Wax Plant Blast Rocks Houston

May 1, 2005
Tom McDonald reports on the second major fire within a year to hit a high-density polyethylene (HDPE) wax manufacturing plant.

HOUSTON FIRE DEPARTMENT
Chief: Phil Boriskie
Personnel: 3,470 career firefighters
Apparatus: 85 engines, 37 ladders, 21 district chiefs, one deputy chief (shift commander), two technical rescue units, two hazmat units, one foam pumper, three safety officers, three air cascade units, one rehab unit (HFD also operates an extensive EMS fleet and provides ARFF service at two major airports)
Population: 2 million
Area: 617 square miles

A mammoth explosion and ensuing fire leveled offices, a warehouse and a tank storage yard at a southwest Houston high-density polyethylene (HDPE) wax manufacturing plant, damaging numerous homes and businesses surrounding it. All three workers in the plant at the time managed to escape safely. Luckily, no one was killed and there were only a few injuries to firefighters and civilians.

Calls from all across the metropolitan area inundated 911 centers shortly before 6 P.M. on Dec. 3, 2004, as the explosion could be felt more than 20 miles away. With the plant only two blocks from Houston’s southwestern city-limit line, several fire jurisdictions near the site responded, including the Houston Fire Department (HFD), which dispatched a first-alarm assignment of four engines, two ladders, two district chiefs, a safety officer and several EMS units.

Initial Operations

Engine 102 from the career Missouri City Fire Department, a community bordering Houston, was the first to arrive from quarters less than a mile away. That crew managed to search the perimeter of the plant and accounted for the handful of employees still inside as Houston units began to arrive.

Houston District 82 Chief E.J. Bender, the first HFD officer to arrive, staged his companies two blocks away for a brief period until the exact nature of the hazards involved were evaluated. The Marcus Oil & Chemical Co. plant, however, was no stranger to firefighters as this blast was not the first recent major incident there. Less than a year earlier, on Dec. 20, 2003, the HFD responded to a potentially-disastrous fire in the main production area of the plant. Four additional engines had to be called to suppress that blaze as long hoselays were required from the few hydrants in the area.

Bender called for the department’s Hazardous Materials Response Team (HMRT), but knew it would take close to a half-hour for the team to arrive from its quarters across town. He ordered firefighters under his command to approach the spectacular, block-long blaze cautiously and give top priority to cooling numerous exposed storage tanks.

Water supply and access were both problems at the plant, so Bender summoned a second alarm. Streets in the area were narrow with deep open ditches and a scarcity of fire hydrants. Apparatus had to be positioned close to the edge of roadways to allow others to pass. Relay pumping was used in several instances to develop the necessary fire flow.

This time, the fire did not involve the production area, but that area was threatened by exploding tanks and drums. Numerous large tanks in the plant’s storage yard, as well as a metal warehouse that also housed the company’s offices, were involved in this fire.

The east (Exposure 2 or B) side of the plant fronted Canemont Street, where a wire fence briefly slowed firefighters from their order to place heavy-caliber streams. The crew from HFD Engine 68 took its deck gun down and used it as a multiversal inside that fence.

The plant’s main entrance, at the north end off Minetta Street (Exposure 1 or A) had a sizable paved driveway, large enough to maneuver 18-wheelers. Ladder 82 and Tower 69 (a platform) were positioned there inside the fence to train protective streams on exposed tanks and the uninvolved production area west of the fire (Exposure 4 or D).

Already partly involved by the time first fire units arrived, the plant’s main office in one of two large warehouses on the site rapidly was consumed by fire. For several hours, smaller tanks and drums continued to explode into spectacular fireballs visible for miles around.

Environmental Issues

The incident’s environmental impact was addressed early. The HFD’s three-piece HMRT arrived from their east-side quarters in less than a half-hour and its crews, under Captains Tommy Erickson and Mike Byrd, began to control runoff and monitor shell temperatures of tanks with infrared thermometers.

Fearing possible involvement of toxic chemicals, Houston police cordoned off a 10-square-block area surrounding the blaze. All news crews on scene were kept a quarter-mile north of the site. Broadcast media advised residents to remain indoors for several hours until the large plume of smoke had dissipated. A very light evening wind allowed most of the smoke to trail straight up.

Air and water monitoring services, ordered by the state’s environmental authority, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), also arrived quickly and began to take samples. An Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) airplane leaving Freeport, 50 miles south of the fire, was overhead during much of the fire taking air samples aloft.

The “dean” of Houston’s HMRT members was on duty that evening, although working on a shift different from his normal crew. Assigned to the team since its inception 25 years ago, Engineer Bill Hand was given the job of team advisor to the Incident Commander.

“Bill is an enormous asset on a fire like that,” Erickson said. “He has a tremendous amount of knowledge that he has gained over the years. He is very level-headed and just goes through the processes smoothly.”

A City Without Zoning

Houston is the largest U.S. city without comprehensive zoning. Even though supporters have managed to put proposals for citywide zoning on ballots numerous times over several decades, voters have always turned down such plans. As a result, many areas of the city, including the area around the wax plant, have developed with a wide array of occupancies next door to one another. In fact, a house, church, homeless shelter and social club were directly across the street from the plant, and all were badly damaged. Fortunately, only a few occupants received minor injuries, but there were many close calls.

Eight men meeting inside The Gulf Coast Club, a social club directly across the street, dove for cover when the initial explosion sent the entire front door and window assembly crashing down on furniture and the office Christmas tree. Employee Juan Vasquez said, “I thought it was a bad thunderstorm. I was in the front room and the whole wall just came in on us so quickly.”

