NIOSH Faults Boston Fire Department in '07 LODDs

Nov. 10, 2009
NIOSH investigators cited inefficient tactics, operations and codes in the 2007 deaths of two Boston firefighters. Warren J. Payne, 53, and Paul J. Cahill, 55, perished while battling a fire in a restaurant. The death certificate listed the causes of death for both firefighters as thermal injuries and asphyxia. The report also notes that toxicology reports were requested but not received: "There have been media reports of alleged substance abuse that were discovered during the toxicological screening of both victims.

NIOSH investigators cited inefficient tactics, operations and codes in the 2007 deaths of two Boston firefighters.

Warren J. Payne, 53, and Paul J. Cahill, 55, perished while battling a fire in a restaurant. The death certificate listed the causes of death for both firefighters as thermal injuries and asphyxia.

The report also notes that toxicology reports were requested but not received: "There have been media reports of alleged substance abuse that were discovered during the toxicological screening of both victims. NIOSH repeatedly requested a copy of the autopsy reports through the fire department, district attorney’s office, and representatives of the families, but did not receive any toxicology reports; therefore, NIOSH is not able to comment on the alleged condition of the victims.”

Investigators were highly critical of the operation. They cited the following:

  • Insufficient occupational safety and health program.
  • Ineffective incident management system at the incident.
  • Insufficient incident management training and requirements.
  • Insufficient tactics and training.
  • Ineffective communications.
  • Delay in establishing a rapid intervention team.
  • Inadequate building code enforcement and development.
  • Inadequate turnout clothing and personal protective gear

     

They also mentioned that neither victim nor others in the fire department had received training in many years.

"NIOSH investigators identified several examples in this incident in which recognized guidelines for IMS were not followed. Specific examples include: incident command was not established by the first arriving officer, incident command was never formally transferred, lack of an established accountability system to track fire fighters on scene, no safety officer was assigned, and a RIT was not established before conducting interior operations."

In addition to making recommendations to fire departments, they also had suggestions to NFPA and municipalities or officials responsible for setting and enforcing codes.

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