On April 4, 1998, the County of Los Angeles Fire Department (LACoFD) command and control center received a report of a man trapped in the vertical shaft within the Black Jack mine on Crown Valley Road. At 3:33 P.M., command and control dispatched a "perso n trapped" response, which included Engine and Patrol 80, Engine and Patrol 81, USAR Truck 24, (paramedic) Squad 37, Air Squad 8 (LACoFD Air Squads are fire/rescue helicopters staffed with USAR-trained paramedic/firefighters), USAR-1 (USAR-1 is the LACoFD 's central urban search and rescue company, whose members are trained in mine rescue and certified as a confined space rescue team) and Battalion 17 Chief Dave Moore.

While enroute, USAR-1 upgraded the dispatch to a "confined space rescue" due to the nature of the report. This added Hazmat Task Force (HMTF) 76, Mobile Air 107, Engine 1 and USAR-2 to the response. Moore also requested the response of two sheriff departm ent search and rescue teams, one from Antelope Valley, the other from Montrose (the Montrose SAR team has personnel certified as a mine and tunnel rescue team).

Upon his arrival, Captain Tom Gifford of Engine 80 reported "a possible mine rescue." As Moore joined Gifford, they were met by the victim's son, who had left his father in the mine and raced into town to call 911. The son told them the following story:

He and his father had "body-rappelled" without harnesses on a single rope into the vertical shaft to a depth of 300 to 400 feet, where they came across a winze, which they explored for a time, then reversed course and began climbing toward the surface, ha nd over hand up the rope. After ascending nearly 100 feet, the older man could no longer hold onto the rope, and he stepped onto the old wooden ladder to aid his ascent.

Suddenly, one of the rungs snapped under his weight, and the man fell onto the ledge from which they had just departed. By sheer fortune, the man landed on the ledge without bouncing off into the abyss of the shaft (in which case he would have free-fallen another 500 feet to the bottom). His fall was partially absorbed by the rungs of a rickety wooden ladder that was precariously attached to old timbers.

After hearing the son's synopsis, Moore established Crown Command, with Engine 80's captain assigned as operations. He reported a "working mine rescue," then asked command and control to augment the original "confined space rescue" assignment with three m ore engines, Hazmat Task Force 43 (LACoFD hazmat task forces are certified as confined space rescue teams), one patrol, two utilities, Biopack 82, headed by Captain David Norman and equipped with 12 four- to eight-hour rebreather self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), Battalion 17's USAR shoring trailer, a safety officer and a public information officer. This brought the total commitment of manpower for the ensuing six-hour rescue operation to 65 firefighters and 15 sheriff search and rescue team memb ers.

"Assessment" Entry
Fifteen minutes later, USAR-1 arrived and Moore assigned its captain as rescue group leader and instructed him to evaluate the rescue problem and develop a rescue plan. Meanwhile, USAR-1 Engineer Richard Meline began organizing essential equipment to supp ort an assessment entry and rescue entry operations. HMTF 76 Captains Matt Gil and Ed Hernandez were assigned as entry group supervisor and entry team leader, respectively. Truck 24 Captain Al Shriver was assigned as confined space/tunnel safety officer, and engineer Jeff Hudspeth was assigned as the entry attendant. HMTF 76 Firefighter David Dougherty was assigned as air supply manager. Hudspeth established an exclusion zone at the entrance to the mine, and a support zone and equipment pool.

The mine entrance was a half mile up a steep hill from the main access road. All necessary equipment had to be stripped from the units on the main access road, loaded onto patrols and utilities, and shuttled up the mountain and reassembled. An equipment p ool was established near the mine entrance. Meline and

Captain Jim Beard (Engine 1) tried to prioritize the staging of tools to ensure that a two-person entry team would be equipped to enter the mine for the initial assessment.

To assess the rescue problem inside the mine, it was decided that USAR-1's captain would be paired with Engineer Pat Rohaley from Engine 131 as Entry Team 1. In accordance with applicable laws and standards, we were equipped with SCBA, personal hazmat air monitors, three sources of light, rescue ropes, tag lines and other required personal protective equipment.

Our task would be to enter the mine and proceed to the vertical shaft to monitor the atmosphere for oxygen content, toxic gases and explosive levels. Then we would attempt to make verbal contact with the victim, assess his physical condition and his predi cament, and agree on possible rescue options before exiting to develop a rescue plan. This would, in turn, set the stage for a subsequent "rescue entry" by a team comprised of six firefighters and SAR personnel trained in confined space, tunnel and high a ngle rescue (including two paramedics) to perform the extraction.

