Fire as a Byproduct of Crime and Terrorism; Firefighter Training

On January 15, 2003, I was working the day shift at Engine 03 in South Philadelphia, PA. It was a cold, bright, clear day typical for that time of the year. Around mid-morning we were dispatched to a box alarm for a high-rise building fire. The address of fire was 604 West Washington Square, the Hopkinson House, a 33-story apartment building in the upscale Society Hill section of downtown Philadelphia.

The Philadelphia Police Department was already on scene dealing with a domestic disturbance. Louis Rogers, a 25-year-old career criminal was in the process of destroying the apartment he shared with his girlfriend, a former public defender. The relationship had reportedly been volatile for some time. Rodgers was throwing furniture and other items off the balcony of the 25th floor. As police SWAT members closed in on the apartment, Rodgers set it on fire. He then climbed out onto the balcony and jumped down to the 24th floor balcony. Once there he gained access to that apartment and set it on fire as well.

Responding from the station we could see the column of black smoke. We received orders to stand by upon arrival as the scene was still unsafe and chaotic. Debris and furniture were still raining down from the upper floors of the apartment buiding. As we listened to the radio chatter we suddenly heard some screams and a sickening thud. Instantly everyone ran to the front of the building. The police had cornered Rogers on the upper floor balcony. He climbed onto the outside of the railing and when the police officers attempted to grab him he fell. The thud we heard was the sound of his body impacting the carport in front of the building. He was killed instantly.

Once we were in the lobby we received orders from the Incident Commander to proceed to an upper floor and commence the fire attack. I distinctly remember passing the SWAT team in the smokey confusion of an upper-floor hallway. As their work was done, ours was beginning. The job eventually went to three alarms before being declared under control.

This incident illustrates what happens when police incidents devolve into fire operations. It’s routine for both the police and fire departments to operate on the same scene and usually things go well. However, when police operations don’t go as planned and result in fire, the illegal activity can put firefighters into extremely dangerous tactical positions. The fire may have a long headstart, reflex time may be increased significantly and rescue of civilians may be compromised. It’s not uncommon to have large losses of life in these scenarios. The following examination of some past incidents will assist the fire service in remembering some lessons learned the hard way.

The MOVE incident

On May 13^th, 1985 the Philadelphia Police Department was embroiled in a standoff with the MOVE organization. MOVE had spent previous years terrorizing their neighborhood. The neighbors had enough and demanded action from the City administration of then-Mayor Wilson Goode. The Philadelphia police had past confrontations with MOVE. In 1977, a siege of the groups Powelton Village compound left a Philadelphia police officer dead and multiple firefighters wounded after the firefighters were caught in the crossfire. Now they were confronting the same type of situation again.

After negotiations broke down, the police decided to use a helicopter to drop an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) on MOVE’s fortified row home. The goal was to dislodge an illegally constructed bunker on the roof. Simultaneous breeching operations by the police resulted in a tremendous shootout between MOVE members and police in which thousands of rounds were expended. The IED ignited a fire on the roof that firefighters were powerless to extinguish because of the violent shootout. The result was an urban conflagration the destroyed 63 homes and cost the city hundreds of millions of dollars. Eleven MOVE members were killed and the incident is still a scar on the conscience of Philadelphia to this day.

The Branch Davidian incident

On February 28, 1993, agents from the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) raided the compound of the Branch Davidians religious sect in Waco, TX. This incident would bear an eerie similarity to the MOVE incident in Philadelphia. Branch Davidians’ leader, David Koresh, was wanted on federal weapons charges. During the initial warrant service an intense shootout erupted between the Davidians and the federal agents. Four ATF agents were killed as well as six Davidians. This resulted in a 51-day stand off between the Davidians and the FBI, who had taken over command of the incident from the ATF.

As negotiations stalled, a decision was made to use military vehicles to inject tear gas into the buildings as well as to demolish portions of them. A fire soon broke out (the orgins are still debated to this day) and quickly engulfed the entire Davidian compound. It burned to the ground on live television. Eighty Davidians, including women and 25 children perished. There was no firefighting equipment in position to stop the flames and it’s unclear if there was any way to save anyone trapped in the compound. Similar to the MOVE incident, fighting the fire could have put firefighters at great risk due to the heavily armed members within the compound. The Branch Davidians had already demonstrated a willingness to engage federal authorities in a sustained firefight. There was no way to tell how they would react to firefighters approaching the compound.

The Beslan incident

On September 1, 2004, nearly three dozen Chechen terrorists stormed a grade school in the Russian city of Beslan in North Ossetia. They took approximately 1,000 hostages including hundreds of children. The terrorists wired the school gym with explosives and were heavily armed. After two days, the siege was beginning to spiral out of control as the hostages were not allowed food, water or lavatories. The Russian Government and the local authorities were under tremendous pressure from the families of the hostages to resolve the crisis and save their children.

