As we reviewed in this column last month (firehouse.com/20994555), on Jan. 31, 2018, the Loveland-Symmes, OH, Fire Department (LSFD) was dispatched to a structure in the City of Loveland. The first unit on scene found a medium, two-story residential structure with a working fire. Crews discovered fire in the basement, but, pushed by strong winds, the fire was spreading rapidly through the home, into the attic.
As conditions deteriorated, interior operations were halted and firefighters were ordered to exit the structure. As the crews from Tower 61 and Rescue 57 were pulling out of the building, they were followed by a ball of fire. Fortunately, no one was injured, as they were just far enough removed from the structure at the time of the fireball.
I think this Close Call exemplifies the coordinated nature of the department’s response to a complex incident that could have gone terribly wrong had it not been for the alertness of command officers keeping an eye on fire conditions and ordering the evacuation.
This month, we’ll review comments and lessons learned from LSFD Chief Otto Huber, Deputy Chief Josh Blum, who was assigned to the safety division, and other responders who were on the call, and I will offer additional observations.
Notes on LSFD
While we are far from perfect, our department, its leadership and our area mutual-aid partners have tried very hard with measurable success to create a service focused on taking care of both the public and our own people. While no one has lost focus on the need to take care of those who dial 9-1-1, we are equally focused on taking care of our people, so that we can function effectively individually and with our mutual-aid departments nearly every day.
Although I was out of town for this fire, thanks to technology, I was able to listen to it, and what I heard provided only a slight understanding of what happened during this complex incident. A great lesson for all of us is that what you hear may not always provide the full picture.
This fire was a good example of the impact of several factors on operations: our training program (literally every day is a training day), our standard of cover/dispatch assignments, our leadership/command training, our fireground expectations/discipline, and our relationships with area departments.
Takeaways from Chief Huber
In discussing the fire with Chief Huber, he offered the following takeaways:
Preplan and special circumstances: Every shift and every morning, all stations get on a conference call to discuss routine and potential issues for the day. The morning conference call indicated that it was going to be a day filled with heavy wind gusts.
Size-up: Our policy requires a standard size-up; it is not an option. The critical fireground factors were identified early—high winds, basement fire, smoke conditions, construction type—which led to the correct strategy and assignments. The 360 performed by Captain Matt Stelle identified that the fire was in the basement and was confirmed by smoke staining on several windows in different divisions. But the fire was also spreading up, and that information was made clear via radio to all on the fireground. Building size was also indicated by the initial size-up report, which led to crews pulling the appropriate lengths in their hoselays.
Resources: The LSFD Standard of Cover ensured that the correct effective response force was dispatched for this particular fire zone. This allowed for a continuation of the three-deep deployment model, and that was reinforced during the event as the incident commander (IC) continued to reevaluate his strategy utilizing the hazard zone management model, as trained through the Blue Card system.
Division supervisors: Putting Division bosses in place quickly allowed the IC to set the stage for success even before deploying crews. This is standard for any reported fire within LSFD, as well as our neighbors.
Apparatus placement: A conscious decision by all apparatus operators in spotting their apparatus (either tactically or out of the way) allowed for full use of equipment and appliances. Configuration: The fact that we had a working fire was indicated before arrival by the IC. We identified that we needed to get this fire in check quickly because it was headed directly for the attic due to construction, burn time and construction type.
Life hazard: Time of day and day of week suggested that we had a lesser likelihood of occupants in the building, and we also had the neighbor’s report of the owners being on vacation. Due to this, our primary focus was on immediate fire control. Changing conditions and strategic changes: Constant reevaluation of conditions allowed for a change in strategy before the troops were unable to exit the building. The communication model worked with constant communications between Divisions and the IC, and senior, experienced division bosses were able to identify the change in conditions early.
The actual fire in the basement was room and contents, which then burned through the floor above. To be clear, when we switched from offensive to defensive and then back to offensive, it was done knowing where the most significant damage was and by communicating and restricting those areas to all personnel.
Comments from other responders and Chief Goldfeder
When writing this piece, I was provided with some great information by relatively young, outstanding fire officers.
One interesting note was by LSFD Captain Matt Stelle, who shared: “One of the biggest takeaways from this incident is the reality that there are still so many firefighters who will get caught up in the moment/excitement of what is going on and not think about anything else, such as what may go on or what has already happened. In this case, it was and is a constant effort to watch out for everyone operating near the hole in the floor just inside the door way. We’ve read about the incidents where firefighters just took a few steps inside the door and that’s all it took. This very well could have been the same situation if we did not initially identify this was a basement fire and there was a hole in the floor just inside the door way.”
Deerfield Township Fire-Rescue (DTFR) Captain Marc Brinker further noted: “After the fire, crews went back inside and noted the layout of house. We also noted that there was no charring of roof joists in the main attic area of house, just heavy smoke staining. The fire possibly breached the cockloft space in the two-story great room from the exterior fire on the Charlie side. This fire in the cockloft area then burned horizontal and breached the separate attic area on the Delta/Alpha side, causing heavy smoke conditions. It is also likely that the deteriorating conditions were due to a significant increase in exterior wind. These wind-driven conditions caused heat and smoke, and eventually fire, to be pushed through the attic and down onto the crews through the areas opened for fire attack in the attic area. We were just getting ready to pull crews out because we noted the deteriorating conditions when command called us out. I did not know from our interior position the significant increase in exterior wind. This was a quick, disciplined decision made by Chiefs Huber and Blum because of the close monitoring of the changing exterior conditions that were not immediately noticed by our crews inside the structure.”
