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The predictability of building performance under fire conditions, structural integrity and extreme fire behavior, accelerated growth rate and intensity levels typically encountered in buildings of modern construction during initial and sustained fire suppression have given new meaning to the term “combat fire engagement.” The rules have changed, but no one has told us. It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations, although any seasoned command and company officer knows that at times it is what gets the job done under the most demanding circumstances.
From a methodical and disciplined perspective, however, aggressive firefighting must be defined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal-oriented tactical operations. These are defined by risk-assessed and risk-analyzed strategic processes executed under battle plans that promote safety and survivability.
The dramatic changes in buildings and occupancies over the past 15 years have resulted in inadequate fire suppression methodologies. Fire research and the need to understand fire and its relationship to buildings, systems and firefighting operations are challenging long-held beliefs and encouraging debate, resulting in thought-provoking and insightful theories, position statements and a time of retrospect and critical self-examination that will influence numerous facets of the fire service.
We have assumed that the success of past operations equates with predictability and diminished risk to firefighters. Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies is not as predictable as past conventional construction; therefore, risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address the new rules.
Executing tactical plans based on faulty or inaccurate strategic insights and indicators has proven to be a common apparent cause in numerous case studies, after-action accounts and firefighter line-of-duty-death reports. Our years of predictable fireground experience have ultimately embedded and clouded our ability to predict, assess, plan and implement Incident Action Plans (IAPs).
The demands of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel in situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrated with intelligent tactical deployments and operations.
“If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for smart aggressive fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner that is no longer acceptable within many of our modern building types, occupancies and structures. This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at risk. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes. Someone could get hurt, someone could die; it’s that simple, it’s that obvious.”
Those are the words of Chief Anthony Aiellos (ret.) of the Hackensack, NJ, Fire Department on the 20th anniversary of the Hackensack Ford dealership fire that killed five firefighters in 1988. Without understanding building-occupancy relationships and integrating fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety-conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident management, company-level supervision and task-level competencies, you are derelict and negligent and everyone may not be going home. Empirical insights and test data must be integrated in emerging fire suppression models and improved firefighting theory.
Our world has evolved. Technological and sociological demands create a continuing element of change in the built environment and our infrastructure. With these changes and demands come the need to assess these vulnerabilities, hazards and threats with effective and dynamic risk management and competent command and control.
Fire suppression tactics must be adjusted for the rapidly changing methods and materials impacting all forms of building construction. n