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  1. #41
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    Quote Originally Posted by ChiefReason
    Apparently, your former department has leadership with an overwhelming taste for gambling with the lives of their people.
    There needs to be an immediate change here before catastrophe strikes.
    CR
    Chief, you would have thought that a department that nearly killed six recruit firefighters in a fixed burn building catastrophe back in 2001 would have implemented 1403 before now, but allas no. They need to find a copy of 1402 as well, but we'll start with 1403.

    As you know we are a combo department, and they were running a 14 week academy class for 18 career firefighter recruits. The report into the incident has been well and truly hidden despite the best efforts of a lot of people to find a copy, but what we have been able to find out is that they were running a live burn in a fixed burn building at the academy. The information suggests that they were burning foam furniture and 6 recruits + 2 instructors were in the fire room when a window that was installed very low to the ground failed, causing a thermal runaway leading into a flashover. One instructor opened up the nozzle on a very wide fog as he could see that they were in a bad situation, but due to the thermal runaway and lots of foam furniture fuel loading, that just slowed down the flashover, rather than stopped it, and created tons of steam. The room flashed on them as they were bolting out the door, with one recruit suffering severe burns mainly to her back, and the others suffering various degrees of steam and thermal burns (the department bans the use of hoods which didn't help). The lessons learned and changes implemented following this very near multi-fatal training LODD? None apparently.

    Another incident that I was personally in saw me order the 2 firefighters that were with me + myself to go out of a second floor window in a fixed burn building as the fire on the first floor was sending that much blistering heat up the stairway due to it having way too much fuel that conditions were becoming untenable and there was no way we were going to be able to go back down the stairs - the fire had gotten bigger than the instructors intended because the hoseline was delayed due to a SNAFU and consequently the fire grew and spread from it's crib to the stack of about 20 straw bales that was kept in the fire room to resupply the crib after each evolution, and then it spread out of the fire room to a couch at the bottom of the stairs - this was after I had expressed concern to the instructors following the previous evolution about the straw bales being stored too close to the crib - "Don't worry - it's never been a problem - WE'VE ALWAYS DONE IT THIS WAY" - how many times have we all heard those words in the fire service!

    Anyone see a similarity with a place called Lairdsville here?
    Last edited by stillPSFB; 11-06-2005 at 02:07 AM.
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  2. #42
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    Quote Originally Posted by stillPSFB
    (the department bans the use of hoods which didn't help).


    Banning hoods? WTF is the point of banning hoods?

  3. #43
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    Quote Originally Posted by TrentonFF
    Banning hoods? WTF is the point of banning hoods?
    Because they don't teach us anything about how to read fire behaviour and conditions, so instead they figure if we don't wear hoods then our ears will tell us when to get out - and you guys all thought your departments had problems
    Busy polishing the stacked tips on the deckgun of I.A.C.O.J. Engine#1

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    Trenton, if you have taken the live burn class in NJ and you hadn't heard the term 1403, you need to contact the NJDFS. The current cuuriculum for live burn instructor is based on 1403 and should be followed to the letter.

    Chief R, you say that there is no reason excuse not follow 1403 to the nth degree. You seem to have missed what Birken was saying. His excuse was "It seemed safe enough". That seems like a good excuse to me.

    "It seemed safe enough": Words to die by.

  5. #45
    EuroFirefighter.com PaulGRIMWOOD's Avatar
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    It goes on .... perhaps I should have started this thread with a poll! Here is a link to yet ANOTHER LODD during live fire training. This is a 2/2005 report so apologies if the link has been placed here before.
    LIVE FIRE TRAINING FATALITY - PORT EVERGLADES Fla

  6. #46
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    Quote Originally Posted by PaulGRIMWOOD
    It goes on .... perhaps I should have started this thread with a poll! Here is a link to yet ANOTHER LODD during live fire training. This is a 2/2005 report so apologies if the link has been placed here before.
    LIVE FIRE TRAINING FATALITY - PORT EVERGLADES Fla

