This month we are going to discuss the subject of doing what you are told. As a dad of five and grandfather of six, and having a history of not always doing as I am told, I have become well versed in this subject. I have developed skills in listening and understanding what I am expected to do, and I have skills in ordering—and expecting—things to be done. I define diversity in this particular subject.
Following orders
As a young firefighter, I thought the orders that our chiefs gave us were generally good. Of course, once in a while, there was an order that I (or we) didn’t think was good, but quite frankly, Chief Eddie Bennett (my boss in the early 70s—RIP) had no particular interest in what we had to say. He owned that fireground and it was going to be led HIS way.
To be clear, if it was a survival factor, such as urgent fire conditions, building conditions, etc., I have never worked for a chief who WASN’T interested in our opinion. But that's not what I am talking about. There is a clear difference in on-scene emergency observations and our normally unqualified opinions later on how “that fire” should have been commanded.
I have served as a subject-matter expert for the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) on its Firefighter Fatality Investigation Program for many years and can assure you that with any fire for which I assisted and reviewed, there was not a single case where the death of a firefighter was appreciated because that firefighter died for stuff. The public generally wants us to save stuff—but not get ourselves killed over it.
Rest assured, I am well aware that there are times where there are indications that we must conduct a search, and we should do so when we have the appropriate staffing and resources. Furthermore, I stand the same as far as conducting an interior attack for life and property when that is the best and quickest way to get water on the fire. However, there is a very clear difference between actions taken on a fireground (because we have to do as ordered and as expected) and a playground (because we wanna do what we wanna do). Life and property? Yes, it's life and property, with life (and potential life) being the heavily weighted factor.
In my position as a board member for the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation, I have found that family members of firefighters who have died in the line of duty agree. Long after the memorial services comes the reality that the surviving families must face the fact that many of their loved ones died heroically in the line of duty—but many others did not. Many died needlessly due to an undisciplined, poorly trained, poorly commanded and out-of-control fireground.
This is to take NOTHING away from well-known and well-documented heroism. We still must search, stretch lines, flow water, look for potential victims, etc., and that is based upon several critical aspects: size-up, fire conditions and available resources ... all of which are determined by the incident commander (IC). It's the IC’s fire, and what we do is based on what the IC wants done (and doesn't want done). I expect some of you reading this have started shaking uncontrollably and may require assistance. I can help.
As a firefighter, you are essentially a soldier. Soldiers do exactly as they are told because they are trained that way. As a company officer, you ensure the safety and survival of your firefighters. You are arguably the most important position on the fireground. The company officer is where the work gets done and where immediate risk assessments are determined based upon excellent communication and the incident action plan (IAP) as dictated (using that word very intentionally) by the IC. ICs own the entire scene and everything that happens, good or bad, on that scene.
My above statements are based on the fair assumption that all of the personnel operating on the fireground are trained and qualified to be in their roles and positions. If that's not the case where you go to fires, write me and we'll address that in another Close Calls column.
Command judgments or defiance
My comments are based on years of getting to know many ICs who have had firefighters killed under their command. I am not sure there is anything tougher to any chief officer. Some chiefs have had to walk away following such horrible losses, and there is nothing but understanding and respect for those bosses. After all, there but for the grace of God go we ....
But yet, there are those who feel differently—those who “know better” than the IC, those who feel a much more aggressive operation should have been conducted. They often get on social media or their own know-everything blog to trash their brother and sister firefighters and ramble about “what-if” situations. But they already know the ending to the story.
Who can forget the story of Chief Mike McNamee and his decision to not allow anyone else in the Worcester Cold Storage building that cold night of Dec. 3, 1999—and of course those who angrily disagreed with him? He stood his ground and unquestionably saved many more firefighters’ lives. He owned it. I think for many of us, and certainly for me, that decision by Mike that night was a significant turning point in drilling into our heads the importance (and fireground ownership) of go/no-go decision-making. Regardless of whether it’s a cold storage warehouse or a single-family dwelling, it's all about the size-up, conditions, risk management and resources—factors that are entirely dictated by the IC.