Several members of the Antelope Valley and Montrose SAR teams arrived. As per protocol when two agencies are working together at a technical rescue or other emergency, unified command was established. Initially, Engineers Phil Enriquez and Corey Lovers from HMTF 76 were assigned as the rapid intervention team. They were identified as Team 2 and assigned to stand by outside the mine to provide backup rescue capabilities. Soon thereafter, it was decided to augment Team 2 with Meline, HMTF Firefighter Mike Pacheco, and Montrose SAR members Bill Lowery and Rick Homan. This exceeded the "2-in/2-out" rule requirements, but was considered reasonable under the conditions. It also provided the ability to immedi ately augment Team 1 in case they required extra trained manpower during the "assessment" entry.

Meanwhile, Gil, the entry group supervisor, set about organizing other support functions such as air supply, ventilation and equipment pool. Hudspeth supervised the placement of a high-volume confined space ventilation fan inside the entrance to start "pu shing" fresh air into the mine. The direction of air movement in the mine was monitored as part of the decision to "push" or "pull" air at the entrance.

We donned our SCBA masks and crawled into the semi-round hole. The tunnel was only two feet in height at the beginning and grew to about four feet in height as we proceeded. At the mouth of the shaft we measured the following atmospheric conditions: oxygen 20.5%, carbon monoxide 0 ppm, hydrogen sulfide 0 ppm and negative explosive levels. In the parlance of mine and tunnel rescue, this mine would be classified as potentially gassy, a term used to describe tunnels that are presently "clean," but where there is still a possibility that toxic or explosive gases may be encountered.

Rohaley suspended one air monitor on a nook high in the tunnel, and placed another monitor in a low point so we could continually monitor for changing conditions during the entire operation. I radioed to the entry attendant (Hudspeth, stationed outside th e mine) to order power for the extension cords that we had dragged into the mine behind us. The cords were already attached to two floodlights supplied by Truck 24.

On Hudspeth's direction, a portable generator from Truck 24 was started at a safe location away from (and downwind of) the mine's entrance. Now the horizontal tunnel was lighted. Rohaley suspended a floodlight and directed its beam down the vertical shaft . The man was not visible because an overhanging "lip" blocked our view of his position. We had already been told that the shaft was 900 feet deep, nearly straight down. It was not difficult to envision that we were working at the edge of a hole whose dep th equaled the height of a 90-story building.

We made voice contact with the man and determined with reasonable certainty that he was well-oriented, in reasonably stable condition, and trapped on a small ledge where a lateral tunnel intersected the shaft. He reported that his injuries consisted of se veral abrasions, "probably a black eye," and pain in the right side of his face. His chief complaint was cold and thirst. Accordingly, we used a tag line to lower a flashlight, warm clothing, a canteen of water, a wound dressing and a "victim" helmet to h im. Our patient was admonished NOT to reach out over the shaft to grab the line and NOT to try climbing it.

We set about evaluating options to establish a high angle rescue system to pluck the man from the shaft. There were no natural features that would provide reliable anchors for high-angle rope systems. We agreed that bolting artificial anchors into the roc k was out of the question because the ceiling and roof were suspect after having been open to the air for 80-plus years. We would have to establish our own anchors in some other way. The cavern at the vertical shaft appeared to be just large enough to acc ommodate a Larkin rescue frame, which would allow us to position a rescuer directly over the center of the shaft for a "pick-off" operation.

After assuring the victim that we would return shortly, we exited the mine, leaving the air monitors in place. Rohaley and I (both paramedics) agreed that he seemed to be exceedingly stable considering the fall he took. We decided that this rescue operati on should proceed "step by step," with all reasonable efforts expended to ensure the safety of rescuers as well as our victim. With the ever-present potential for a disaster if we moved too fast or neglected key items, this was not a situation that warran ted the type of "extremis" risks that we might normally take if someone was in imminent danger of dying.

Rescue Plan
Team 1 met with command, members of the Montrose SAR team and the firefighters assigned to critical positions. We diagramed the mine's configuration and explained how a rescue operation could proceed, based on our observations. The rescue plan we proposed was this:

