Historical perspective
I remember participating in some live burns in the early 70s and 80s, and one in particular where we were burning some small-frame farm-type buildings. One of the area fire chiefs, donning his plaid shirt, cowboy boots, jeans and Vitalis, tossed a coffee can full of gasoline on the fire to “make it realistic.” While we had to take natural and unnatural rapid action to survive that event, it didn’t seem like a big deal at the time. We were "Wow!" and "Phew!" and "Damn, THAT was hot!" but it seemed to be more exciting rather than dangerous. But it was really dangerous. We were an example of uneducated fire officers because we simply didn’t really know any better.
The history of NFPA 1403 goes back to a 1982 training detail in Boulder, CO, where two firefighters died in the line of duty (training) and another suffered severe burn injuries during their training incident. The firefighters were doing search-and-rescue evolutions in a well-involved acquired structure when a flashover occurred. Even though the companies had been directed to focus on locating the objects of their search rather than extinguishing the fire, the subsequent investigation revealed several factors, including inadequate hose streams, combustible materials, and a general lack of operational safety/survival procedures.
The Boulder incident is hardly the only training incident where firefighters have been critically injured or lost their lives since then. The following are training incident stories from around the country.
Firefighters burned in New Jersey during live-fire training in a converted bus
In Parsippany, NJ, in 1992, the Greystone Park Fire Department was conducting a Firefighter 1 course with 19 fire trainees (all rookies) with other area fire departments. Two fire officers from Greystone Park taught the course, one being a state certified fire instructor. This training was done independently and not through the local Morris County Fire Academy, which was actually located in the same town. On the day of the training fire, the burn was held with only one officer who was the certified instructor along with 18 of the trainees. The fateful goal of the training that day was to get the trainees to understand real fire conditions and the proposed training would have the recruits perform search and rescue drills while inside an old school bus. The 1976 bus, donated by the local school board, had been used for local fire training for several years. The seats were removed and steel plates were welded over the windows. On the day of the fire, the fuel load piled up in the bus consisted of a foam cushioned couch, a hollow wood door, a five-gallon can containing a small amount of liquid fuel, and a partially burned truck tire. Wood soaked in kerosene was placed in three sections of 55-gallon drums that had been cut in half to create heat and smoke. Shredded paper was placed under the foam cushions on the couch, and a road flare was left under the cushions to ignite the fire. The fire was allowed to burn for approximately 10 minutes before five students and the one instructor entered the bus. Approximately 30 seconds to one minute after they entered the bus, a flashover occurred. The instructor and two students exited the bus immediately and were uninjured. Two other students were able to exit on their own but were injured. One student had to be removed from the bus and was severely injured.
The New Jersey Division of Fire Safety report identified numerous items of concern, but the ones directly leading to injuries include:
Use of an inadequate facility not designed for firefighter training
- No protection of a hoseline
- No safety officer appointed
- Not enough certified instructors
- Excessive amount of fire load
- Inappropriate fuels
Probie firefighter used as a simulated victim killed in New York live training burn
This is another training exercise that went horribly wrong when a young firefighter died, others were injured, and the fire department's assistant chief was indicted on manslaughter and assault charges. Lairdsville, NY, fire trainee Bradley Golden was killed in the line of duty while participating in a live-fire exercise when he and two other firefighters were trapped on the second floor of an abandoned house. The other two survived with burns. They were participating in rapid intervention training and they were playing the role of "victims" to be rescued by other firefighters. Firefighters had planned to set a fire in a steel barrel on the second floor, which would have generated smoke and heat only. At the time though, during legal proceedings, prosecutors claimed that Assistant Chief Alan Baird ignited a sofa on the first floor instead, which burned out of control, trapping the young firefighters on the second floor. The district attorney at the time claimed that this "training" went far beyond mere negligence, to the point of recklessness. The exercise was conducted in an old wooden structure with only a single staircase and boarded-up windows. Thus, there was a highly flammable environment with limited escape routes. They accused the assistant chief of lighting the fire in a couch, which was then placed in the staircase, and there was no charged hoselines when the was fire started.