In my book “Pass It On: What We Know … What We Want You to Know," I introduced Chief John Salka's chapter with a story related to no-nonsense command. I shared how a company decided to freelance on HIS fireground, completely countering what he expected. Without me completely retelling the story, John essentially pulled that company out immediately and they were held outside until after the fire, and he then made it crystal clear to that company and the officer how that would never happen again on his fireground. He owned it. He was in command.
Take a look at how “command” is defined by Merriam-Webster: “to direct authoritatively; to exercise a dominating influence over; to have or exercise direct authority; to give orders; to be commander; to dominate.” It's pretty clear. Nowhere does it say:
- “Unless the firefighters don't like it”
- “Unless they may not like you”
- “Unless you want to hold a ‘vote’ on your fireground decisions”
- “Unless you are willing to unnecessarily put a firefighter in harm's way (key word is ‘unnecessarily’ because sometimes we absolutely must place firefighters in harm's way)”
A case study
In Spokane, WA, there was a fire in a well-known abandoned/derelict 25,000-square-foot building in November 2017. The following are comments from Spokane Fire Department Chief Brian Schaeffer:
The first-due company and the majority of the more senior members in the department, in this case, knew the building. Everyone has that one structure in their first due that is recognized as a "firefighter killer"—and this was it. The original structure was built as a nursing home in 1906 and had multiple restorations and changes, with the most significant being in 1973. It had been boarded-up for years and every firefighter on the job recognized it as a death trap for firefighters. It was full of combustible material, stacked floor to ceiling in different areas of the structure that created a maze, and was deemed structurally uninhabitable without significant repair and restoration.
The first-arriving companies personally preplanned it. They had been told by their officers of the dangers for 20 years. They trained on it in worst-case scenarios, recognizing the locations of the best water supply access, the adjacent fuel station and its storage tanks. They were ready.
When the first company arrived that morning on the first alarm, they gave an excellent size-up and declared a defensive strategy. Upon hearing the report, the first-due battalion chief upgraded it to a second alarm. When he arrived, he confirmed the defensive strategy and assigned the safety officer to complete a 360 of the building. He returned, radioed to the IC that the doors and exits were secured, boarded up with no evidence of entry. The IC established a clear defensive strategy and solidified his IAP. His main strategic goals were to: provide for firefighter and civilian safety; soften all exits to the building and search with TICs; confine the fire to the structure of origin utilizing defensive tactics; and protect the fuel station exposure.
About 30–45 minutes into the fire with heavy fire and four aerial pipes flowing, a division supervisor reported that a squatter had emerged from one of the exterior doors of the structure. The victim appeared uninjured but was suffering from smoke inhalation and transported to the hospital. A plan was quickly put together to search the area from where the victim appeared with members who were equipped with TICs, and a RIC team was immediately put in place to support the operation. The search was short-lived and limited due to the heavy fire conditions, and the companies were pulled out.
The Spokane Fire Department had companies on scene for over two days to support the investigation. However, the majority of the fire finished up that evening. The entire basement was pumped to finish searching for any victims, and there were none. The victim that we transported left the care of the fire department when he arrived and literally ran out of the emergency department against medical advice.
I completely stand by what happened in this incident and support our battalion chief who was the IC. I also am incredibly proud of that first company officer who recognized the risks, evaluated the situation and chose to take a pragmatic approach.
Chief Goldfeder’s observations
Could there have been people in there? Certainly, and there was one. But there was absolutely no indications of that being the case. The first-due company officers made the decision: This fire is defensive.
Yes, sir.
It should be noted that there were a few firefighters who were less than happy with the fact that the officers decided to not allow companies to go offensive/interior—and they chose to share their displeasure on social media. Welcome to 2018. The fact is that they may have the opportunity to make those decisions when and if they promote up, but until then, they are under our command and will go offensive or defensive based upon orders.
