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  1. #21
    MembersZone Subscriber ChiefReason's Avatar
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    Anyone who wants to read about the grandmother of them all, go to the IACOJ website and read the three part series Just Enough Time To Die.
    The articles study the Lairdsville incident from beginning to end. It includes the NIOSH report and a discussion of it, the trial.
    If you want to see a classic example of NOT following NFPA 1403, it is a must read.
    I would post it over here, but it is 27 pages long.
    Clicking the link in my signature will get you there fast.
    CR
    Visit www.iacoj.com
    Remember Bradley Golden (9/25/01)
    RIP HOF Robert J. Compton(ENG6511)


  2. #22
    Forum Member Weruj1's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by TrojanHorse
    It isn't expensive for the fire house or the fire departmetn to buy them. And they should get the complete set and make them available to all of the members. But asking me to buy them out of my pocket is another issue. I don't have that kind of money laying around to buy the NFPA regs. And yes, compared to some of the other standards they are relatively inexpensive.
    ./uhmmmmm DUH !!!! I think we already said that...........
    IACOJ both divisions and PROUD OF IT !
    Pardon me sir.. .....but I believe we are all over here !
    ATTENTION ALL SHOPPERS: Will the dead horse please report to the forums.(thanks Motown)
    RAY WAS HERE 08/28/05
    LETHA' FOREVA' ! 010607
    I'm sorry, I haven't been paying much attention for the last 3 hours.....what were we discussing?
    "but I guarentee you I will FF your arse off" from>
    http://www.firehouse.com/forums/show...60#post1137060post 115

  3. #23
    MembersZone Subscriber ChiefReason's Avatar
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    Default Paul; not trying to hijack your thread...

    Quote Originally Posted by stillPSFB
    Down Under we don't have a standard like 1403 (but IMO we should be using 1403). I've seen quite a few things done that contravene 1403 in live fire training, including -
    - Use of live "victims" (obviously never heard of Laidesville)
    - lack of prior training before live burn training - One FF was on their first night of firefighting training ever "here stick this on yer back, and we'll help you get the mask on right - you'll be fine - don't worry"
    - lack of seperate sources of water supply for primary and backup lines (backup lines not even stretched sometimes)
    - no ambulance or EMS on scene apart from the first aid and O2 kits on the rigs, and no medical training higher than first aid
    - no walk-through of the structure by participants before training commences
    - flammable liquids being used inside structures
    - no safety officer appointed
    - no RIT in place
    - modern lounge room furniture being used for fires
    - no communications in place
    - no information on evacuation signals given during briefings
    - fires being lit simultaneously in multiple rooms on different floors
    and we won't even talk about the famous "Flamin' Highway from Hell" excercise!
    Here is an excerpt from Part I of Just Enough Time To Die. Compare it to stillPSFB's post as quoted.
    NIOSH Report

    As a practice, NIOSH does not include names in the published summary of their findings. I am listing the names and their roles in this incident at the beginning for clarity.

    Victim – Bradley Golden

    Firefighter #1 – Benjamin Morris

    Firefighter #2/Safety & Ignition Officer – Adam Croman

    Chief – Westmoreland Chief James Kimball

    1st Assistant Chief/Instructor – Alan Baird III

    2nd Assistant Chief/Safety Officer – Gary Spaven

    Trapped firefighters – Victim Bradley Golden and Firefighter #1 Benjamin Morris

    The final Death in the Line of Duty report was published on October 31, 2002. In its summary, NIOSH stated that:

    On September 25, 2001, a 19 year-old male volunteer firefighter (the victim) died and two male volunteer firefighters (Firefighter #1 and Firefighter #2) were injured during a multi-agency, live-burn training session. The victim and Firefighter #1 were playing the role of firefighters who had become trapped on the second-level of the structure. The training became reality when the fire was started and progressed up the stairwell, accelerated by a foam mattress that was ignited on the first floor. Firefighter #1 and the victim were recovered from the second-level front bedroom where they had been placed for the training. Firefighter #2 jumped from a second-level window in the rear bedroom. The victim was unresponsive when removed from the structure. Advanced life-saving procedures were initiated on the victim en route to the local hospital where he was pronounced dead. Firefighter #1 and Firefighter #2 suffered severe burns and were airlifted to an area burn unit.