The three trapped rookie firefighters had not been trained in the use of SCBA. This incident lead to a life lost and numerous lives ruined forever.
Two Florida firefighters killed during live training burn
On July 30, 2002, the Osceola County Fire Department used a foam-rubber mattress to fuel a fire during training. Again, there was a flashover. This time, two Osceola County firefighters, Lt. John Mickel and rookie firefighter Dallas Begg, were killed.
As part of the drill, a firefighter set fire to straw and wood pallets with a flare. Two other firefighters shoved a mattress across the bedroom floor to another firefighter, who said he tossed it on the fire, and then they exited.
Mickel entered the burning house with Begg as planned. It was Begg’s first month on the job and Mickel’s 10th year. They formed the training’s search-and-rescue team. Their role was to sweep the home’s interior and rescue the “dummy” victim. Other crews followed as thick, black smoke rose in the front bedroom behind a pane of glass, but little visible fire. On directives, a firefighter walked to the bedroom window and used a pole to break it. The action was supposed to help firefighters inside by clearing smoke and heat away. Instead, the fresh air fueled the deadly flashover. Fire and smoke blew through the hole and up toward the roof line.
Interior firefighters could not see the fire conditions and could not see each other due to the thick smoke. The training incident commander hadn’t heard from the search-and-rescue team and he called out for them with no response. He tried again. No response. The evacuation signal was transmitted.
As one of the surviving crews exited, a firefighter caught a glimpse of what he thought was a mannequin. He reached to pull it from the fire. The air pack started coming as they were trying to drag the body out, still at this point not realizing what was happening or who they had. They rolled what they thought was the mannequin, and the air mask came off his face. That’s when they realized that it was a firefighter. A horrible loss that continues to live with those who survived that day.
Assistant chief killed in dwelling fire training
Assistant Chief Arnold Blankenship and other members of the Greenwood, DE, Fire Company were participating in a training/demolition burn of a 2½-story wood-frame dwelling on April 30, 2000. The plan for the day was to do small, one-room burns to evaluate a saw, and then to completely burn the house. After a series of small fires were extinguished on the first floor of the house, preparations were made for the demolition burn. The plan for the final fire was to ignite the attic, then ignite the first floor, evacuate the house, and allow it to burn completely. Water curtain nozzles were set up on the exterior of the house to protect trees that were in the proximity of the house.
Blankenship went into the attic of the house and used a small garden-type sprayer to distribute diesel fuel in the attic. As fires were ignited inside an attic room, he used the sprayer to “accelerate” the fire. Except for Blankenship, all firefighters had left the attic space and were proceeding to the first floor of the structure. A firefighter waiting at the base of the attic stairs for him noted fire and smoke coming from the attic. When firefighters reached the exterior of the structure, they notified the fire chief that Blankenship was missing and possibly trapped.
As some firefighters attempted to suppress the fire, other firefighters used a ground ladder to access the second floor of the house in an attempt to rescue Blankenship. After several attempts, firefighters followed the sound of an activated PASS device and were able to reach him. They were, however, unable to remove him as portions of the collapsed roof covered him. Mutual aid firefighters arrived and were able to locate and remove Blankenship’s body about an hour after the time he was reported missing. The cause of death was later listed as asphyxiation and burns.
A Major Incident Response Team from the Delaware State Fire Marshal’s Office conducted a thorough review of the incident. The review concluded that there were several contributing factors to Blankenship’s death. They included:
- Blankenship remained in the attic too long, despite the urging of at least two other firefighters to exit the attic due to deteriorating fire conditions
- The initiation of several fires simultaneously in different areas by orders of Blankenship
- The confined space of the attic construction caused the unstable conditions in the attic resulting in raising the ambient temperature; thereby causing volatile conditions in the room where the firefighters were present
- The use of atomized diesel fuel through a garden sprayer by Blankenship directly on a free-burning fire in the south wing of the attic resulted in the flash fire that enveloped the attic, and ultimately claimed his life.