Like at any fire, there must be a constant size-up, which may mean flexibility on the IC’s part, as when it was found that there was someone in there. That someone was removed and once it made sense, a limited search was authorized by the IC after feedback from the incident safety officer and the division supervisor. The search was carefully executed and under extreme control.
This was another dilapidated fire trap. Was someone in there? Yes. But based upon the officer’s initial condition-based decisions, it was going to be a defensive fire. Again, this was based upon the KNOWNS: They KNEW this building and KNEW it was crap—a KNOWN potential firefighter killer.
Should we search vacant buildings? Absolutely, when the conditions indicate signs to the IC to make that decision. In this case, the company officer and IC made the good decisions to not risk putting their personnel in there. It is their decision. They own it.
Don't worry about Spokane. Consider how your department would handle this. Have you ever drilled in a 25,000-square-foot building? With the lights out? At night? On air? With charged lines? With obstacles? With noise? What’s your first-, second-, third-alarm staffing? How long will it realistically take for those companies to arrive? What's the building construction type(s)? Will your radios work deep inside? What are your plans? What is plan B if the radios don't work? What flows can you expect? What is the roof like? What is on the roof? What size hoselines will you use? How much water do your lines/nozzles deliver? You sure? How long will your air last? How about your partner's air? How do you complete a 360 survey of this building? Who does that? What's the available water supply? What are the flow path potentials? How will/will not this building or the fire area be vented? How many floors in height? Is there a basement? How many basements? What is the mayday plan? What are your access points? What does the preplan show? Who has the preplans? Can you access preplans if your laptop goes down? These are just a few of many, many, preplanning questions. Not planning or drilling is like never practicing and yet still expecting to win the Super Bowl. It's not gonna happen.
Key to all of this: well-trained and experienced company officers armed with the needed resources to make whatever decision THEY feel must be made at the time, based upon department policy and procedure. When the next-arriving officer arrives and decides to take command, they then own it and they then make the decisions. That is how it works.
In the words of Chief Brian Schaeffer of Spokane: “We have to be willing to plan for fires in these kinds of buildings and not be afraid to let our people critically think about actions and predicted consequences—good and bad. Unfortunately, these fires get sensationalized, but much more importantly, they have a long history of taking firefighters down with them.”
Schaeffer later wrote me: “This email could be completely different. I could be writing you asking for help coordinating a shift worth of funerals because we put people into an obvious firetrap because we didn't dare to say no to our people. Emotion, aggressiveness with a whole lot of invincibility should never win.”
While it is easy to say they should have gone in, let’s focus more on the fact that there were no other victims, including firefighters. Focus on the fact that fire officers who knew the building decided that they were not going to put their people in a crap building in those fire conditions. That was enough for them to balance against the unknowns and the “what ifs?”
We all want to go in. It is nothing new and our reasons are generally positive—we want to search for occupants and put the fire out. But in 2018, we have more knowledge, more training and better data than ever to help the IC decide what is the best way protect the public and their people by getting that fire knocked as quickly as possible. Heck, Spokane even had live drone footage with aerial thermal imaging and real-time analysis of the changing conditions.
Constant training at all levels in their area of responsibility (know YOUR job as an expert) derives proven and positive results. After that, we wait for the tones to go off, and everything we have done up until this point will determine the outcome of the incident.
The fireground is not a democracy, nor should it be. As a young firefighter, I didn't always agree with the bosses, but as I aged, I opened my mind a bit to understand that they don't want a civilian to get in trouble anymore than I did and that they didn't want one of us to get in trouble in spite of our cocky actions or attitudes, and that balancing that, and commanding a fire with success, is their very tough responsibility. I learned that I had to trust the bosses, but then also understood that the bosses had to trust me. Sometimes, as a young firefighter and new officer, an important factor that I had forgotten about is: Can they trust me?