    Introduction. On September 25, 2001, a firefighter (the victim) died and two firefighters (Firefighter #1 and Firefighter #2) were injured while participating in a multi-agency, live-burn training session. The victim and Firefighter #1 were playing the role of firefighters who had become trapped in a structure on the second level.

    On September 27, 2001, the United States Fire Administration notified the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) of this incident. On December 4-5, 2001, two safety and occupational health specialists and the section chief from the NIOSH Firefighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program investigated this incident. Interviews were conducted with the Chief, the Assistant Chiefs, and firefighters of the departments from the district involved in the training session. The department that was operating the training was disbanded. Copies of their standard operating procedures were not available for review. The training records of the victim and injured firefighters were reviewed.

    The fire district involved in this multi-agency training session operated from four volunteer stations and was comprised of 102 active members. The district serves a population of approximately 25,000 in a geographic area of about 25 square miles. The victim had been a volunteer firefighter for just a few weeks and had not received any formalized training before the incident. Firefighter #1 was reported to have received Basic Firefighting Essentials, Maze Training, and Live Tower Training, but no documentation was provided during the investigation. Firefighter #2 was documented to have completed Firefighting Essentials, Pump Operator, Commanding the Initial Response, Apparatus Operator, and Hazardous Materials First Responder Operations. The site was a two-story, side-by-side duplex. Vacant and in disrepair, the duplex was scheduled for demolition in the near future by the owner.

    Investigation. At approximately 1845 hours, Firefighter #1, Firefighter #2, the victim, the 1st Assistant Chief, and the 2nd Assistant Chief were on the scene discussing the plan for a rescue drill during live-burn training. The 1st Assistant Chief was the instructor. The 2nd Assistant Chief was a Safety Officer for the west unit of the duplex. Firefighter #2 was a Safety Officer for the east unit and the Ignition Officer. The following apparatus were on the scene before the start of the training: Engine #451 equipped with a 1,000-gallon water tank, Engine #3 equipped with a 1,000-gallon water tank, Heavy Rescue #449, Rescue #1, Truck #459 and a 10,000-gallon water tanker (building owner’s).

    The training scenario was designed to include two firefighters who had become trapped while conducting a search for an infant in a bedroom located on the second floor of a duplex apartment. Note: The firefighters that were used to simulate victims during this training session will be referred to as the “trapped firefighters” throughout this report. Engine #451 was to hook up to the owner’s water tanker on site and have two 1-3/4 hand lines stretched to the structure, one hand line to the rear entrance and one hand line to the front entrance of the east unit. Engine #3 and Heavy Rescue #449 were then dispatched to stage approximately ¾ of a mile away to practice their response to the scene. The scenario included blocking the door to the stairs of the unit (east unit) leading to the “trapped firefighters” to simulate that the stairs had collapsed. The responding units would have to deploy a rapid intervention team (RIT), which would then be forced to access the second floor via the stairs on the other side of the duplex. Once on the second floor, the RIT would breach the wall leading to the other apartment to conduct a search for the “trapped firefighters” and the infant. Note: The wall on the second floor separating the two units had been breached during earlier training sessions. The “trapped firefighters” (Firefighter #1 and the victim) were placed in the front bedroom with some debris scattered about the floor and a Ping-Pong table placed upon them to simulate a real entrapment. Note: This was reportedly the first time the victim had worn a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) in a fire condition. Firefighter #1 had approximately 1 year with the department and minimal experience with an SCBA in fire conditions. A burn barrel was to be used to produce smoke and simulate fire from the back bedroom of the east duplex.

    The 2nd Assistant Chief was positioned with a 20-pound fire extinguisher on the second floor of the west unit to guide the RIT up the stairs and through the breach in the wall. He was to ensure the RIT did not go through an opening in the back wall of the west unit. Firefighter #2 was on the second floor of the east unit where he was to place the “trapped firefighters” in the front bedroom, light the burn barrel in the back bedroom, and guide the RIT if necessary (Refer to official report for Diagram #1). The Chief arrived on the scene and did a walkthrough of the upstairs to ensure safety and to make sure no accelerants were used in the burn barrel. He then proceeded to the front of the duplex and took over outside command as requested by the 1st Assistant Chief, who had interior command from the first floor of the burn unit (Refer to official report for Diagram #2).