    The thing that I really didnt understand (and still dont) the first time I read that report was the fact that it was the trianees FIRST live fire exposure. A simulated ship fire as the first? Probably the most difficult (other then hi-rise) type of fire we have in Fla (the land of no cellars). What were they thinking?
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  7. #47
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    Quote Originally Posted by TrentonFF
    I'll post really quickly on this before I get back to reading the rest of the thread. Having just finished all of my hours of live burns at the fire academy, I wont disclose where I'm attending, but I was never introduced to or have ever heard of NFPA 1403. I'd guess from what I've read thus far that it has to do with how life-fire operations and training are carried out. Perhaps I haven't been introduced to it because both of our Burn buildings/simulators and the car fire simulator is run on propane gas and therefor may not require the amout of "going over" that real objects on fire would? I don't know. I do know that one day when it wasn't working, they were burning pallets, but refused to call them pallets, and in a sort of side-ways, round about talking manner, let us know that they shouldn't have been burning pallets. Maybe thats part of it? I dont know.
    Ordinary combustibles are allowed under NFPA 1403. Most pallets are made of wood, wood is an ordinary combustible.

    At the Massachusetts Fire Academy, the car fire prop is fueled by propane. We also place straw in the engine compartment, passenger comparment and the trunk (under the bonnet and boot for you Brits! ) to create the smoke and give the students something to overhaul.
    ‎"The education of a firefighter and the continued education of a firefighter is what makes "real" firefighters. Continuous skill development is the core of progressive firefighting. We learn by doing and doing it again and again, both on the training ground and the fireground."
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  8. #48
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    Quote Originally Posted by GeorgeWendtCFI
    Trenton, if you have taken the live burn class in NJ and you hadn't heard the term 1403, you need to contact the NJDFS. The current cuuriculum for live burn instructor is based on 1403 and should be followed to the letter.

    SNIP

    Hmm...Just a thought that came to me as I was reading the thread.

    Perhaps they only mentioned 1403 'in passing' because of the copyright issues. Someone earlier mentioned that NFPA wants $25 or $35 a copy for the spec. If the folks who are running the class have already checked and ensured that their SOPs are in accordance with 1403, they may have just given out or discused the SOP.

    I'd think its an easy way to side-step the copyright issue.


    Jon

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    Just like being in the Navy where an illegal and/or immoral order can be disobeyed.
    Be forewarned that you will face some people across a table or room and they will be VERY unhappy that you did not do what you were told to and will be wanting to know why.
    Your proof had better be the Truth,the whole Truth and nothing but the Truth so help you God or you can get additional trouble for disobeying and then lying about why you disobeyed.

    [QUOTE=PaulGRIMWOOD]That's a pretty strong statement Jay .... but it's one that I fully support. However, any firefighter needs to be pretty damn sure that he can back his/her refusal up! I have challenged hierarchal decisions on the fire-ground on several occasions and was able to provide sound reasoning at a later stage. It did not make me popular on occasions!

    QUOTE]

  10. #50
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    To get back on subject,a nearby city that ryhmes with Paducah in the past couple years ran a live burn with no officer going in,no pumper on scene and no experienced people on the hose.
    I haven't heard of any more of this story and will try to find out what happened.I do know that no one got hurt during this session but whoever thought it up and whoever allowed it to happen both need to be booted out of the fire service with no chance of getting on with ANY department for it.