1. Reconfigure Team 1 by adding two members from the Montrose SAR team (Bruce Parker and Rick Homan, both confined space rescue instructors and certified in mine rescue) and two additional USAR/confined space rescue-trained firefighters.
2. Keep Team 2 intact as the rapid intervention team, and augment it with mine rescue-trained personnel from the Montrose SAR team, HMTF 76 and HMTF 43.
3. Team 1 (reconfigured) would enter the mine with USAR-1's Larkin frame, picket anchors, rope systems, and the required personal protective equipment. One SCBA for each member (and for the victim) would be cached in the mine in case of a change in the qu ality of air in the tunnels, and continuous monitoring would be conducted.
4. Team 1 would rig the rescue systems using the Larkin frame and a dual-line high angle system, maintain contact with the victim, and continue to monitor atmospheric conditions. One rescuer (Homan) would be lowered to conduct a "pick-off" rescue in the v ertical shaft. It was the consensus of Rohaley and myself that a vertical confined space rescue harness would provide the necessary C-spine protection and vertical lifting protection for the extraction. Essentially, with regard to the high angle systems, this rescue would be akin to "typical" cliff or vehicle over-the-side rescue, which Montrose SAR and USAR-1 had conducted dozens of times.
5. When Team 1 was ready to haul the victim and rescuer from the shaft, four additional USAR/confined space/mine rescue-trained personnel would be called in as a rope hauling team and to lend whatever other assistance might be needed.
6. The victim would be treated, packaged and removed from the mine, followed by the rescuers. 7. The LACoFD's supplied air breathing apparatus system (SABA) would be positioned outside the mine in case an umbilical air system was required. The LACoFD's rebreather SCBA were also en route from the special operations division to provide longterm capa bilities if needed.
8. Team 1 would bring USAR-1's remote search camera (on a 240-foot reel of hard wire) so its operations could be monitored by personnel outside the mine as an added safety measure. This device would also allow for hard-wire communications among Team 1, co mmand and the entry team manager.
9. Squad 37's paramedics would establish a medical team, not only for immediate removal, transportation and treatment of the victim, but for any personnel who might become injured during the operation. The medical team would be standing by with a confined space rescue litter for immediate packaging of the victim once he emerged from the vertical shaft. Air Squad 8 would be on standby to provide air ambulance service.

Rain Not A Hazard
A "forward staging area" grew quickly on the slopes outside of the hill, beyond the perimeter of the operational area and the command post. It was now dark and cold, with a frigid drizzle blowing across the hills. I was concerned that flood water might fi nd its way to the ledge of the horizontal tunnel where the victim awaited us, possibly causing hypothermia or even washing him into the vertical shaft. Several contingency plans were discussed. Fortunately, the heaviest rains did not come until later that night, and it never became a factor for us.

It was now about 6:20 P.M., and the media had congregated en masse in an area set aside for them by Public Information Officer Ed Loney, who was kept busy trying to keep up with their requests for updates on the goings-on inside the mine. Loney arranged f or one cameraman to act as the "pool," filming the interior operations directly off the search camera's television monitor near the entrance to the mine.

Team 1 entered the mine carrying the search camera probe and the other equipment. Once we reached the vertical shaft, we re-established voice contact with the man and determined that he was still fully oriented and in the same condition as when we left. W e explained the plan and told him that it might be more than an hour before he was rescued.

Meanwhile, Meline supervised assembly of the Larkin frame while Parker pounded a picket anchor system into the tunnel floor. Homan and Enriquez began putting together a two-rope lowering system, joined by Meline when the Larkin frame was up.

Parker found that the steel pickets could be driven only one foot into the floor with a sledgehammer before they were stopped cold by solid rock. Most likely, the pickets were reliable for the operation at hand. However, we were not sufficiently comfortab le with the strength of the shallow pickets to allow a rescuer to be suspended over a 900-foot abyss, placing almost total dependence on the pickets to hold his weight, the weight of the victim, and the forces that would be exerted on the system during th e lowering and raising operation.

We agreed it was necessary to anchor the Larkin frame to a separate anchor system. The additional anchor system could also be used to secure other ancillary systems such as the safety (belay) lines for Rohaley and I to work near the edge of the shaft. To accomplish this, Parker suggested creating two "dead man" anchors using four-by-four-inch timbers that would be wedged into crevasses across the width of the tunnel. We measured the spaces and radioed the lumber dimensions to a shoring team that had been established outside the tunnel by Engine 24 Captain Bob Goldman. The "dead man" anchors proved to be effective and necessary.

At this point, we still had concerns about the reliability of the picket system. To alleviate this concern, we asked the entry team manager to have Truck 24's crew build a separate picket anchor system in reliable soil outside the mine. This external pick et anchor system was connected via a 3:1 mechanical advantage rope system to the interior picket system, in order to reinforce it for maximum reliability.

As expected, radio communications proved to be difficult from inside the mountain. Initially, an SCBA-equipped firefighter was placed at the bend of the entry tunnel to relay radio traffic between the inside and outside. This worked well, but valuable tim e was lost in the multiple transmissions. The SABA system's hard-wire communication system was considered, but it was decided that USAR-1's search camera probe was working sufficiently to pass critical, real-time information back and forth.

Then, while Rohaley lowered the search camera remote into the shaft, I exited the mine to view the monitor that had been set up outside the entrance. The intent was to view the positions of the victim, and to spot any unseen hazards before we lowered the rescuer. Several areas of concern were identified, including old timbers that bisected the shaft horizontally every 30 to 40 feet. The timbers might complicate the vertical movement of the rescuer and victim in the shaft, and their stability was suspect. Below the 80-foot level, the probe met with resistance in the form of a ledge, over which it could not be convinced to drop, even with Rohaley swinging the hard line back and forth from above.