    Firefighter #2 struck a flare and lit the burn barrel on the second floor and radioed to the Chief at approximately 1855 hours that it was lit. He then positioned himself in the hallway to guide the RIT if necessary. The barrel was not producing smoke, so Firefighter #2 went to the back bedroom to assist in the process. During this time, the 1st Assistant Chief struck another flare on the first floor and lit the foam mattress of a sleeper sofa that was extended adjacent to the open side of the stairs.

    Firefighter #2 heard the second flare being struck and went to investigate. In a matter of seconds, the flames began to roll across the ceiling, up the stairs, and out the front windows of the burn unit, producing what was described as a thick, “steamy” smoke. The 2nd Assistant Chief was cut off from the east unit by the fire extending up the stairwell. He exited via a ladder through an opening in the back wall of the west unit. The 1st Assistant Chief went out the back of the structure to locate a hand line. Unable to locate a hand line in the back of the structure, he searched for a hand line at the front of the structure. Note: No hand lines had been stretched from Engine #451 before the start of the training evolution. Flames were now extending out of the first-floor bay window into the front bedroom. He then pulled 200 feet of 1-3/4 inch preconnect off Engine #451 and advanced the line to the rear of the structure.

    Firefighter #2 went to retrieve the “trapped firefighters” from the front bedroom where flames were already coming through the windows from downstairs. Firefighter #2 grabbed the two “trapped firefighters” and led them to the stairwell, which was fully engulfed. Firefighter #2 lost his fire gloves in the process, exposing the leather gloves he had worn underneath. The leather gloves immediately burned and adhered to his skin. He and the “trapped firefighters” became separated. Firefighter #2 made it to the back bedroom where the burn barrel was located. Conditions in the back bedroom were extremely smoky with little heat. Firefighter #2 frantically searched for the window that had been boarded shut to aid in the smoke conditions. He was able to pry the window open with his hands, and he jumped from the second floor just as the 1st Assistant Chief arrived with the hand line.

    The two staged engines proceeded to the scene under normal driving conditions as planned for the training operations.

    Once on the scene, they were immediately informed that this was no longer a drill, that two firefighters were down on the second floor, and that one firefighter had jumped from the second-story window. Due to the circumstances, both engines deployed a RIT team. The first RIT made forcible entry through the front door of the east unit and proceeded up the stairs to the front bedroom. They immediately found Firefighter #1 and dragged him down the stairs by his turnout gear to the lawn in front of the duplex. The second RIT proceeded to the front bedroom and found the victim. They dragged the victim to the front of the duplex for immediate assistance. Note: Both the victim and Firefighter #1 were found wearing their face pieces. Burn injuries to the faces of both firefighters indicated that their masks had been removed during the fire’s progression. The victim was unresponsive when removed from the structure. Advanced life-saving procedures were initiated on the victim en route to the local hospital where he was pronounced dead. Firefighter #1 and Firefighter #2 suffered severe burns and were airlifted to an area burn unit.

    Cause of Death. The cause of death was listed as asphyxia due to smoke inhalation.

    Recommendations and Discussion. The following recommendations and discussions of them are:

    (1) Fire departments should ensure that no one plays the role of victim inside the structure during live-burn training. The National Fire Protection Association Standard 1403, 2-4.13, notes that individuals shall not play the role of a victim inside the building. Rescue operations should be conducted by using mannequins instead of firefighters, just as the mock baby was used to simulate the infant.

    (2) Fire departments should ensure that a certified instructor is in charge of the live-burn training and that a separate safety officer is appointed and has the authority to intervene and control any aspect of the operation. Fire departments should comply with the National Fire Protection Association Standard 1403, which notes that all instructors shall be deemed qualified to deliver fire-fighter training by the authority having jurisdiction. The instructor-in-charge should be a certified instructor who oversees all aspects of the training session.