  11. #51
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    As you know we are a combo department, and they were running a 14 week academy class for 18 career firefighter recruits. The report into the incident has been well and truly hidden despite the best efforts of a lot of people to find a copy, but what we have been able to find out is that they were running a live burn in a fixed burn building at the academy. The information suggests that they were burning foam furniture and 6 recruits + 2 instructors were in the fire room when a window that was installed very low to the ground failed, causing a thermal runaway leading into a flashover. One instructor opened up the nozzle on a very wide fog as he could see that they were in a bad situation, but due to the thermal runaway and lots of foam furniture fuel loading, that just slowed down the flashover, rather than stopped it, and created tons of steam. The room flashed on them as they were bolting out the door, with one recruit suffering severe burns mainly to her back, and the others suffering various degrees of steam and thermal burns (the department bans the use of hoods which didn't help). The lessons learned and changes implemented following this very near multi-fatal training LODD? None apparently.
    Taken from the NIOSH Report of the Lairdsville incident:
    Fire departments should ensure that the fuels used in the live-burn training have known burning characteristics and the structure is inspected for possible environmental hazards. Fuels for training fires should have known burning characteristics, and the quantities used should be the minimum necessary that are controllable and able to create the desired fire conditions. The structure should be inspected to identify and remove materials that could contribute to rapidly spreading fires and create an environmental or health hazard. The structure must also be inspected to provide for physical safety of the participants in the training.
    So; if these are instructors violating the spirit/intent of 1403, then I have to challenge their credentials, because 1403 states:
    Fire departments should ensure that a certified instructor is in charge of the live-burn training and that a separate safety officer is appointed and has the authority to intervene and control any aspect of the operation. Fire departments should comply with the National Fire Protection Association Standard 1403, which notes that all instructors shall be deemed qualified to deliver fire-fighter training by the authority having jurisdiction. The instructor-in-charge should be a certified instructor who oversees all aspects of the training session.
    Their responsibilities include planning and coordinating all training activities, monitoring activities, structure inspections, briefing and assigning instructors and support personnel, and ensuring adherence to the directives.
    Another incident that I was personally in saw me order the 2 firefighters that were with me + myself to go out of a second floor window in a fixed burn building as the fire on the first floor was sending that much blistering heat up the stairway due to it having way too much fuel that conditions were becoming untenable and there was no way we were going to be able to go back down the stairs - the fire had gotten bigger than the instructors intended
    Taken from the NIOSH Report of the Lairdsville incident:
    Fire departments should ensure that fires used for live-burn training are not located in any designated exit paths. During a training exercise, every effort must be made to ensure the exit paths are free from obstructions. To provide a protected area of travel, fires should not be located in any exit paths. These areas should be closely monitored to ensure that fire does not spread during the training exercise. The sofa bed was located at the bottom of the stairs leading to the front exit. The front exit was blocked to simulate that the stairs had collapsed for the responding RIT. Once the sofa bed was lit, the fire immediately traveled into the exit path using the stairway as a chimney. To enhance the smoke conditions for the evolution, the windows on both floors were boarded over or partially covered to minimize ventilation. When the fire entered the exit path, the training exercise became a working structure fire.
    You should NEVER, EVER set a training fire at the bottom of a stairway.
    the hoseline was delayed due to a SNAFU and consequently the fire grew and spread from it's crib to the stack of about 20 straw bales that was kept in the fire room to resupply the crib after each evolution, and then it spread out of the fire room to a couch at the bottom of the stairs - this was after I had expressed concern to the instructors following the previous evolution about the straw bales being stored too close to the crib - "Don't worry - it's never been a problem - WE'VE ALWAYS DONE IT THIS WAY" - how many times have we all heard those words in the fire service!
    Taken from the NIOSH Report of the Lairdsville incident:
    Fire departments should ensure that only one training fire is ignited at a time by a designated ignition officer and that a charged hose line is present while igniting the fire. One person, who is not participating in the training, should be assigned the duty of ignition officer and light the fire as instructed by the instructor-in-charge. The safety officer should be in the presence of, and have direct supervision over, the ignition officer when the fire is lit. A charged hose line should be present when igniting the fire.
    Your concerns should have been voiced to the designated safety officer and he had the authority to shut it down until it was safe to continue.