On the monitor, the incident commander and others outside watched black-and-white scenes of the shaft, then darkness as the probe hit the ledge. The victim could not be visualized. However, the two-way microphones in the probe were used by Dougherty (HMTF 76) to reassure the victim that rescue was minutes away.

"Pick-Off" Rescue
I re-entered the mine with four additional members of HMTF 76 to act as the hauling team. Team 1 was double-checking the entire rescue system, and Homan was preparing to be lowered. The medical team was now requested to move into the lateral entry tunnel with the confined space litter and medical equipment. After Homan's harness was double-checked, he was attached to the dual-line rope system.

A safety briefing was conducted to review the plan. Essentially, it would be run similar to a "pick-off" rescue that might be conducted to pluck a victim from a cliff Ð except that in this case, the entire operation was happening in the confines of a mine , and the rescuer was about to dangle over a drop that was the equivalent of a 90-story building, with extremely limited recovery options if something went wrong.

The Larkin frame had been secured in place using pickets and rope systems that prevented it from bashing into the roof (and potentially loosing rockfall from the unstable ceiling of the mine). Homan slowly "loaded" the rope systems with his weight while h e was still on solid ground. Meline was in charge of the main lowering line, with Enriquez assisting. Parker was set to operate the safety (belay) line. The haul team was in place. Rohaley and I, secured to additional ropes via prussics to our harnesses, would provide edge assistance and direction for the lowering and hauling teams.

When everything was set, Homan was guided out over the center of the shaft, and the lowering operation began. After a few minutes, Homan radioed that he had reached the victim. He reported that he was moving onto the ledge to evaluate the man, treat him f or cuts, abrasions and other injuries, and package him for the ascent. Homan placed an LSP Miller half-back vertical lifting/C-spine harness on the victim, and followed up with a CMC Homan rescue harness (Homan's own design).

One hundred feet above Homan, Meline and Parker "locked off" the dual rope systems and commenced changing over to hauling systems. The haul team moved forward to take its place, and another safety check was conducted of every component in the system.

Homan explained that he was going to send the victim up alone while he remained behind on the shelf. He was (rightly) concerned with minimizing the strain placed on the overall system by hauling two large men 100 feet up a 900-foot-deep shaft in a mine. ( If the victim had been more seriously injured or unable to fend for himself, the rescuer might have accompanied the victim. We agreed, however, that there was no reason to hurry this.)

Homan signaled that the victim was "on main line and on belay (safety)." The haul team slowly took slack out of the system, allowing the victim to "load" it before he was suspended over the shaft. Homan radioed that the victim was ready, and a slow haulin g operation began. With the use of a 3:1 hauling system, the victim was easily raised upward. As he emerged from the shaft, the man was gently moved onto the waiting rescue litter and then disconnected from the rope system.

The medical team had already attached a rope to the foot of the litter, which allowed personnel outside of the mine to assist in the evacuation by pulling the litter through the narrow mine tunnel like a sled. As he emerged from the mine into the hands of waiting sheriff SAR team members and firefighters, the man was carried to a waiting patrol that would shuttle him down the muddy slope to Air Squad 8. He was hurriedly evaluated and treated by Squad 37 and transported to Antelope Valley Hospital, where i t was discovered that he had a fractured orbit and other facial injuries that would ultimately require seven hours of surgery and the insertion of three plates to reconstruct the right side of his face.

Lessons Learned

• Inter-agency cooperation and teamwork is critical to safety during incidents of this nature.
  
• Command organized the incident effectively, making assignments that addressed safety and matched the experience and expertise of personnel and units with essential tasks.
  
• The first responders recognized the potential hazards involved (i.e., entry to an old mine, vertical fall hazards, etc.) and took precautions.
  
• Standard safety principles were followed.
  
• Logistics proved to be a challenge. All of the equipment and manpower had to be shuttled up a steep, muddy road to the mine.
  
• Rigging for this rescue was challenging, and the safety of the high angle operations was due in great part to the experience and training of the team members.
  
• When Homan reached the victim, we let him unclip himself from the rope systems to treat and package the injured man. Homan reported there was little danger of falling. All the same, he was left without a proper belay, and there was still 800 feet of open shaft below his position. In retrospect, it might have been safer to send a third rope down with Homan to provide him with a belay line while he was "off line" from the main and safety ropes.
  
• After Team 1 determined that the air was good in the upper reaches of the mine, we discontinued the exclusive use of SCBA and chose not to use umbilical air lines or rebreathers (even though we conducted constant air monitoring, and these air sources were kept at the ready in case conditions changed). We should have used, at the least, particulate masks.
  
• This rescue might have been conducted in less time if the patient's condition had required more drastic measures. That, of course, might have increased the risk to personnel and the patient. And sometimes rushing tends to delay the overall operation by causing unexpected setbacks.