There is no one among us who hasn't given “the wave”—you know, that hand wave when an automatic fire alarm is transmitted. “Oh, it’s just another automatic alarm,” you think, assuring yourself that 99 percent of the time, it won't be anything. We have all been there, done that—and perhaps found ourselves to be wrong.
Here’s something else we have all experienced: “Units respond to an automatic fire alarm” and a few minutes later, “Engine 34 is on scene with nothing … uh, wait … Dispatch, we have smoke showing. Transmit a full box alarm for a working fire.”
As someone said many years ago, “It’s a fire [or emergency] until we get there and determine that it is not.” And that clearly defines our role—respond smartly, knowing that it may be something, regardless of the “odds are” factor.
In this month’s Close Call, members of the Spokane, WA, Fire Department (SFD) responded to an automatic fire alarm at a retirement community, and although it didn’t turn out to be a fire, this “nothing showing” situation resulted in a significant emergency for both occupants and firefighters alike.
Incident overview
Two companies from the SFD responded to an active fire alarm at a building on the campus of an assisted-living facility. There, they discovered that the building’s air conditioner, which is located in the basement with other mechanical systems, was venting an inert gas that activated one of many sensors in the building. The light haze triggered the automatic fire alarm that summoned the fire department. The gas was R-22 refrigerant, commonly known as Freon, which created an oxygen-deficient atmosphere in an enclosed space.
The firefighters who descended into the basement to check the alarm were wearing SCBA; however, their face masks were not attached because no smoke was visible. They did what so many fire departments would do when the atmosphere appeared clear during an automatic alarm.
Once inside the room, the firefighters experienced dizziness and became lightheaded. The symptoms did not go away when they went back into the hallway, so they were transported to a hospital. All the firefighters have since been released and are expected to recover fully.
Details from SFD Chief Brian Schaeffer
On Monday, July 25 2017, at about 7:30 p.m., an alarm system response was sent to an assisted-living facility. This occupancy is a two-story masonry structure with a full walk-up basement housing an assisted-living facility and offices. There are approximately 60 to 80 residents living there at any one time.
A call from the site reported an alarm sounding with what was described as a slight smoke smell. An alarm system response in Spokane consists of a ladder company and the closest engine company. Spokane Tower 2 with four personnel and Engine 2 with three personnel responded, arriving at 7:42 p.m. The Engine 2 officer established command, and Tower 2 went “all in” with four members to investigate.
Tower 2 met a facilities manager who accompanied them through the structure. The alarm panel was reporting an activated smoke detector in the basement. The crew went to the basement with the facilities manager. Upon checking most of the basement, nothing was found. However, when the mechanical room was opened, there was a light haze inside. Once inside the room, members reported hearing a hissing noise. A green cylinder seemed to be the source of the noise. When the Tower 2 officer asked the facilities manager what was in the tank, he was told that it was compressed air. There were no placards or other markings indicating any hazardous materials present.
Thinking that the haze was probably from a malfunctioning light ballast, the crew entered the mechanical room. Quickly all four started to feel lightheaded. When one of them mentioned this to the others, all four confirmed they too had symptoms, including some nausea. They quickly exited the room and the basement.
At 7:53 a.m., once Tower 2 had met in the hallway and transmitted their findings to the incident commander, he requested a full hazmat response, which included the SFD Hazardous Materials Team. Additionally, the building was ordered evacuated.
After assisting in the initial evacuation efforts, the Tower 2 crew was decontaminated and evaluated on scene by SFD paramedics. As some of the symptoms of headache and nausea had not yet fully gone away, the four members were transported by ambulance to a specialty hospital for evaluation.
The Hazardous Materials team set up exclusion zones and made multiple entries to evaluate the escaping product and monitor the atmosphere inside the building. After testing, the tank was found to have been leaking R22 Freon. Although a non-hazardous substance, it did leak enough to displace the air/oxygen in the enclosed room. The Freon dispersed with the aid of positive pressure fans.
The members’ symptoms continued to improve without treatment, and all four were later released without admittance to the hospital.
No residents or staff of the assisted-living facility had any significant exposure to the product. One person was transported for shortness of breath, but air monitoring showed that this person was not in any locations that had an oxygen-deficient atmosphere. The haze noted in the mechanical room is suspected to have been some residual oils in or near the Freon tank that became vaporized by the flowing Freon.
Incident analysis
There are several incident details worthy of analysis.
System influences
Alarm system activation incidents are guided by a section in the SFD’s standard operating guidelines (SOGs). All personnel performed per this policy, including the wearing of structural firefighting PPE, SCBA (although not with face pieces in place utilizing the stored air), and appropriate tools (including a water extinguisher and thermal imaging camera). The crew and initial incident commander operated within the guidelines of SFD policy and practices for alarm system incidents, and escalated the response quickly and appropriately.
Educational and training issues
All members were kept up to date to the firefighter 1, 2 and hazardous materials operations level. No training or educational issues were noted.
Circumstantial influences
There may have been some minor influences that could have fostered complacency. With most alarm system responses being malfunctioning systems, the lack of other indicators did not lead the crewmembers to take further precautions.
