9 Forest Service Firefighters Reassigned

[lady_in_turnouts]

Nine Forest Service firefighters reassigned
05/19/2002

The Associated Press


YAKIMA, Wash. - The U.S. Forest Service has reassigned nine firefighters and commanders from active fire duty, 10 months after they violated safety guidelines during the fatal Thirtymile blaze last summer.

The reassignments were made last week after the Forest Service completed an administrative review of the fire, agency spokesman Rex Holloway told the Yakima Herald-Republic.

Still, the Forest Service has refused to talk about who was suspended and why.

"We're not at liberty to discuss it. That's an internal action and that's internal business," said Alan Quan, deputy forest supervisor with the Okanogan and Wenatchee National Forest Service in Wenatchee.

The administrative review, begun three months after the fire, was the third federal investigation into the deaths of Tom Craven, 30, of Ellensburg, and Yakima residents Devin Weaver, 21; Jessica Johnson, 19; and Karen FitzPatrick, 18.

The Forest Service concluded last year that fire bosses failed to follow basic safety rules and ignored numerous signs of danger.

The four died in their emergency fire shelters July 10 when they were trapped by an inferno with 10 other firefighters and two campers in the Chewuch River canyon in the Okanogan National Forest.

Fire bosses repeatedly underestimated the fire and allowed their only escape route from the dead-end canyon to be cut off, the agency found.

The families of the victims say it shouldn't have taken so long to begin disciplinary action.

"It's like punishing your children," said Jody Gray, Johnson's mother. "You don't wait 10 months to punish your children; the psychological impact is gone." Gray said the agency should have long ago fired those whose decisions led to the deaths.

The nine firefighters and commanders are still employed by the Forest Service, but no longer are involved in active firefighting.

They could face further punishment, including termination.

"Our human resources folks have to go through that," Holloway said.

Meanwhile, he said, the nine individuals can still take part in training exercises.

U.S. Sen. Maria Cantwell, D-Wash., and Rep. Doc Hastings, R-Wash., have suggested Forest Service tardiness in punishing anyone was evidence that the agency was trying to dodge responsibility.

"If this is a start to having accountability, then this is a good first step," Hastings said.

The same message was coming from Cantwell's camp.

"It's about time that the Forest Service recognize that mistakes were made and that there must be accountability," said Jed Lewison, Cantwell's spokesman.

Harv Forsgren, the Northwest regional forester based in the agency's Portland, Ore., office, had authority to take disciplinary action last summer. He is being reassigned to the Forest Service's southwest region.

Ellreese Daniels, the commander in charge of the fire crews at Thirty Mile, requested and was granted a desk job last summer.

[NJFFSA16]

Originally posted by lady_in_turnouts
Nine Forest Service firefighters reassigned
05/19/2002

The Associated Press


YAKIMA, Wash. - The U.S. Forest Service has reassigned nine firefighters and commanders from active fire duty, 10 months after they violated safety guidelines during the fatal Thirtymile blaze last summer.
The administrative review, begun three months after the fire, was the third federal investigation into the deaths of Tom Craven, 30, of Ellensburg, and Yakima residents Devin Weaver, 21; Jessica Johnson, 19; and Karen FitzPatrick, 18.

The Forest Service concluded last year that fire bosses failed to follow basic safety rules and ignored numerous signs of danger


Considering what legal action is currently under way in New York,(Lairdsville Incident) these nine individuals should consider themselves quite lucky. And to be reassigned in anonymity...how quaint.

Does this open up avenues for wrongful death lawsuits?

Still, the Forest Service has refused to talk about who was suspended and why.

That's just plain BS...if they have been held accountable for the tragedy...WE ought to know their names!:mad: :mad:

THANKS for the post!

[lady_in_turnouts]

NJFFS, I too agree that the names should be made available.

They didnt follow safety guidelines and it resulted in the deaths of 4, but they feel its an internal problem, and should stay behind closed doors? I dont think that is right...it should be out in the open and released for all to see. My goodness, it could save lives in the future, knowing what went wrong,what wasnt followed, etc..

I'm certainly no lawyer, but I think the families of the deceased have some very good grounds for a lawsuit...unless of course that has been taken care of behind closed doors also??


Lady.

