MARY MARSHALL
ICHIEFS Publications Editor
Nine months after the tragedy in Worcester, MA, claimed the lives of six
fire fighters, Chief Dennis Budd and Massachusetts State Fire Marshal Steve
Coan presented the lessons learned and recommendations to the audience at
Fire-Rescue International's Disaster Night session on Sunday, Aug. 27. The
lessons learned focused on the large-scale recovery efforts in the eight
days following the disaster and taking care of the survivors-immediate
family and fire fighter family.
"I'm just like every fire chief here tonight," said Budd as he began his
presentation. He described Worcester as a large New England city, and the
area where the fire raged at the Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse
building is an industrial railroad hub. He also noted the construction of
the six-story building, which was known to fire fighters as "the building
from hell." The building, which was insulated to keep cold in, had very few
windows. The layout of the building, which contained a series of freezers
and meat lockers, was literally a maze.
To make matters worse, Budd said that there were no preventive measures to
make the building safe from fire. There was no smoke control, no standpipes,
the sprinkler system was turned off as per agreement with the building
department, and there was no fire department connection to sprinkler system.
The incident
In a somber voice, Budd described the incident as has been described many
times before. The Worcester Fire Department responded to a fire at the
Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse building. Early reports on the scene
indicated that two homeless people used the warehouse for shelter and might
still be inside the burning building. Shortly before 6:30 p.m., fire
fighters entered the building to search for the couple. At this point,
visibility was clear. Less than an hour later, conditions worsened
considerably.
Shortly before 7 p.m., the first signs of trouble appeared. During this
time, Rescue 1 fire fighters Paul Brotherton and Jerry Lucey called in a
Mayday report. They said they were low on air and lost in the building. They
gave their location as two floors below the roof.
Search and rescue teams, carrying ropes, were deployed to locate Brotherton
and Lucey. Just after 7 p.m., conditions deteriorated rapidly. A third alarm
was struck and mutual aid was requested. During this time, Lt. Thomas
Spencer radioed that he and Timothy Jackson, both of Ladder 2, were lost on
the fifth floor. He asked if someone could go to the door of the stairwell
and yell to help them find their way out.
After Spencer and Jackson radioed that they were lost, fire fighters Jay
Lyons and Joe McGuirk from Engine 3 entered the building to help with the
search and rescue operations. Some time before 7:30, fire fighters Lyons and
McGuirk made it to the fifth floor where Spencer and Jackson were lost.
Between 7:30 and 7:45, three attempts were made to contact the missing fire
fighters from Ladder 2 and Engine 3. None of the men ever responded.
Investigative fire fighters were sent inside to report on interior
conditions. They reported that they could not get above the third floor.
Everything above was fully involved. Shortly before 8 p.m., a wall of fire
shot through the roof, rising nearly 100 feet above the building. This was
nearly an hour after Rescue 1's first Mayday call and more than 25 minutes
since the last radio contact with Ladder 2. At that point, Budd called for a
complete evacuation of the building. The operations became defensive and
Budd knew he had a recovery operation rather than a rescue. He immediately
called in a critical stress incident management team (CISM), which was
coordinated through the State Department of Fire Services.
The recovery
In addition to the difficulties of battling a major fire, WFD was faced with
serious challenges. First and foremost, they had lost six members and needed
to conduct search and recovery. This would require prolonged operations,
expected to last at least several days if not weeks. It would also require
major technical and engineering needs and continuity of operations while
engaged in extinguishments.
In terms of personnel, there were additional problems. All local resources
were committed to the incident.
Outside factors included a major influx of help that did not bring its own
support, weather conditions that made operations difficult to dangerous and
national media attention.
The recovery operations to bring out the six fallen fire fighters would last
eight days. It would require the cooperation and resources of fire
departments and agencies across the state.
