On Nov. 24, 2014, a grand jury in St. Louis County, MO, handed down no indictments on Police Officer Darren Wilson concerning the shooting of Michael Brown. The decision was long awaited and gave fire and EMS agencies plenty of time to plan after the civil disturbances that followed the shooting in late August.
As one who worked for the City of St. Louis for 25 years, I have many friends, contacts and acquaintances there. I have had the unique opportunity to discuss with many of them concerning the lessons learned from almost three weeks of rioting after the first incident, their planning for the day the decision would be handed down and their lessons learned from the second round of rioting and violence.
It all started when allegedly Brown and a friend were walking in the middle of the street when Wilson, in a police car, pulled up alongside the men and asked them to move to the sidewalk. A fight reportedly broke out between Brown and Wilson and evidence later showed Brown punched Wilson in the face twice and wrestled for the officer’s gun while Wilson was seated in the police car. Other evidence in the police car confirmed the presence of Brown’s blood.
Witness accounts
Although various versions of the story floated around media outlets – depending on who they were talking to; there was no dash camera in the officer’s cruiser that could record or document the encounter, which reportedly occurred in and around the vehicle. Some witnesses said Brown ran and Wilson drew his weapon after getting out of his police car in an attempt to stop Brown. Most of the protest was based on some witness statements that had Brown raising his arms to surrender while Wilson shot him.
Evidence shown to the grand jury indicated Brown turned back to attack Wilson after initially running away. In an ABC interview, Wilson said he feared for his life, so he continued to fire his weapon until the threat was neutralized.
At the center of ground zero were the Ferguson Fire Department (FFD) and Christian Hospital EMS (CHEMS), when riots broke out on the afternoon of Aug. 9 and then in a massive way on the night of Nov. 24 after the grand jury announcement was made. At the core of providing fire and EMS response were the FFD and CHEMS. The FFD operates from two fire stations and is the primary fire agency for the city of Ferguson. FFD provides first response, but not EMS transport ‒ that service is contracted out to CHEMS.
CHEMS is a hospital-based EMS system that is the 9-1-1 provider for eight fire protection districts and municipalities in north St. Louis County, which has a population of approximately 250,000. With 22 ambulances and 108 employees, CHEMS is the third-busiest 9-1-1 provider in Missouri, answering about 46,000 calls annually.
Many of the lessons learned from the almost three weeks of rioting that started on Aug. 9 were used in the planning process for whenever the final decision would come down. It was not sure how the crowd would respond if an indictment came down, but there was no doubt what they could expect if Wilson was not indicted.
One of the biggest lessons learned from the Aug. 9 episode was the need for unified command between law enforcement, fire and EMS. For the first three or four days in the first incidents of civil disobedience, there was no unified command and police were not communicating fully with fire and EMS. The police had their own challenges. Technically, it was the Ferguson Police Department’s jurisdiction, but the St. Louis County Police Department assumed overall command because of its larger size and the size of the incident. However, several days into the unrest, Missouri Governor Jay Nixon indicated that the Missouri Highway Patrol was being brought in and would be taking control. The police had their own challenges with unified command.
As fire and EMS realized that it did not appear that the first civil unrest incidents would end, it was necessary to coordinate with the police. In some cases, buildings burned when firefighters could not go in and in other cases EMS victims waited or were thrown in privately owned vehicles and taken to the police command post several blocks from the rioting.
The biggest challenge for fire and EMS in the initial riots was determining when a scene was secure to go into and then mirroring up the EMS or fire response with force protection. The largest challenge during the Nov. 24 riots was the sheer number of protestors, who outnumbered the police on the first night. It seems the police planning did not anticipate the large number of rioters and looters. Not helping matters was when Brown’s stepfather publicly announced “burn the bitch down” immediately after hearing the decision.
The first night of civil disturbance resulted in 21 buildings burning along with police vehicles in the city of Ferguson. Some buildings were unreachable by firefighters because the situation was too dangerous and they were just allowed to burn. In some cases, fire companies and strike teams that were brought in to assist the FFD had to abandon their positions, disconnect hoselines from engines and leave the scene after they came under direct fire. Hoses had to be left lying in the street in order to make a quick exit.
The first priority for all fire and EMS personnel during periods of civil unrest is safety. The important lesson is coordination with law enforcement agencies ‒ do not go in until the area is secure and maintain force protection during fire and EMS operations.
For more news and training on EMS, visit http://EMSWorld.com/.
pull quote:
Firefighters abandoned their positions, disconnected hoselines and left the scene after they came under direct fire.
GARY LUDWIG, MS, EMT-P, a Firehouse® contributing editor, is the fire chief of the Champaign, IL, Fire Department. He has a total of 37 years of fire, rescue and EMS experience, including St. Louis, MO, and Memphis, TN. Ludwig is a licensed paramedic and has a master’s degree in business and management.
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