[smketer]

lady_in_turnouts and NJFFS,

True we should let others know the names, but really what would that help?
They will not be working fire until they have been threw some training *hopefully*

But here is another way to think about it.
When they were going in the class of S-130/S-190 one of the things they teach you is the watch out, so why did they each not say well we are breaking all of the rules.

Yes they should have not been in that area, and I do rest lots of the burden on the IC of the fire, he new that they were a type II crew and did not have much experince but he still let them go on the fire line and he new the fire was getting hot and winds were gusting.

I hope that others learn to really know the 18 and 10 and everyone should stress that everyone knows them.

And the other thing is I do blame some on the forest service, the fire shelters should of have been better, I have heard the company Storm King Mountain has had one ready for about 8 years now but yet the forest service is still dragging their feet.

Stay Safe and see you down in AZ or NM

[medford]

It does matter some on what the names are but if you read the accident investigation report you will get a darn good clue on who some of the folks.

I'm sure they will post names or whatever when they get it done.
I think that you shouldn't focus on who they are but what happend, and what not to do.

[elkhound]

As usual I agree with smketer, yes overhead is accountible but you will notice more and more that wildland firefighters killed or injured are performing out of there comfort range. Case in point, I believe it was in Eloy where several members of a type two crew were injured performing a burnout that a shot crew refused to do for safety reasons. Yes it was overheads fault for sending them but it was also on the crew for not knowing their limitations. Wildfire is a very dangerous thing. If you are not sure of what you are doing you should be no where near the fire. Down here type 2 crews mop up and that is it. Direct line construction is reserved for IHC's. A safety zone should be an area where you can survive a burnover without a shelter. Everyone should have one it is a major flaw of instruction in that many people are taught that a safety zone is a deployment area. Expect the worst and hope for the best. See you on the big, jsut back from Prescott.....

[Celt]

I think this is a bunch of poo. I have been in this profession for a long time and know well enough how inadequate the training is. You sit in a room for 8 hours and listen to a bunch thou shalts that have no relative direction on how to accomplish any of the tasks. For instance; We teach you must have a lookout, end of story. Consider what it takes to be a lookout. Where will you be? What has to be seen? How do you know it is starting? How do you communicate it? To whom? When? What happens if your radio does not function? What else must you check to verify it really is happening? How long are you going to be in place? What is the effects of vigilance? What is vigillance? What's important to monitor? When? Why? Are you safe? What will you do to be safe, knowing you are alone? I think the officers doing the suspensions and reassignments are more guilty than the victim survivors. These firefighters are products of an inconclusive system we built and support, the only thing they are guilty of is learning what we taught them, which is woefully inadequate. Look for the root problems, not the symptoms.

[smketer]

Celt,
how long have you been in wildland fire?

About lookouts, well they are someone who has had good years of fire under the belt and someone who knows what to do where to go. And most of the time is in a spot where he can see the whole crew, so as your down punching line or doing a back burn he is listing to ground to air, air to air, and watching the fire, and knowing where the safe zones are at. He is also looking to make sure everyone is safe looking for snags, rolling rocks, spot fires. If a radio stops working, start yelling or throwing rocks, or get out a mirror and flash someone, that has a radio, they will figure out that yours is not working and send someone up or walk down.

Now about your question about being alone and safe, well look around keep your head up, walk the area so you know what is around you and pick a few safe zones to go if a spot fire comes up behind you. If none are around then take the tool that you have *shovel* combie* or whatever *overhead tool you use* and go clean a good 10 x 10 area or more. Also take the weather while your up in your area, you should someone down where the crew is take it anyways every 30 mins to an hour, or if your burning out every 20 mins.
Dont take your pack off, incase you have to run you dont have to worry about getting it back on.

Elk, please dont say see you at the big one I just got back from a hot nasty steep area in AZ.
If anyone is going to R3 AZ or NM, bring extra camelbak's you will need the extra water.