The most respectful way to honor fallen firefighters is to learn what went wrong (and what went right) and use proven and factual details as we educate, train and drill going forward.
We have quite a history of getting ourselves hurt or killed during training. Why? In many cases, it’s because we—from the command level to the firefighter level—get too comfortable. It may be that simple. We drift from what we know and what we were taught (or were never taught, so we “don't know what we don't know”), we get comfortable and we ignore standards, policy and history. Some see the training ground/live-fire detail as a chance to “play” ... and then we end up repeating that behavior on the actual fireground.
Historically, some have ignored what we know and how we are expected to act at a “real” fire. After all, “it’s just training” may be the conscious (or unconscious) attitude that takes over what should be a high level of preparedness and risk management.
There is a lot to learn and there are departments that have learned.
Live-fire drill close call
A few months ago, I saw a video online of the Salisbury, NC, Fire Department (SFD) conducting a live-fire training. During the training, the video showed what appeared to be a close call. As the fire on the second floor intensified, a large piece of burning plywood flew from a window, narrowly missing a firefighter positioned at the bottom of a ladder.
I've been friends with SFD Fire Chief Bob Parnell for many years. His reputation for leading a community-focused enthusiastic department is well known. "Every day a training day" is the goal of the SFD—one that they regularly meet.
The SFD responds to more than 4,000 incidents a year, protecting a population of more than 34,000. The department employs more than 100 highly trained men and women. During an average year, the department responds to a variety of calls for assistance, including medical emergencies. Besides fire engine and fire truck units, the department has specialized teams for hazmat, water rescue, high-angle rescue, trench rescue, confined space and collapse incidents. They serve the community in many other ways than just traditional firefighting based on the talents and interests of their team members. Our sincere thanks to Chief Parnell, Battalion Chief of Training Nick Martin as well as all the members of the SFD who have contributed to sharing the facts of their live-fire drill.
“What happened?”
The following are comments from Chief Parnell.
This live burn was designed to be a scenario-based series of drills to bring together several areas of operational and training focus that had been covered for several months prior. The tone of the day was to be more of a “drill” than “training”—putting into place what we had already been working on. Present at the drill were regular SFD members, members of the SFD recruit class (who had already completed their FF 1 & 2 training), and automatic aid departments. Thus, there were both veteran and rookie firefighters on the drill.
This incident occurred during the first live burn for the day. The scenario was to be a second-floor single-room fire. The engine would encounter a victim on the stairs from the first floor to the second floor and would need to react appropriately (including managing both the rescue and fire attack in accordance with some previous training we had done). The room was prepared by the live-burn instructors. These instructors are certified by the North Carolina Office of the State Fire Marshall—a special certification above that of a regular instructor that is quite rigorous to obtain (side note, I am not a North Carolina live burn instructor and was not the instructor for this burn).
The instructors that day were not members of the SFD but were veteran officers from another major fire department in the state. All crews received a safety walk through and briefing prior to the burn. The scenario was created and evaluated by the SFD, the live burn fire itself was run by the North Carolina instructors. The instructors were briefed on all the scenarios prior to the start of the day and reviewed the setup of the building for compliance with safety standards. The fire room was loaded and ignited by the instructors, utilizing a standard package of four wooden pallets and two bales of hay. Though North Carolina allows the pre-application of diesel fuel to burn sets, none was used in this scenario. Other than the burn set, the room was empty. The windows throughout the house had been removed during asbestos abatement. Therefore, OSB was used to cover the windows to control ventilation. The OSB was mounted to the outside of the windows with 2–3 penny-nails so that it could be easily and rapidly removed by hand if necessary.
After all companies and crews were in the ready position, the fire was ignited. The instructors retreated to their pre-planned refuge area on the front porch, which allowed them to watch the fire room and crews without being in the way of the advancing hoseline. An SFD chief officer was also on the fire floor at the start of the scenario, back towards the stairs in an observational role. The scenario was set to have companies deploy from the apparatus. Instructors allowed the fire to grow to flashover of the fire room, in accordance with North Carolina standards, before signaling via radio for the companies to begin deployment.