At some point on the morning of September 3, explosions were heard in the school. It’s unknown for sure who caused the explosions. Russian Special Forces subsequently launched a frantic and uncoordinated attack on the terrorists using heavy weapons including rockets, armored personnel carriers and tanks. The ensuing running gun battle and siege lasted 10-plus hours. More explosions caused the roof of the gymnasium to catch fire and eventually collapse. The collapse and resulting fire raged along with the gunbattle. It was hours before the local firefighting forces even arrived on scene and once there, water problems and the ongoing firefight kept them from mounting anything resembling a competent fire suppression or life-saving operation. There was little command and control exerted on any of the agencies involved in the response.

Hundreds of hostages were killed by the terrorists, Russian Commandos, and the fire that raged unchecked for hours. At least a dozen Russian Special Forces troops were also killed. The local emergency services and medical facilities were immediately overwhelmed by the dead and injured. There were not enough ambulances to transport the hundreds of critically injured people and local hospitals lacked the beds to receive them. Most of the injured were transported by local private vehicles and transferred to better equipped hopitals further away. Needless to say the Beslan debacle is a textbook case of how badly a police incident can go for the emergency services.

Today’s threats

Recently, ISIS issued a call to its followers to burn down churches and other targets of opportunity in America. This threat has grave implications for the American fire service. Using the Internet, ISIS has been able to influence its follower’s worldwide to perpetrate terrorist actions on its behalf in multiple countries. The vast majority of these attacks have been carried out using more traditional methods such as shootings, bombings and hijackings, by semi-autonymous cells. These methods have long been terrorist staples. ISIS has gone beyond these usual methods and expanded into horrifying atrocities such as beheadings, throwing people from buildings, setting them on fire and using trucks as wepons of mass destruction. Their willingness to do the inhumane should not be underestimated. The terrorist group has instructed its followers to committ arson attacks in its online terror publication Rumiya using the following, chilling instructions:

“Molotov cocktails are infamous for wreaking destruction with minimal effort and can be useful in an extended arson campaign against the Crusader enemy. Moreover, preparing a Molotov cocktail is a simple procedure requiring very basic and easily attainable components.”
“Ideal target locations for arson include houses and apartment buildings, forest areas adjacent to residential areas, factories that produce cars, furniture, clothing, flammable substances, etc., gas stations, hospitals, bars, dance clubs, night clubs, banks, car showrooms, schools, universities, as well as churches.”
“When the objective is to inflict casualties, before executing the attack, one should generally observe his target and identify the locations of exits leading out of the building. This information will assist in execution and increase the likelihood of killing or severely injuring those inside…if one has access to its interior, he should initiate the fire on the staircase of the lower level, or just above the ground floor for high-rises, by dowsing the area with his container of fuel and lighting it at a safe distance…This can be followed by setting fire to the exits leading out of the building, as this will seal any opportunity of anybody escaping the blaze.”
“Ideally, one should strive to maximize the just terror he inflicts, by executing multiple, simultaneous attacks, while following the same guidelines.” (Rumiyah 2017)

At a recent active shooter exercise I witnessed, I was floored when the arriving firefighters parked their apparatus and, without further thought, began to assist with EMS. No one engaged in any observable firefighting activity. No lines were stretched, hydrants flushed, ladders pulled from the trucks, nothing that counted toward preparing for firefighting service. We must remember: The fire department is the only branch of the Incident Command System (ICS) that’s trained and equipped for fire suppression. When we show up on an incident scene that’s our primary responsibility, to do firefighter stuff. If we don’t, then who will? If the incident gets away from law enforcement as past incidents have, it may be too late for firefighters to save savable lives and or property.

Fire scene commanders must remember some basic principles when working with law enforcement:

Police are dealing with unpredictable people who don’t necessarily want to cooperate and will actively try to thwart their efforts.
Firefighters do Firefighter stuff, EMS does EMS stuff and Police do Police stuff.
If we don’t do our jobs, no one else will and time is our enemy.
Law enforcement stand-offs may drag on for hours, days and even weeks. You must be properly staged and in a posture that will allow you to go into service immediately when the time comes.
Think about using aerial devices and unmanned appliances early. Don’t delay deploying them early in the incident (if possible) while things are still fluid. Once the bad guys get established, you may not get another chance.
Keep people fresh and rotate them often. These events are stressful.
Envision a time when we have armored firefighting apparatus and ambulances as well.
Put all your pre planning into effect immediately—notify hospitals, mutual-aid companies/departments and have everything you need staged early.
Consider making the event a Hazardous Materials Incident. The time to call the Hazmat team is before you find out the terrorists cooked up a chemical IED and some of your people go down. Cover your bases and plan for the unknown.
Consider setting up a mass casualty triage station(s) early.

Whether it’s an ISIS arson attack, an active shooter incident or an extended standoff/siege, the fire service can quickly end up in a transition from support role to lead agency or vice versa. It’s imperative that firefighters and commanders clearly focus on, and prepare for, firefighting operations before engaging in other support roles. No other agency can do what we do. When it comes to incident command and coordination, the fire service is the primary agency to accomplish this goal, even in unified command.

Reference

Issue 5 of Rumiyah magazine, “Guide for arson attacks and proposing targets.” (2017, January 06). Retrieved January 21, 2017, from http://isis.liveuamap.com/en/2017/6-january-isis-releases-issue-5-of-rumiyah-magazine-featuring.