Club member James Cheek pointed out a three-foot-wide hole in the brick on the front wall of the building where a jagged piece of flying metal had imbedded itself. Much of the ceiling in the New Deliverance Church, next door to the social club, collapsed during the blast. The church operated a homeless shelter, and many of the men staying there were pelted by falling building materials. HFD rescue personnel systematically checked nearby homes and businesses, but found no trapped victims.

A number of homes and other businesses near the plant were heavily damaged as well, including a residential garage directly across the street that was hit by a large piece of flying debris. A nearby resident sitting in her living room watching TV ended up on the floor of her home when the force of the blast knocked out a plate-glass window right behind her sofa. Her husband said, after a few minutes, he started smelling gas. “The explosion blew out the pilot light on our stove, so I just shut off the gas to the house,” he said.

By far, the most spectacular example of flying debris was an intact 40,000-gallon tank that had rocketed more than 100 feet across the plant’s property and lodged itself into the side of a neighboring metal building. Next to where that tank had stood were three other similar tanks, one of which had flaming product flowing from it.

Apparatus Threatened

About an hour into the incident, the main drain in the plant’s north driveway became so plugged with flowing wax that Engine 82, positioned near the north gate and supplying water to two ladder pipes, became surrounded by a sea of molten sludge. Engineer Robert Fults first stood on the pump panel running board, then finally escaped the hot wax by climbing over the cab, while Captain Robert Ross slipped and fell into it, burning both hands severely. At least one other fire officer was transported for fall injuries.

Local and federal investigators converged on the scene. Within a day, they determined that the initial explosion was due to a mechanical failure in a storage tank, ruling out an intentional act. The federal investigators, however, were considering recommending a more in-depth investigation of the facility in light of the other recent major incident.

Knowledge Gained

  • Cooling and protection of exposed tanks is critical for a successful outcome in industrial plant fires. Using unmanned streams from as far away and out of the potential trajectory as possible is certainly preferable to manned devices at such incidents. This action certainly requires that a voluminous water supply be developed early, but its use should be tempered with a plan for containing runoff.
Monitoring of internal tank temperatures is highly desirable if equipment to do so is available. Aggressive action to prevent the inferno from spreading within the plant kept the fire away from the potentially more catastrophic production area. Concerns for the environment were addressed early and often. Runoff control was implemented early and ideally should begin even before the first streams are opened up. Early notification of government environmental agencies and private hazardous waste cleanup services are equally important steps. Apparatus should be carefully positioned at industrial incidents where product flows may encroach on them and, if repositioning is likely, should be positioned for escape from the start. Where space permits, rear-mounted aerials should be positioned with cabs facing away from the “hot zone” and aerials extended straight out behind the apparatus as low and long as possible toward the hot zone, affording vehicles maximum protection. Unmanned streams should be used as much as possible. Repositioning should commence at the first sign of danger. Extensive fire, EMS and police resources should be called to such scenes as early as possible and operate under a unified, safely located command. In the event it is found that all such resources are not needed, they can easily be returned to other duty. The HFD and Houston Police Department share a common tactical frequency that can be used in just such emergencies. Command, through its communication and media relations arms, should inform local broadcast media as quickly as possible and as often as needed of all information pertaining to street closures, evacuation routes and sheltering instructions. It is best to stress specific instructions to the public for protective action and minimize discussion of potential dangers. The goal is to get people to do what you want them to, not cause a panic. All fire command vehicles should be outfitted with portable TV receivers to monitor aerial video shot from local broadcast media helicopters. Incidents even smaller than this one will likely be covered live in most metropolitan areas where local TV stations have helicopters, but many incident commanders work just such incidents without the benefit of seeing what off-shift firefighters are watching at home. Voters and officials in cities without comprehensive zoning should become keenly aware of the potential for disaster when volatile industrial plants are allowed to stand side-by-side with homes and businesses. Where such situations exist, it is an absolute prerequisite that the local fire and police departments take the initiative to target specific properties for disaster drills, working together to manage quickly what might be a very challenging real event some day.

HOUSTON FIRE DEPARTMENT HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RESPONSE TEAM (HMRT)

  • Established: Oct. 5, 1979 by now-retired District Chief Max McRae
  • Quarters: Fire Station 22 at 7825 Harrisburg, near the Port of Houston (the second-largest-tonnage port in the U.S.)
  • Commanders: Assistant Chief Danny Snell and District Chief Blake White
  • Apparatus: Two step vans and one foam pumper
  • Staffing: Ten on a shift, including a captain on each van, engineers on all three units and two firefighters on each van plus one on the foam pumper
  • Training: Minimum Hazardous Materials Technician, but most with incident command and Hazardous Materials Specialist training as well

HOUSTON FD RESPONSE
Marcus Oil & Chemical Co. Explosion and Fire Dec. 3, 2004

5:52 P.M. – First alarm; District Chiefs 82 and 10, Engines 82, 48, 59 and 80, Ladders 82 and 59, Safety Officer 26 P.M. – Special call for Haz Mat 22 Unit 1, Haz Mat 22 Unit 2, Foam 226:04 P.M. – Second alarm; District Chiefs 28 and 33, Engines 68, 73, 21, 47 and 10, Ladder 76, Tower 69, Safety Officer 15, Shift Commander, Rescue 117:15 P.M. – Third alarm; District Chiefs 69 and 46, Engines 77, 26, 70 and 28, Ladders 77 and 2611:32 P.M. – Under controlTom McDonald is a captain, serving his 23rd year with the Houston Fire Department, and is assigned to Engine Company 82.

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