A ladder and engine company were first to arrive, simultaneously. On their arrival, no fire was evident from the second floor, only dark smoke. The crew of three (driver, officer, firefighter) established a water supply via a forward lay, completed a 360, and stretched a 200-foot 1 3/4-inch line (150-gpm nozzle) to the side Alpha door, entering approximately 75 seconds after their arrival. The crew proceeded to the stairs at the rear of the first floor and ascended to the second floor. As they passed, they made the second floor approximately 33 seconds after entry, there was a brief flame at the ceiling at the top of the stairs. Crews at this time had found the “victim” and passed it off to the ladder company behind them and began flowing and moving down the hallway to the fire from at the A/B corner. They continued to extinguish the fire, and along with the ladder company, completed a primary search and controlled extension. Other than the fire event, the scenario played out as expected and in accordance with our fireground standard operating procedures (SOPs) and the drill plan.
In short, as fire chief, I was made aware of all planning, actions and preparations for the live-burn training at the acquired structure well before the training date. I was very comfortable with our training staff and our operations chiefs and their planning actions. I was very comfortable with the local college’s live-burn preparations and the instructors they selected to run the program. I was familiar with the acquired building as we had planned to train in it a few times over the years (way back when I was the chief of training 15 years ago).
As the discussion of the live-fire training at the specific acquired structure started, I knew, by way of multiple discussions, staff meetings and informal discussion, that the training staff and operations chiefs were following our internal live-burn SOPs and the state’s live-burn training procedures. In North Carolina, interior live-burn training sessions don’t just happen overnight. Significant planning, inspections and approvals are required and followed.
The 18-second video
I was not on site as the training started and I quickly received the video of the “rapid expansion.” I immediately called the supervising chiefs who quickly verified no injuries occurred, that there was not one drip of fuel used in the fire (the use of diesel fuel in live burns to simulate a flashover was discontinued years ago in North Carolina), that the interior fuel load policies were strictly adhered to and that this rapid expansion event happened at the very first burn of the day (the building was not pre-heated). They continued to verify that the two “firefighters” who were videoed sticking their heads into the window on Division 2 Alpha were the training instructors who were exactly where they were planned to be, doing exactly what they planned to do—which was to watch the students advance the hoselines from that window.
In North Carolina, the hose/nozzle crews are not allowed to enter a live burn room until flashover/rollover has occurred (reducing the chance that firefighter trainees are exposed to flashover injuries). The chiefs advised me that the hose and nozzle crews were not in the fire room as the rapid expansion occurred, in fact, the crews didn’t feel or see anything of it. The hose crews were on the stairs pulling hose up toward the fire floor. The rapid expansion was rather violent from the exterior but was not at all impressive from the interior.
We are thankful that the young firefighter who was at the base of the ground ladder on the Bravo side was not hit by the falling, burning plywood. The plywood was fastened to the window frame with two 1 1/2-inch finish nails to facilitate easy ventilation by interior firefighters, and to allow for safety egress if needed. It was not needed. In hindsight, we have some work to do with our young regarding ground ladder placement and to avoid operating directly below a window. Imagine if a glass-filled window sash broke out due to the rapid expansion. That firefighter would have been rained upon with shattered glass shards. Maybe additional nails should be used to fasten the plywood covering the windows.
Focus on safety
The SFD training staff is highly capable, competent and had planned with the safety of firefighters foremost in mid. They properly briefed the students at the onset of the training session including a pre-burn walk through, had communicated established emergency signals, had a rapid intervention team at the ready and medical teams on site. They had adequate safety officers in place, ventilated the structure appropriately, and never exceeded fuel load policies. There were adequate instructor staff and a solid communications plan. The training goals were verbally communicated with the students often and the training evolutions were organized (crews and company rotations were established). Appropriate water supplies, working hoselines and safety hoselines were all in place and operational.