In discussing this fire with LSFD Deputy Chief Josh Blum, who was assigned to the safety division at this fire, he noted several lessons reinforced (in italics, followed by notes from myself):
Confirm the fire address early on for later arriving units.
In a case where the fire turns out to not be where you were dispatched, use the radio and make sure everyone knows where to go.
Be aware of wind conditions. We often think of wind-driven fires as just mid- and high-rise buildings.
There have been some recent cases where house fires turned disastrous when wind was not immediately recognized as a contributing factor. Just a few years ago in Texas, a captain and a probationary firefighter lost their lives in a one-story dwelling fire where wind was a contributing factor.
Size up and give details to responding units—and use a TIC!
Whereas several years ago, the TIC was considered a “special” piece of equipment, it is now a standard piece of equipment that should never be left on the apparatus. Recently, a mid-Atlantic department had two firefighters fall through the floor, ending up in a burn unit, after the TIC was left on the rig and they walked in and fell into a burning basement. By all accounts, the TIC would have eliminated those unnecessary burn injuries.
Identify the basement and give updated information from the 360 size-up.
Let them know all about the basement, including access, egress and what conditions exist.
Position apparatus to be utilized based off of the potential conditions, not just what you have on arrival.
One of the most wonderful things on the fireground is having experienced and well-trained fire apparatus operators who know where—and where not—to place the rigs based upon current (and forecasted) conditions.
Deploy the proper hoseline to reach the fire location.
Setting up your apparatus with pre-connects as well as “dead loads” can make a huge difference, especially when that pre-connect doesn't measure up. Versatility that matches the potential of your response area is the way to set up your hose loads, not based upon how a manufacturer may want it set up. Getting out into the area you protect, planning and drilling for those long stretches is the way to be ready.
Monitor smoke and heat conditions with TIC and visual conditions.
Once again, the TIC is useless on the rig. And today, with the low cost of TICs, it is possible that every seat could be equipped with one.
Understand building construction and roof spaces. (This home had 5 separate roof spaces.)
While we have a responsibility to understand our first-due areas, there will always be some conditions that we are unable to anticipate. Communication on the fireground and experienced anticipation can help minimize those situations.
Get fast water on visible fire.
Getting water on the fire quickly always helps the overall conditions. Keep in mind that while water on the fire may seem easy, without apparatus set up to be able to do that, and regular hands-on training to ensure the skills are present, you may be surprised at how long it takes. This is also a good time to understand your flows. How much water do you need, expect and actually deliver with your current lines, lengths and nozzles? What are your drivers expected to pump? What is the desired outcome? A stream that “looks good” means nothing. This is a great reminder to do some testing so you know the facts vs what may be false outcomes.
Standard of cover
There are many takeaways from this Close Call, but the one I want to focus on is the deployment model, an organization’s “Standard of Cover”—in other words what happens BEFORE THE FIRE. What's the plan in your department? Rest assured, our “system” was hardly created overnight, and a whole lotta heartache and aggravation was part of the hard work over many years.
In this case, the fact that we had solid, experienced and well-trained companies and officers from all departments operating on scene was just one factor, because on the outside were the critical contributions of the exterior command officers providing what those inside companies needed—a clear understanding of the conditions that they were unable to identify.
So often you may see videos or pictures where there are little to no exterior officers providing the coaching staff to the IC and those inside, or numerous bosses are on scene, with no specific role.
As stated by the members operating inside at this fire, the officers from the exterior did an excellent job of monitoring the conditions and making the decision to have interior crews exit the structure based upon what they saw—what those crews couldn’t see.
If your department has enough chief officers responding to cover assignments, such as command, accountability, exterior divisions, interior divisions, safety, etc., that's excellent. If not, consider how a change may benefit in supporting the IC, the firefighters and most importantly, those having the fire. And when we talk about these other assignments, we are NOT talking about taking company officers away from supervising companies; we are talking about your staff chiefs and/or your neighboring chiefs planning ahead, training and then responding together on that first alarm to ensure all those critical positions are rapidly covered.
Our sincere appreciation to LSFD Chief Huber along with all Loveland-Symmes, Deerfield Township, City of Blue Ash, City of Sharonville, Goshen Township officers and firefighters for their assistance and cooperation in this article.
Billy Goldfeder
BILLY GOLDFEDER, EFO, who is a Firehouse contributing editor, has been a firefighter since 1973 and a chief officer since 1982. He is deputy fire chief of the Loveland-Symmes Fire Department in Ohio, which is an ISO Class 1, CPSE and CAAS-accredited department. Goldfeder has served on numerous NFPA and International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) committees. He is on the board of directors of the IAFC Safety, Health and Survival Section and the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation.