Human factors
All four crewmembers are to be commended for not trying to “tough it out,” but rather admitted to each other that they were having symptoms. All of them noted that the symptoms were similar to having sudden onset flu symptoms. The fact that one of them brought it up right away and all confirmed their symptoms allowed the hazardous situation to be immediately recognized, providing for a quick evacuation.
Contributing factors
Until the Hazardous Materials team and/or on-shift incident safety officer arrived, there was no atmospheric monitoring equipment on scene other than the carbon monoxide (CO) detectors on EMS bags. These were not utilized, as there was no medical issue initially. It is doubtful that any common four gas-style monitoring equipment would have notified the crew of the hazard any sooner than occurred.
Recommendations from Chiefs Goldfeder and Schaeffer
This run reiterates something that in the 70s an old firefighter friend by the name of Tito Cimerelli said to us: “Hey, ya never know!” and he also used to often say, “It’s ALWAYS something.’”
His simple words ring loudly today, as we truly never know what we will encounter upon arrival, and the fact is, because people DID call us or an alarm system activated, “something” caused the problem. It IS always something.
Post-incident considerations
- Use air-monitoring equipment on alarm systems (or anytime you enter a structure), especially with odors or a visible haze or smoke. This may not alert crews any sooner, but it can provide some early information as to the nature of the atmosphere.
- Provide lessons learned and/or after-action training to reinforce the positive behaviors exhibited by the Tower 2 crew and to build awareness about unknown-cause alarm systems masking a possible hazmat incident.
- Depending upon your department’s staffing and response, a smell or odor update may justify a heavier first-alarm assignment. This is especially true in suburban or other areas where an upgraded alarm assignment response may not be rapid. Note how quickly this went from an alarm system to an odor call to a hazmat with substantial evacuation.
- This incident reiterates the evacuation challenge. While SFD has numerous resources available through planning, how would this work at your department and region:
o What is your response to an automatic fire alarm at an assisted-living facility?
o How many firefighters are assured on the first-alarm assignment?
o What does your policy require by those companies (e.g., PPE, tools, equipment)?
o Is your agency able to handle this type of run with its own resources or will this be a mutual-aid incident? And how often is your department’s plan drilled with ALL potential response agencies?
o Where does your hazmat response come from? What is the staffing and resources and how quickly can they deploy?
o If it’s a beautiful sunny day, evacuation may be a little less challenging; however, what is the plan when its 20 degrees out, with high winds and heavy snow?
Final thoughts
Fortunately, this incident turned out positively because the firefighters identified a problem—they felt sick and did not “push through” or “keep going,” but rather reacted smart, exited the area, and called for more resources without delay. This went from a so-called “hand wave” automatic alarm to a job where some of the firefighters became victims themselves, all while the department still had to manage the leak and protect and remove all those inside the structure.
When I write this column (always with the cooperation of the agency involved), I do so with the thought that the readers may not be members of fire departments that match those in the story, but knowing that they may still have to respond to similar incidents, circumstances and structures. While Spokane is a fully career and staffed department, consider your own department—and be honest—when answering the questions above as well as these additional questions:
- What is the proven/assured staffing of your department?
- Does your first-alarm assignment match the reported incident and potential tactical factors and priorities?
- What is your assured response time?
- Who will be leading this response?
- What atmosphere-related equipment is carried on your first-due rigs? Does that equipment work? How often is it checked? (Correct answer: daily.)
- Where is your hazmat team coming from?
- What can your department do—and not do—prior to hazmat’s arrival?
- Can your radios easily communicate with all other fire/EMS response agencies, including hazmat?
- Where will the occupants be moved if needed?
- What are your applicable policies, and does your department operate as your policy dictates?
Brainstorm additional questions and challenge yourself and your department to be prepared for these types of responses. And remember, the so-called “hand wave” calls are always caused by something; you never know when it might be a deadly situation.
Our sincere appreciation and thanks to the members of the Spokane Fire Department, especially those directly involved with this incident, and a special thanks for the cooperation of Spokane Fire Chief and Firehouse Editorial Board Member Brian Schaeffer. They have given us the opportunity to learn from what they experienced so that we may be better prepared ourselves.
Sidebar: About the Spokane Fire Department
The Operations Division is the largest division within the SFD. It is responsible for paramedic-level EMS, fire suppression, mitigating the consequences from disasters, and rescue activities. In addition to emergency work, Operations Division members provide a wide range of services to the community, including blood pressure screening, tours of fire stations and apparatus, and on-duty fire and life safety presentations within the community.
The Operations Division is comprised of four platoons within two battalions of firefighters who work an alternating schedule of 24/72-hour shifts. Each battalion is supervised by a battalion chief who is responsible for the emergency and administrative activities of all members assigned to that battalion. The deputy chief supervises the nine battalion chiefs and oversees all activities within the Operations Division.
The SFD consists of 16 fire-rescue stations operated by 350 personnel, taking in 40,000 runs annually and protecting 220,000 people. Daily operational staffing includes two battalion chiefs, one safety/field training officer, 14 engines, two ladder companies, one tower company, two Quint companies, one air/light/rehab support, and two alternative response units.
