In the beginning, the fire was not unlike the majority of house fires that we fight over the ears. One of the occupants called 911 to report that her paralyzed husband was in a chair that was on fire. While the dwelling was relatively small in size, the main body of fire was located in a family room addition constructed between the original brick structure and the garage. Heavy fire in the rear was visible to the crew of the first arriving engine as they were en route, and a decision was made on arrival to attack the fire with a 2-1/2" line.
The report states that the IC, the officer of the first-arriving engine did not complete a 360-degree size up of the building before attack efforts were initiated.
The 2-1/2" line was stretched into the front door of the structure and was moved toward the involved area, a textbook placement, but in hindsight, may not have been the best choice. The line was operated by a 3-person crew that attempted to advance in conditions of high heat build-up and heavy black smoke.
The line was opened and closed in a technique commonly called "penciling" in an effort to cool the room. While this technique is considered somewhat controversial in water application circles, in this case, it was apparent from the layout of the house that what little water was discharged, never reached the main body of fire.
Almost immediately, the senior member of the crew had to exit the building because of a placement issue with his hood, leaving two relatively inexperienced members inside to operate the line.
About the same time, venting operations were initiated and in a short time, the interior flashed over, trapping the firefighters.
As I said above, with so many fire attack LODD investigation reports, when all the extenuating circumstances are stripped away, more often than not, it is usually apparent that the lack of water materially contributed to the fatality, and this case is no different.
While the volume of water that could have been flowed on the fire from the 2-1/2" line was more than sufficient to extinguish the fire, two items precluded its effective use.
The first was the decision to stretch the big line into the building rather than take it around to the "C" or rear side to hit the fire from a point that would have stopped its spread into the garage and into the house, and also reduced the intensity of the fire to a level where it would have been safer for people operating within the structure.
We have been taught for years that ideally, a line should be advanced from the unburned area into the burned area, and for most fires, this is a reasonable and prudent approach. In this case, however, the circumstances were that heavy fire that was easily accessible from the exterior was pushing in two directions, a relatively inexperienced crew was attempting to move a heavy cumbersome line into a structure that would have required a number of turns to reach the area of involvement, and the heavy fire was causing interior conditions to rapidly deteriorate, reducing visibility and building up heat.
While interior placement might have been a successful tactic if a smaller, more maneuverable line was used, in this case, the line stopped moving and operating before reaching the area of involvement. The fire found the line rather than vise-versa.
Second, was while an attempt to cool the "compartment" was initiated by opening and closing the nozzle bail, the technique proved ineffective because of the location and volume of fire. An officer who was on the scene told me that if the nozzle inside was fully opened and directed toward the rear interior of the building, chances were that the heat build-up would have been mitigated and the flashover would not have occurred.
There are those who might argue these points, but the facts in this case point directly to the argument many of us have been making for years-put the fire out and things immediately get better.