"During the recovery, smoldering debris would re-ignite," said Budd. "And
going through the debris was like conducting an archeological dig. We wanted
to maintain the integrity of the site, and we wanted to bring out these fire
fighters with the dignity and respect that he deserved-and with respect for
the families. "
The resources
Before the flames died at the Worcester Cold Storage building, help from
outside the Worcester Fire Department was made available. The Massachusetts
State Department of Fire Services, under the direction of State Fire Marshal
Steve Coan, was on hand to help coordinate the logistics, which included
assisting in coordinating continued fire protection for the state's second
largest city (coordinated activation of Statewide Fire Mobilization Plan);
assisting in identifying and obtaining expert assistance (FEMA Urban Search
and Rescue teams, Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, Corps of Fire
Service Chaplains and Peer Support); providing the supports necessary to
sustain operations (Health and safety, food, ground support, supplies and
equipment).
Coan said that the ability to successfully assist the Worcester Fire
Department during the crisis was possible because the State Department of
Fire Services had the Statewide Fire Mobilization Plan established prior to
the incident.
"I think we were very fortunate in our state to have a document we could
pull off the shelf-a statewide plan," said Coan. "I don't think we could
have managed the amount of mutual aid resources for that community if we had
to fly by the seat of our pants."
The support
As news of the Worcester tragedy unfolded, help poured in from across the
region. The Fire Chiefs Association of Massachusetts assisted with statewide
mobilization planning, provided staff officers and provided executive
assistance to the fire marshal. The International Association of Fire
Fighters and the Professional Fire Fighters of Massachusetts provided peer
support for the fire fighters and helped coordinate the memorial service.
The Chaplains Corps, formally established only weeks before the Worcester
tragedy, were available to the families-immediate and fire fighter-to assist
with emotional, religious and spiritual needs. Budd emphasized the
importance of meeting not only the physical needs of the fire fighters and
families, but the emotional needs as well. He said that having critical
incident stress management at the scene is imperative.
In closing his remarks, Budd thanked all who had helped during the Worcester
crisis. He also told the chiefs to take advantage of networking
opportunities such as Fire-Rescue International. Earlier this year, Budd had
spoken to the Metro Chiefs Section in Miami. He told them, too, how valuable
their support had been. "If it wasn't for this organization, the opportunity
to attend meetings and conferences such as these, for the networking and
friendships...you don't know how important the conferences are until you
have a situation like mine," said Budd. He said that he had spoken to Gary
Marrs, chief of the Oklahoma City Fire Department, after the bombing in
Oklahoma City. Marrs had told Budd to always make sure that he had a good
relationship with his police chief. Budd did, and it helped during the
recovery.
"I had thought that serving in Vietnam, seeing friends die...seeing death
related to fire incidents, vehicle collisions, medical emergencies...I
thought it would harden me to this," Budd said quietly. "Boy, was I wrong.
There is nothing that can harden you to this."
Since the tragedy
In the aftermath, the state legislature has instituted the Massachusetts
Initiative, which includes $10 million fire fighter safety and health
community grants; enhanced fire fighter safety and survival training; the
purchase of a new incident support unit; and the development of an Incident
Support Management System. Charges were dropped against the homeless couple
who set the fire. They had been charged with involuntary manslaughter.
Ten lessons learned
- Prepare for the long term operations.
- Establish separate and limited media area. Hold scheduled incident
briefings being cognizant of media deadlines.
- Develop plans to provide food services to large numbers of personnel
24 hours a day during operations.
- ID card system for site security tried and failed due to badges
being requested as souvenirs.
- Recognize local law enforcement issues in denying access to extended
family and community residents.
- While it was desirable to provide as much comfort as possible, it
was also recognized that too much comfort would have the undesirable effect
of preventing fire fighters from going home.
- Develop community resource guide to identify needed materials to
support the long term operation.
- Provide privacy and coordination for family needs.
- Establish statewide system of critical incident stress management
teams and fire service chaplains.
- Create state memorandum of understanding with FEMA for activation of
USAR Team.
- Develop statewide mobilization plan sufficient for major operations
of long term duration. Match mutual aid assignments with company resources.
This article appears in the November 1 issue of On Scene, the official
publication of ICHIEFS, the International Association of Fire Chiefs.