapse due to the size of the building. Both RIC teams were ready for immediate deployment. How quickly would/could your department assemble a secondary well staffed and well trained RIC team?
- A hoseline had been positioned by Engine 7 and was immediately available to protect the trapped individual during the rescue. Stretching and moving hoseline takes staffing—before you need the line! Does your department have a heavy enough first-alarm assignment to complete this task?
- Everyone involved in the incident, from the IC to individual firefighters, demonstrated an appropriate combination of skills, initiative and discipline in responding to the critical situation. When was the last time your department—and those departments that may respond with you on structural fires—trained so that the reactions and behaviors have the best chance to result in the best possible outcome?
- Several additional chief officers and staff personnel had responded to the incident and were immediately available to support the rescue operation, including the training officers who had conducted the RIC and mayday training. How many chiefs are "due" or turn out to your first-alarm assignments? Do you have enough command/chief officer personnel to establish command, manage accountability, cover the Alpha and Charlie Divisions, lead RIT and/or civilian rescue operations, and provide an incident safety officer?
- Command officers—not company officers—are who you want in these roles. If you use company officers for command support roles, who is leading the company? Company officers belong with their company, supervising the assigned company task.
- Given the central location of the incident, GFD had an adequate number of fire apparatus and firefighters on the scene to conduct a successful rescue operation and maintain the fire suppression effort that was necessary to protect the rescuers and the trapped member. Now is a great time to think about your first-due area and consider what would be dispatched and responding. Identify now what you would need responding to perform multiple simultaneous tasks.
- In many mayday situations, all firefighting activity stops as firefighters focus on the rescue of the trapped firefighter. There were a sufficient number of firefighters on the scene at Elm Street to conduct the rescue and continue firefighting. What would your fire department’s first-alarm assignment be if this building was in our area? Fortunately, the availability of a sufficient number of properly staffed fire department units was a significant factor in this incident.
Lives saved
It is important to note that this was an extremely successful RIC operation with a positive outcome. The trapped captain’s life was saved because the mayday procedure and RIC response were executed quickly and skillfully by well-trained members. The contributions of the EMS personnel and all the medical professionals who cared for the critically injured captain after he had been rescued must also be recognized.
In addition, the members who self-extricated used techniques that they had learned and practiced at the Training Academy. Without this training there could have been three additional members trapped in a location that was not immediately evident.
This incident will be used by many other fire departments as a model execution of mayday and RIC procedures. It is likely that it will contribute to additional successful operations. The GFD’s planning and training absolutely mattered!
Next month we will take a look at the changes the GFD has or is in the process of implementing as well as timelines, equipment, communications and related observations.
PLEASE USE UPDATED BIO FOR APRIL 2015:
WILLIAM GOLDFEDER, EFO, a Firehouse® contributing editor, has been a firefighter since 1973 and a chief officer since 1982. He is deputy fire chief of the Loveland-Symmes Fire Department in Ohio, an ISO Class 2 and CAAS-accredited department. Goldfeder has served on numerous National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) committees. He is on the board of directors of the International Association of Fire Chiefs (representing the Safety, Health and Survival Section), National Fallen Firefighters Foundation, September 11th Families Association and National Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System. Goldfeder and Gordon Graham host the free, non-commercial website www.firefighterclosecalls.com.
Connect with Billy
Email: [email protected]
Website: firefighterclosecalls.com
