Cleveland Fire Department
Chief Kevin G. Gerrity
Personnel: 997 career firefighters
Apparatus: 26 engines, 14 ladders, four rescue squads, one fireboat
Population: 510,000
Area: 76 square miles
A fire at a metal-plating company in Cleveland on March 23, 1997, sent 35 career members of the fire department to local hospitals. Numerous chemicals were stored in the structure that were used in the plating process, many of which burned or reacted with the water that was used during fire suppression.
Engines 11 and 26, Ladders 11 and 13, and Rescue Squad 1 were dispatched at 10:30 A.M. to the Aetna Plating Co. at 7309 Union Ave. under the command of Battalion Chief Bob Gribble. First-in Engine 11 arrived on scene at 10:33 and Lieutenant Robert Fenderson reported a working fire with heavy smoke coming from the one-story, L-shaped structure.
The 60-year-old building was 40 feet wide and 120 feet deep, and was of ordinary construction. An office area was located at the front with a shipping and handling area behind it. This part of the building also contained a basement storage area. A single-story wing measuring 120 by 35 feet was attached to side 4 of the structure. It was in this wing that the plating process took place. There was no basement under this wing. The fire appeared to be in the plating area upon arrival of firefighters.
Crews donned self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and initiated an interior attack with one 1 3/4-inch and one two-inch line from Engine 11. Ladder crews performed roof ventilation. Interior crews encountered heavy smoke and heat that limited their ability to advance inside the building.
With fire conditions worsening, Gribble requested a second alarm at 10:35. Responding on this alarm were Engines 9 and 41, Ladders 7 and 10, Air Truck 705, Heavy Rescue 729, the command post, Assistant Chief Paul Stubbs (the safety officer) and Acting Assistant Chief Johnny Brewington.
Photo by John McCown Firefighters reposition hoselines out of the collapse zone.
Crew members from Engine 9 were ordered to ventilate the cellar windows on sides 1 and 2. Engine 9, a 55-foot TeleSqurt, was then positioned at the southwest corner of the building and placed its master stream into operation. This unit was initially supplied by Engine 26; later it was supplied by Engine 4. From this position the master stream could be directed into the fire building and also used to protect a residential exposure 10 feet away.
With the fire continuing to spread, Gribble ordered all firefighters out of the building and off the roof at 10:45. A defensive operation was established with the primary concerns of a residence on side 2 that had already been evacuated and a row of residential garages on side 3.
Brewington requested a third alarm at 11:05, bringing Engines 4 and 38, Ladders 1 and 20; Hazmat Units 700 and 701; Fire Prevention Bureau Hazmat Specialist Lieutenant Terry Bindernagel and Chief Robert Derrit, acting chief of the department, to the scene.
An increased water supply was needed to supply the five aerial master streams and numerous handlines that were in operation. This was accomplished with multiple relays using four-inch supply lines. Engine 4 laid a 550-foot length of supply line from Engine 9 to a hydrant on East 71st Street. Engine 38 hooked on to a hydrant at the southeast corner of East 75th and Union streets. This engine supplied Ladder 13 with a 200-foot supply line. A 100-foot two-inch handline was also placed into service to protect the north and east exposures.
Once the fire was knocked down, the aerial master streams were ordered shut down to avoid spreading the chemicals unnecessarily. The fire was declared under control at 12:43 P.M. Due to the lack of water application, however, the fire began to grow again and was generating a significant amount of smoke. A weather front had moved in, bringing cloud cover and light snow to the area. This kept the smoke close to the ground on side 1 of the fire building.
Photo by John McCown Ladder 11, among the first units dispatched to the scene, mounts an aerial attack. At one point, five aerial master streams and numerous handlines were in operation.
A meeting was held between Cleveland Fire Department hazmat personnel, on-scene representatives of the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency and the building owners to determine the best fire-suppression tactics. Once the exact locations of the chemical baths in the plating area were determined, fire streams were reinstated to extinguish the remaining fire. The chemicals, stored in various forms and amounts, included copper cyanide, potassium cyanide, silver cyanide, sodium cyanide, zinc cyanide, glacial acetic acid, methyl ethyl ketone, cadmium oxide, granulated carbon, chromic acid flake, hydrofluoric acid, nitric acid, oxalic acid, phosphoric acid, caustic soda, sulfuric acid and trichlorethane.
The first signs of illness among firefighters appeared at noon. Complaints of a burning sensation in the lungs and throat, headaches, and in some instances nausea were being received by fire officers. Paramedics from Heavy Rescue 1 established a triage area west (upwind) of the fire building. The "START" (Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment) method of triage was implemented. Each firefighter was quickly assessed and it was determined that all were breathing at a normal rate, had a capillary refill of less than two seconds and had normal mental responses. It was determined that none of the firefighters were in critical condition, and this allowed time for a more detailed assessment of their conditions while awaiting transport to a hospital. Twenty-six firefighters were transported to seven area hospitals by fire department rescue squads. An additional nine firefighters requested medical examination after their units had returned to quarters. Five firefighters were admitted for overnight observation at the Cleveland Clinic. All others were examined and released to return to duty. Two residents of the house next door to the fire were also transported to the hospital for treatment of smoke inhalation.
Based on information that was gathered early in the incident, it was thought that trichlorethylene used in a degreasing bath and also in the shipping and handling areas was the cause of the respiratory distress suffered by firefighters. It was believed that the chemical had evaporated and entered the atmosphere due to the high heat conditions in the building. During post-fire cleanup, it was discovered that nearly all of the chemical remained in the degreasing bath. Officials searching for the cause of the medical problems learned that there is virtually no information or research available on the behavior of plating-shop chemicals under fire conditions.
Fire investigators have not determined cause of the blaze. The total estimated fire loss was $200,000 to the plating company and $1,500 exposure damage to homes. The cost of environmental cleanup of the site has exceeded $500,000.
Jay K. Bradish, a Firehouse® contributing editor, is a former captain in the Bradford Township, PA, Fire Department. He has been a volunteer firefighter and fire photographer for more than 20 years.