    Their responsibilities include planning and coordinating all training activities, monitoring activities, structure inspections, briefing and assigning instructors and support personnel, and ensuring adherence to the directives. The authority having jurisdiction in this area does not have any requirements or procedures in place for determining if an instructor is qualified to provide firefighter training as outlined in NFPA 1041, Standard for Fire Service Instructor Professional Qualifications. NFPA Standard 1403 further states that safety officers shall be appointed for all training sessions and have no other duties to interfere with their safety responsibilities for all persons on the scene. The safety officer should eliminate unsafe conditions, prevent unsafe acts, coordinate lighting of fires with instructor-in-charge, ensure personal protective equipment compliance, ensure all participants are accounted for before and after each evolution. The safety officers during this incident also had the responsibility of the ignition officer in the presence of and under the direct supervision of the safety officer.

    (3) Fire departments should ensure that only one training fire is ignited at a time by a designated ignition officer and that a charged hose line is present while igniting the fire. One person, who is not participating in the training, should be assigned the duty of ignition officer and light the fire as instructed by the instructor-in-charge. The safety officer should be in the presence of, and have direct supervision over, the ignition officer when the fire is lit. A charged hose line should be present when igniting the fire.

    (4) Fire departments should ensure that Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are developed and followed. Standard operating procedures (SOPs) should be developed addressing emergency-scene operations such as Training Fires, RIT Operations, SCBA, Water Supply, and Hose line Operations. These SOPs will then form the foundation as to how the training will be conducted. The SOP should be in written form and included in the overall risk-management plan for the fire department. If these procedures are changed, appropriate training should be provided to all affected members.

    (5) Fire departments should ensure that all firefighters participating in live-burn training have achieved a minimum level of basic training. To ensure safety during live-burn training, all firefighters should have a minimum level of basic training. As stated in NFPA 1403, 2-1.2, the firefighter student shall have received training to meet the performance objectives for Firefighter 1 of the following sections of NFPA 1001, Standard for Firefighter Professional Qualifications:

    Section 3-3 Safety

    Section 3-5 Fire Behavior

    Section 3-6 Portable Extinguishers

    Section 3-7 Personal Protective Equipment

    Section 3-11 Ladders

    Section 3-12 Fire Hose, Appliances and Streams

    Section 3-16 Overhaul

    Section 3-19 Water Supply

    (6) Fire departments should ensure that before conducting live-burn training, a pre-burn briefing session is conducted and an evacuation plan and signal are established for all participants. All participants should attend a pre-burn briefing before conducting the live-burn training session to discuss all facets of the training. The instructor in charge of the training should present the briefing session using the pre-burn plan to detail all aspects of the operation. The characteristics of the training area and structure should be addressed to include such items as crew assignments and the designation and layout of ingress/egress routes in the event of emergency. An evacuation plan should be established and an audible evacuation signal be demonstrated to all participants in an interior live-burn training evolution. It is imperative that all participants are familiar with the layout of the structure. All participants should conduct a walk-through of the structure before any training evolutions are initiated.

    (7) Fire departments should ensure that fires used for live-burn training are not located in any designated exit paths. During a training exercise, every effort must be made to ensure the exit paths are free from obstructions. To provide a protected area of travel, fires should not be located in any exit paths. These areas should be closely monitored to ensure that fire does not spread during the training exercise. The sofa bed was located at the bottom of the stairs leading to the front exit. The front exit was blocked to simulate that the stairs had collapsed for the responding RIT. Once the sofa bed was lit, the fire immediately traveled into the exit path using the stairway as a chimney. To enhance the smoke conditions for the evolution, the windows on both floors were boarded over or partially covered to minimize ventilation. When the fire entered the exit path, the training exercise became a working structure fire.

    (8) Fire departments should ensure that the fuels used in the live-burn training have known burning characteristics and the structure is inspected for possible environmental hazards. Fuels for training fires should have known burning characteristics, and the quantities used should be the minimum necessary that are controllable and able to create the desired fire conditions. The structure should be inspected to identify and remove materials that could contribute to rapidly spreading fires and create an environmental or health hazard. The structure must also be inspected to provide for physical safety of the participants in the training. NFPA 1403, 2-2.10, identifies the following items that should be addressed:

    · Floors, railings, and stairs shall be made safe.