    Taken from the NIOSH Report of the Lairdsville incident:
    NFPA Standard 1403 further states that safety officers shall be appointed for all training sessions and have no other duties to interfere with their safety responsibilities for all persons on the scene. The safety officer should eliminate unsafe conditions, prevent unsafe acts, coordinate lighting of fires with instructor-in-charge, ensure personal protective equipment compliance, ensure all participants are accounted for before and after each evolution. The safety officers during this incident also had the responsibility of the ignition officer in the presence of and under the direct supervision of the safety officer.
    Plus; a pre-burn conference should be done with the people in charge of the training and with the participants.
    Taken from the NIOSH Report of the Lairdsville incident:
    Fire departments should ensure that before conducting live-burn training, a pre-burn briefing session is conducted and an evacuation plan and signal are established for all participants. All participants should attend a pre-burn briefing before conducting the live-burn training session to discuss all facets of the training. The instructor in charge of the training should present the briefing session using the pre-burn plan to detail all aspects of the operation. The characteristics of the training area and structure should be addressed to include such items as crew assignments and the designation and layout of ingress/egress routes in the event of emergency. An evacuation plan should be established and an audible evacuation signal be demonstrated to all participants in an interior live-burn training evolution. It is imperative that all participants are familiar with the layout of the structure. All participants should conduct a walk-through of the structure before any training evolutions are initiated.
    Anyone see a similarity with a place called Lairdsville here?
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  12. #52
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    So; there are comparisons that can be drawn between the Lairdsville, NY incident and the Port Everglades, FL fatal training exercises. They are:
    1) In my mind, this is the most important observation that can be made, in that it involves the psychological demeanor of these trainees. The trainees were left with the belief that they could not “question” what was being asked of them. They apparently didn’t want to appear “weak”. Some of you would argue that the trainees were not knowledgeable enough to question whether or not they were being placed in an unsafe situation with grave consequences. That is a consideration that must be discussed. In the “Port Everglades” report, several references are made to a “boot camp-like” atmosphere. At Lairdsville, the survivor (Ben Morris) stated that he trusted his fellow firefighters to not place him at risk. Family of Brad Golden stated that they couldn’t understand how other firefighters could let something like that happen. And it’s clear in BOTH cases that no one “expected” anyone to die.
    2) Interior temperatures became untenable and when the order to evacuate the structure was given, trainees were left to get out on their own.
    3) It was not clear who was actually in charge of the exercise.
    4) More than one fire was lit and burning at the time of the incident.
    5) No dedicated safety officer was performing safety tasks at the time of the incident.
    6) EMS was not on-scene/on stand-by for the exercise.
    7) No walk through or pre-burn plan was afforded the participants.
    8) No planned response was discussed in the event of an emergency.
    9) Communications during the exercise did not exist.
    10) A second means of egress was not discussed or identified to participants.
    11) Missing victim(s) was identified only AFTER all other participants were out of the facility.
    12) Participants of the training exercise were not trained to a basic level of skill.
    13) Other than common combustibles (wood, paper, straw) was used for live fire segments.
    14) Instructors did not know of the participants’ whereabouts.
    15) No hose line was in place or charged prior to igniting fires.
    16) Instructors that were not state certified were used.
    17) Instructors failed to notify Command that trainees were left unattended.
    18) NFPA 1403 was not followed.
    It is interesting to note that the recommendations that came out of both of these tragedies were almost identical. Certified instructors, instructors trained specifically to conduct live burns, safety officers dedicated solely to safety tasks, no more than one training fire at a time, enhanced communications, a pre-training conference with a walk through of the facility, accountability system for participants, limiting fuel load for training fires and other recommendations can be found in the reports for both the Lairdsville and Port Everglades incidents.
    The old adage: anyone who doesn’t learn from their mistakes is destined to repeat them has been at work in our nation’s fire service for decades.
    The initial shock, horror, indignation and anger that we feel with each, new senseless death is soon replaced with the same complacency or indifference that is found pre-incident.
    We can no longer be complacent or indifferent. We have to stop it.
    Now.
    CR
    Last edited by ChiefReason; 11-06-2005 at 09:23 PM. Reason: add bold
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    Quote Originally Posted by jonemac
    Hmm...Just a thought that came to me as I was reading the thread.

