Editorial: You Can’t Fool With Mother Nature

Jan. 1, 2004

I recently returned from my second trip to Southern California to cover the devastating wildland fires that occurred in late October and early November 2003. This is in preparation to publish a special report in an upcoming issue. Our in-depth coverage will detail the management of the fires, strategies and tactics used, the deployment of hand crews, engines and aircraft, how weather affected the fires, topography and the lessons learned.

During the incidents, I was able to watch live TV coverage on many channels as news crews followed the progression of the fires. Let me set the stage of the fragile environment of Southern California in late October 2003: high temperatures, critically low humidity, extremely low fuel moisture (below critical levels), a drought that has lasted nearly five years, vegetation in many wildland areas that had not burned in decades, homes built in the interface, overgrown vegetation around homes and many wood-shingle roofs. Add several human-caused fires in the same geographic area, many of which are still under investigation. Throw in the Santa Ana winds, blowing fiercely from the northeast toward the Pacific Ocean. Numerous fires burning at the same time in the southern half of California, eventually blackening hundreds of thousands of acres. Several civilians died, many while trying to escape rapidly advancing flames. One firefighter was killed because of severe fire conditions.

Because of the close proximity of the fires in the southern half of the state, incident commanders had to update each incident daily with the California Office of Emergency Services. The threat assessments they provided were then used to prioritize the incidents for additional limited resources. Upon arrival at the Cedar Fire in San Diego, incident commanders requested 92 Strike Teams, consisting of 460 engines, on an immediate-need basis. Many of these resources had to travel over 12 hours after dispatch from the northern portion of the state. Eventually, out-of-state units were needed to keep up with the constant demand for resources for structure protection.

In San Diego County 13 civilians were killed, 107 people were injured and 2,824 structures were damaged or destroyed. The fire destroyed nearly 280,000 acres, making it the largest in area in the state’s history. In Ventura County, the weather and fire conditions were no different. Officials recorded a burn index of 298, the highest recorded in Ventura, where a reading of 245 is critical. The Simi Fire threatened many homes and the Reagan Presidential Library. Erratic winds pushed the fire through thousands of acres every hour. The flames were sure to extend through a mountain pass that it had crossed during eight previous fires, but this time the fire stopped.

When the weather finally changed and wind direction turned 180 degrees, from East to West the fires slowed and allowed firefighters to get a better handle on the situation. Because of the changing weather conditions, one firefighter commented that he encountered fire, rain, snow and fog – all in the same area in the same day. Another firefighter added, “We aren’t letting the houses burn down because we don’t know what to do. Many of the homes were not defendable.”

Many residents who lost their homes were understandably upset. They wanted to know why they had no advance warning when told to evacuate as the fires were drawing down upon them. With the fires burning at record speeds, in many cases, firefighters also had little advance warning. A lot of blame was heaped upon firefighters for not doing more. There was also much civic praise for firefighters and police who performed evacuations during the fires. Homeowners, however, have to do their share. If a house has flammable vegetation all around and a wood-shake roof, but no defensible space, there may be little that an engine company can do. After a hurricane, people don’t blame the fire department. After a tornado, people don’t blame the fire department. This was not a fire or series of fires, with the existing weather conditions – this was a natural disaster. As one chief summed up, the fire burned what it wanted, traveled where it wanted to go and all firefighters could do was stand to the side and watch it go by.

Congratulations to longtime Firehouse® Contributing Editor Dennis Rubin, who was recently appointed as fire chief of the City of Atlanta. A tip of the helmet and best wishes to the chief.

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