    · Special attention shall be given to potential chimney hazards.

    · All walls and ceilings shall be intact or patched.

    · Debris creating or contributing to unsafe conditions shall be removed.

    · Low-density combustible fiberboard and unconventional interior finishes shall be removed.

    · Extraordinary weight above the training area shall be removed, or the area below it shall be rendered inaccessible.

    · An adequate ventilation opening(s) shall be made in the roof.

    · Utilities shall be disconnected.

    · Consideration shall be given to potential hazards of toxic weeds, insect hives, and vermin.

    · All forms of asbestos shall be removed by an approved asbestos removal contractor.

    Additionally,

    (9) States should develop a permitting procedure for live-burn training to be conducted at acquired structures. States should ensure that all requirements of NFPA 1403 have been met before issuing the permit.

    Discussion: NFPA 1403, Standard on Live Fire Training Evolutions, is the guideline for conducting live-burn training evolutions at approved training centers, and in this case, acquired structures. Approved training centers have burn buildings that are specifically designed for repeated live-burn training evolutions. The structures that are acquired for live-burn training are usually in disrepair and were never designed for live-burn training. Any building that is acquired for live-burn training must go through an inspection process to identify and eliminate any hazards, or potential hazards that may be present to the participants, the public, and the environment. An application for permit procedure that is overseen by the state through local officials or a State representative would help ensure safety. If training facilities with approved burn buildings are available, then live-burn training exercises should not be conducted in acquired structures.

    Investigator Information. This incident was investigated by Jay Tarley and Tom Mezzanotte, Safety and Occupational Health Specialists, and Robert Koedam, Section Chief, Trauma Investigations Section, Surveillance and Field Investigations Branch, Division of Safety Research, NIOSH.

    Copyright © by IACOJ All Right Reserved.

    Published on: 2003-09-13
    In Part II of the article, the NIOSH report is dissected and discussed.
    Paul; if I remember, you weighed in very heavy on the Lairdsville discussions.
    CR
    Visit www.iacoj.com
    Remember Bradley Golden (9/25/01)
    RIP HOF Robert J. Compton(ENG6511)

  4. #24
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    Quote Originally Posted by ChiefReason
    Here is an excerpt from Part I of Just Enough Time To Die. Compare it to stillPSFB's post as quoted.
    You know Chief, sometimes I wonder just how my department keeps getting away with breaking just about every rule of "Commonsense Structural Firefighting" and getting away with it. Sometimes I wonder if the guy upstairs even has time to watch over the rest of you because he's probably so damn busy stopping us killing ourselves through our sheer stupidity
    Busy polishing the stacked tips on the deckgun of I.A.C.O.J. Engine#1

    ...and before you ask - YES I have done a Bloody SEARCH!

  5. #25
    MembersZone Subscriber jaybird210's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by stillPSFB
    You know Chief, sometimes I wonder just how my department keeps getting away with breaking just about every rule of "Commonsense Structural Firefighting" and getting away with it. Sometimes I wonder if the guy upstairs even has time to watch over the rest of you because he's probably so damn busy stopping us killing ourselves through our sheer stupidity
    Because no one will stop them. No one, meaning the members of your brigade. Yes, you have to follow orders and all that, but not when those orders endanger your life. I make it clear to eveyone here, from the new probies all the way up, that if an officer gives you an order that threatens your safety, you are not obligated to carry it out.
    Omnis Cedo Domus

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    EuroFirefighter.com PaulGRIMWOOD's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by jaybird210
    I make it clear to eveyone here, from the new probies all the way up, that if an officer gives you an order that threatens your safety, you are not obligated to carry it out.
    That's a pretty strong statement Jay .... but it's one that I fully support. However, any firefighter needs to be pretty damn sure that he can back his/her refusal up! I have challenged hierarchal decisions on the fire-ground on several occasions and was able to provide sound reasoning at a later stage. It did not make me popular on occasions!

    Having said this .... we have had threads on this before .... you get to know, after a while, who you can trust to make decisions that might affect your 'lifeline' .... and you go with it.

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    EuroFirefighter.com PaulGRIMWOOD's Avatar
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    'Paul; not trying to hijack your thread...'

