My background is wildland fire; right now it's been 32 years since my first. I have heard a lot of discussion about the 10 standard orders, and the 18 situations that shout watch out, as well as the development of lces (lookouts, communications, escape routes, and safety zones), also the downhill line construction standards, and the common denominators of near miss and tragedy fires. Mostly, they say, "these are the basics, the fundamentals of fighting wildland fires safely". My point, and this applies to structural firefighting as well (i belong to a volunteer dept.), if we say something is a standard, it obviously will show the measure of our actions. If it does not, it is not a standard, it is something else, like good advice, or part of a vision statement. I believe in the 10/18, etc., but I reflect on them as good advice, not the fundamentals of good tactical and people management. The reason is, I have data to show we are ignorant relative to some of the purest concepts of being safe. In a room of 40 people, with experience totaling close to 800 years, the room is a mass of disagreement over what it will take to be safe in the described environment. The reason for this, I think is these paradigms do not tell us, how to develop decision points, or even that we need them. How to implement them, and how in a fire environment we can assure ourselves that what we have develop will keep us safe. I would ask, are we just as safe by being in an effective safety zone 1 hour prior to a high intensity burn-over, compared to running into an effective safety zone 3 minutes prior to the same burn-over?
I sense we are comparing our actions, which are explicit, to concepts that require much detail to implement. We are not providing the means to develop a standard approach to this, or a means to collaborate, verify, and document success. We react to tragedy, and continue to compare apples to oranges. The firefighter will always be shown as the bad decision maker.
My perception is, human factors control the majority of our ability to make good decisions. That we have to recognize when collaborative, analytical decisions are the best, and when "recognition primed" decision making is most appropriate, and who should be making them. This would require profiling firefighters and nontraditional training. We are a long ways from that right now.
I am a training specialist in a wildland cirriculum, and I'm very interested in your thoughts. After all, we work shoulder to shoulder when structures are involved, and haz mat adds a new dimension to wildfire. You folks do good work here, don't give up on this subject of human factors and safety, and conceptual direction. I'm listening.
[This message has been edited by monte (edited November 15, 1999).]
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