Stay Safe,

[Celt]

The majority if not all NWCG sanctioned courses do not allow for beta testing decision making in a fire environment. What you responded with smketer is exactly what I am referring to. You can recite some of the verbage because it can be applied generically to most situations. What I am referring to is how to make decisions on the fire ground without having to pretend we know what we are doing. An example, how do you actually determine what the fire behavior trigger points for a tactical withdrawal are? This is perhaps the most commonly used safe guard used to prevent people from over extending into a bad situations. It is not mentioned or talked about in any NWCG course. How do you calculate it, who monitors it, from where, what are they looking for? How do you incorporate that into the human factors side of behaviors like bias for action, tunnel vision, the effects of vigilance over time on lookouts, and perhaps 20-30 other similar situations. We already know that standards for safety zones have been grossly underestimated for years, due mostly to a lack of understanding of what it takes to be safe, or worse yet, the notion we know without basing that notion on any data. Remember it has only been in the last 5 years that real data has been collected and analyzed to indicate what safety zone size should be based on radiant heat.

smketer, you say if there are no safe areas then clean out a 10 x 10 area; and do what? You are advocating being caught, and you are fully willing to commit someone to having to use their fire shelter. Bad dog, bad. If you think this is an attribute of good lookout behaviors, the defense rests.

[smketer]

Celt,
There are lots of things you can do with a clean area, one its not a place to use a shelter, you could if you had too, its more or less a safe zone, IE, (if the main fire is coming up you can do a few things burn a bigger area out or if you had to make it a safe zone for a crew) or even use it as the start of a LZ in case someone gets hurt.

About all of those other things you were talking about you learn those with time and experice of being on a fire, that is why you start on a type II hand crew or an engine crew then work your way up. Next comes shot crew and then jumping (if you want) after that you should have some good time on fire to know what to and not to do.

(like dont get your tent next to the generators or next to the kitchen in fire camp)

Stay Safe,

[Celt]

I will try to explain my point of view w/o seeming too obnoxious. I am a 30 year veteren of wildland fires and prescribed fire. My point, as is supported through the Tri-Data study is that, the points I am making are fundamental to making effective decisions on the fireline. If they are fundamental, then why are they not being taught, and why are they not part of our expected performance? It's because we spend more time and money on what we do know, which are the band aid approaches to fighting fire. It's easier to be a beaurucrat and hand out reprimands, and fire shelters, etc. than it is to spend the energy and money to assure our first line firefighters get the correct information, and they are tested on it, and they are drilled on it, and they know how to avoid compromised locations. My point about your 10 x 10 area was, that it was used unqualified as a mitigation for the general risk perception of a single person located with a whole bunch of unburned fuel between them and the fire. My premise is, if the location is that untenable, and there is nothing their existing that will be effective as a safe area, then the lookout should not be there. If the lookout is that critical to the operation, then we have to find a suitable replacement option (perhaps and aerial observer). If we cannot do that, perhaps we need to decide the fire behavior trigger points so our crews are out of the way during the peak burning periods. If we can't do that, perhaps we shoukdn't be in that location at all, and rethink our tactics. It's a decision process based on known data, if you don't know about it, you are set up for failure. We gain a lot through experience, but please donot think a Type 1 crew is any more intelligent than the rest of us. They die just as easily, and in as many uncompromised situations as Type 2 folks as a result of their poor decisions. Also consider, if we have to wait 10-20 years to figure out the basics through experience, what does that say about lessons learned? Would you want our military to go into battle, the bulk of which are teens and early 20's, without the best information and tactical training possible? If you answer no, then why should we expect any less in the fire suppression profession? I like exchanging ideas, thanks for taking the time to do it.

[NJFFSA16]

Excellent points..and well received here, I might add. S130 and S190 are good BASIC courses to familiarize one's self with wildland fire operations...but I agree wholeheartedly, we need more. Fundamentals teach you just enough to make you dangerous. Sending crews out in the field with just that basic knowledge..is a prescription for disaster. After 32 1/2 years in this field...I find it rather frustrating to have to beg my division officers for more training within our own infrastructure. At a "training session" held last year...we spent a good 45 minutes watching slides about a town in New Jersey that had received 18 inches of rain....and the resulting flooding, damage....etc. What in God's name does that teach me about wildland firefighting?

I expect, and look forward to sessions that deal with LCES, ICS, Engine Ops, Urban Interface, advanced fire behavior and more. I'm not in the flood damage business. :rolleyes: And, when I post a lookout...I expect them to know WHAT to look for.

What I am referring to is how to make decisions on the fire ground without having to pretend we know what we are doing.

Amen!