    Chief Go Ahead 10-4!

  8. #28
    EuroFirefighter.com PaulGRIMWOOD's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by stillPSFB
    You know Chief, sometimes I wonder just how my department keeps getting away with breaking just about every rule of "Commonsense Structural Firefighting" and getting away with it. Sometimes I wonder if the guy upstairs even has time to watch over the rest of you because he's probably so damn busy stopping us killing ourselves through our sheer stupidity
    'Still' - thanks for having the courage to be open and frank about your views on departmental failings. I am sure there are many more reading this thread who will be viewing things from the same angle but are not posting their fears.

    Be a voice in your region .... take every opportunity to make things better .... make things right.

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    Quote Originally Posted by PaulGRIMWOOD
    That's a pretty strong statement Jay .... but it's one that I fully support. However, any firefighter needs to be pretty damn sure that he can back his/her refusal up! I have challenged hierarchal decisions on the fire-ground on several occasions and was able to provide sound reasoning at a later stage. It did not make me popular on occasions!

    Having said this .... we have had threads on this before .... you get to know, after a while, who you can trust to make decisions that might affect your 'lifeline' .... and you go with it.
    Very true all around, Paul. It's definately a training issue. Some people have a different idea about what is "dangerous" is what is not. But no propblems yet.
    Omnis Cedo Domus

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    During these scenarios, a dummy was placed inside a room of the building and the room was set on fire using a mix of diesel and gasoline before the teams could enter and rescue the ‘victim’.
    Thankfully the use of flammable liquids in this case was only a footnote, and not a contributing factor to an unfortunate incident. It would seem however that these kinds of practices are continuing.

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    I won't lie, the last few structure burns I was on were done by a training officer who is very experienced in this sort of thing and did each ignition by sloshing diesel/gas mix all over the place. (We use it ordinarily in drip torches for wildland fires)

    I am going out on a limb here but it seems safe enough to me, however there is a fine line that would be easy to cross, too much gasoline in the mix, too much fuel on before ignition could have dangerous results. And this is a neighboring department, it has been a long time since then, they may not be doing it any more. It seems like it would take a long time between burns though having to use ordinary combustibles in the house, the goal being to rotate as many people through as possible. I wonder if much actual data went into that part of the standard or if it was just a knee jerk inclusion.

    Birken

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    Quote Originally Posted by PaulGRIMWOOD
    'Still' - thanks for having the courage to be open and frank about your views on departmental failings. I am sure there are many more reading this thread who will be viewing things from the same angle but are not posting their fears.

    Be a voice in your region .... take every opportunity to make things better .... make things right.
    Funnily enough Paul - guess what happened when I voiced my concerns about a recent live fire training excercise that was absolutely stupid - I'm now no longer a member of my volly brigade as they didn't like me saying that what they did that night was absolutely crazy. Last time I checked the basis for our existance was that we were here to protect life and property, not that we were to go around destroying property on the bull***** pretence of it being a training excercise. I've seen plenty of stupid things by both firefighters and civilians in the nearly twenty years that I've been a firefighter, but that training session took the cake.
    Busy polishing the stacked tips on the deckgun of I.A.C.O.J. Engine#1

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    But you were right to do this and lets hope that some of the other vollies involved can see the points you were trying to make and support you mate.

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    Quote Originally Posted by PaulGRIMWOOD
    But you were right to do this and lets hope that some of the other vollies involved can see the points you were trying to make and support you mate.
    Unfortunately not - the rest of them are too new to even understand.
    Busy polishing the stacked tips on the deckgun of I.A.C.O.J. Engine#1

    ...and before you ask - YES I have done a Bloody SEARCH!