    Perhaps they only mentioned 1403 'in passing' because of the copyright issues. Someone earlier mentioned that NFPA wants $25 or $35 a copy for the spec. If the folks who are running the class have already checked and ensured that their SOPs are in accordance with 1403, they may have just given out or discused the SOP.

    I'd think its an easy way to side-step the copyright issue.


    Jon
    It is not an issue at all. NFPA 921 is the Guide to Fire and Explosion Investigation. It is mentioned approximately a billion times at every training seminar that is ever held. Every time it is mentioned, it is free advertising.

  14. #54
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    Rossco,Where and when did you take a training with a "State"instructor that wasn't TO THE LETTER 1403? I've been with the State training system since 1995 and EVERY State sponsored training has been to 1403,NO EXCEPTIONS ALLOWED! I've even seen operations suspended because of the area Chief wanting to "skirt"some of the requirements.It's simply NOT ALLOWED under State training mandates.Any STATE instructor found operating outside the requirements will be suspended or FIRED. T.C.

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    Quote Originally Posted by GeorgeWendtCFI
    It is not an issue at all. NFPA 921 is the Guide to Fire and Explosion Investigation. It is mentioned approximately a billion times at every training seminar that is ever held. Every time it is mentioned, it is free advertising.

    I thought that, too....but I've run into folks that get real antsy about copyright issues.

  16. #56
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    Quote Originally Posted by stillPSFB
    Because they don't teach us anything about how to read fire behaviour and conditions, so instead they figure if we don't wear hoods then our ears will tell us when to get out - and you guys all thought your departments had problems

    For those of you that like to expose your ears to get a feeling for the fire conditions, I would suggest a different more sensitive area of your anatomy...unzip your bunkers
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    Quote Originally Posted by ChiefReason
    You should NEVER, EVER set a training fire at the bottom of a stairway.
    They didn't actually set the fire at the bottom of the stairs, but the fire in the room next to the hall/stairs developed so much that it ignited the couch that was out in the hall near the bottom of the stairs - because they didn't anticpate that the probies might take a little while to get the line stretched in from the pumper, and so the fire spread to the fuel stock and then out to the couch. Pretty silly on their part given that Probies don't always stretch quickly and perfectly

    Quote Originally Posted by ChiefReason
    Your concerns should have been voiced to the designated safety officer and he had the authority to shut it down until it was safe to continue.
    The safety officer was one of those in the group that I raised my concerns with - he was the one that said "Don't worry - it's never been a problem - WE'VE ALWAYS DONE IT THIS WAY"

    Like I said earlier - "Sometimes I wonder if the guy upstairs even has time to watch over the rest of you because he's probably so damn busy stopping us killing ourselves through our sheer stupidity"
    Busy polishing the stacked tips on the deckgun of I.A.C.O.J. Engine#1

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    Default Other Incidents

    Here are links to reports on 2 other incidents, with the general recommendations. Also, NFPA members can download a report on the deaths of 3 fire fighters during a live burn training session in Michigan in Oct of 1987, which unfortunately shows that we are still making the same mistakes. There is no record of the number of injuries and close calls which occur, we only pay attention when someone dies, and even then it seems we only pay attention for a short while.

    Volunteer Assistant Chief Dies During a Controlled-Burn Training Evolution–Delaware--April 30, 2000

    NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar incidents, fire departments should
    •ensure that flammable or combustible liquids as defined in NFPA 30 not be used in live fire training
    •ensure that proper ventilation is in place before a controlled burn takes place
    •ensure that fires not be ignited in any designated path of exit
    •ensure that an evacuation signal is communicated to all fire fighters prior to ignition
    •ensure that a building evacuation plan is in place and all fire fighters are familiar with the plan
    •ensure that a method of fireground communication is established to enable coordination among the incident commander and fire fighters
    •ensure that a safety officer be appointed for all live fire training
    •ensure that each fire fighter be equipped with full protective clothing and a SCBA
    •ensure that backup personnel are standing by with equipment, ready to provide assistance or rescue
    •ensure that only one person be assigned as the "ignition officer" and it not be a fire fighter participating in the training
    •ensure that exterior fire attack is at a minimum during search and rescue
    •ensure that fire fighters who enter a hazardous condition enter as a team of two or more.
    http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/face200027.html

    Career Lieutenant and Fire Fighter Die in a Flashover During a Live-Fire Training Evolution - Florida--July 30, 2002

    •ensure that the fuels used in live-fire training have known burning characteristics and the structure is inspected for possible hazards prior to the training
    •ensure that ventilation is closely coordinated with interior operations
    •ensure that fires are not located in designated exit paths
    •ensure that a method of fireground communication is established to enable coordination among the Incident Commander and fire fighters
    •ensure that Standard Operating Guidelines (SOGs) specific to live-fire training are developed and followed
    •consider using a thermal imaging camera during live-fire training
    Additionally, States should consider
    •developing a permitting procedure for live-fire training to be conducted at acquired structures. States should ensure that all the requirements of NFPA 1403 have been met before issuing the permit

    http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/face200234.html

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