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    Quote Originally Posted by stillPSFB
    Unfortunately not - the rest of them are too new to even understand.
    And also unfortunately, they are at greater risk of being seriously injured or killed because of their "newness".
    You should have been commended, instead of being released.
    Apparently, your former department has leadership with an overwhelming taste for gambling with the lives of their people.
    There needs to be an immediate change here before catastrophe strikes.
    CR
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    Remember Bradley Golden (9/25/01)
    RIP HOF Robert J. Compton(ENG6511)

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    Quote Originally Posted by BirkenVogt
    I won't lie, the last few structure burns I was on were done by a training officer who is very experienced in this sort of thing and did each ignition by sloshing diesel/gas mix all over the place. (We use it ordinarily in drip torches for wildland fires)

    I am going out on a limb here but it seems safe enough to me, however there is a fine line that would be easy to cross, too much gasoline in the mix, too much fuel on before ignition could have dangerous results. And this is a neighboring department, it has been a long time since then, they may not be doing it any more. It seems like it would take a long time between burns though having to use ordinary combustibles in the house, the goal being to rotate as many people through as possible. I wonder if much actual data went into that part of the standard or if it was just a knee jerk inclusion.

    Birken
    I am shaking my head and wondering..... were the lessons of Lairdsville learned? The answer is a resounding NO!

    How many more of our brothers and sisters are we going to kill because of ignorance to the nth degree about NFPA 1403?

    It does not take a long time to cycle people through a burn day using ordinary combustibles, such as straw and pallets. We do it all the time at the Massachusetts Fire Academy.
    ‎"The education of a firefighter and the continued education of a firefighter is what makes "real" firefighters. Continuous skill development is the core of progressive firefighting. We learn by doing and doing it again and again, both on the training ground and the fireground."
    Lt. Ray McCormack, FDNY

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    ANY fire department in the United States who does not follow NFPA 1403 when conducting acquired structure live fire training should be cited and fined for not doing so.
    ANY fire department who does not follow NFPA 1403 and has a fatality should be criminally charged, tried and convicted of criminally negligent homicide, starting with the TO, Chief and Fire Commissioners/Trustees. No plea deals.
    THEN, and only then will we see a change in the casual attitude towards hurting and killing our firefighters.
    There is absolutely NO argument that can be advanced for NOT following NFPA 1403. NONE!
    CR
    Visit www.iacoj.com
    Remember Bradley Golden (9/25/01)
    RIP HOF Robert J. Compton(ENG6511)

  18. #38
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    Absolutely. Years ago while attending live burns sponsored by nearby towns, we were exposed to some crazy stuff. Being new, and being told " don't worry, it'll be fine". This sounds so familiar. Looking back, we were very lucky.
    Just to give an example, the first time I ever got burned, was the first time I ever saw live fire. I was on the knob, and the state instructor told me to take off my glove to feel if the door to the fire room was hot. I did as he instructed, and just about that time, the ceiling in the fire room fell, blowing the door open, and pushing fire out in the hall way all over us. Of course I couldn't get my glove on fast enough. More of the same was to follow during my training.


    After a time, some of us being concerned, but haveing never heard of ths 1403, started our own rendition of safe live fire training. Later, we got the 1403 standard,and compared it to how we had been operating, just by being safety concious, and useing our heads, and to our surprise, we weren't too far off. It is definitely the way to go, and combined with useing your head, can go a long way towards safety.
    There goes the neighborhood.

  19. #39
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    I'll post really quickly on this before I get back to reading the rest of the thread. Having just finished all of my hours of live burns at the fire academy, I wont disclose where I'm attending, but I was never introduced to or have ever heard of NFPA 1403. I'd guess from what I've read thus far that it has to do with how life-fire operations and training are carried out. Perhaps I haven't been introduced to it because both of our Burn buildings/simulators and the car fire simulator is run on propane gas and therefor may not require the amout of "going over" that real objects on fire would? I don't know. I do know that one day when it wasn't working, they were burning pallets, but refused to call them pallets, and in a sort of side-ways, round about talking manner, let us know that they shouldn't have been burning pallets. Maybe thats part of it? I dont know.

  20. #40
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    Quote Originally Posted by BirkenVogt
    It seems like it would take a long time between burns though having to use ordinary combustibles in the house, the goal being to rotate as many people through as possible.

    Birken
    I would think that being slowed down through having to use ordinary combustibles would be a good thing in a lot of instances - it gives the instructors more time to recover and rehydrate between evolutions, it allows more time for debriefs etc.
    Busy polishing the stacked tips on the deckgun of I.A.C.O.J. Engine#1

    ...and before you ask - YES I have done a Bloody SEARCH!

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