On The Job - Texas: 8 People Injured As Apartment Fire Destroys 8 Units in 16-Unit Building
Early in the morning of Sept. 19, 2006, an apartment fire was reported to the Fort Worth, TX, Fire Department. The building, a 16-unit wood-frame structure built in the late 1970s, was located within the Breckenridge Apartments. The building had no sprinkler system, and the fire appeared to have started in the kitchen of a ground-level apartment. The ensuing two-alarm fire resulted in an EMS sector, a major collapse and an injured firefighter.
The building, one of 68 in the complex, was constructed of lightweight wood trusses, which were commonly used in the 1970s and '80s. Situated between apartment floors and throughout the gable-end composition roof structure, open-bar wood trusses, held together with nailed gusset plates, had been deployed in all buildings within the apartment complex.
The Fire
The first 911 call was received at 2:16 A.M. on a mild and clear morning, so the weather was not a factor. The initial alarm consisted of Battalion 1, Battalion 2, Engine 17, Quint 17, Engine 4, Engine 10 and Truck 14. All responding companies were informed that several calls had been received concerning the fire. Engine 4 advised that a train had temporarily halted their response, but Engine 17 arrived on scene within five minutes of the initial 911 call and discovered a two-story apartment building with heavy fire showing from the roof. Fire engulfed four upstairs units, as well as two rear ground-level units, and smoke showed from two front ground-level apartments.
The Engine 17 crew noticed that no one stood outside the burning structure, which is a familiar sight at residential fires. Engine 17 pulled a two-inch attack line, and Firefighter Shea O'Neil, who was on the nozzle, stated that had anyone been trapped inside the two front ground-level apartments, they had a viable chance of survival despite the smoke showing from those units. Engine 17's crew hoped to push the fire away from those two apartments so they could be searched.
Quint 17 arrived on scene and, under the direction of Captain Bobby Tatum, requested a second-alarm assignment and then set up on the A-B corner, with the aerial positioned to knock down the main body of fire inside the building, even if the fire progressed.
Engine 17's pump failed, the cause of which was deemed mechanical, but the problem corrected itself, and the line was charged and advanced. At that moment, both building stairwells and the second-floor landing collapsed. Behind the nozzle, Firefighter Kyle Stapp was injured when part of the stairwell carriage beam landed on his foot; he was later transported to the hospital. Engine 4 arrived on scene and laid a supply line into Engine 17. A hydrant sat less than 20 feet from Quint 17. Battalion 1 Chief Danny Miller arrived on scene and assumed Breckenridge Command.
Engine 17's crew entered a ground-level apartment through a window in an attempt to keep the fire off the two downstairs units so they could be searched. Once the search was complete and an all clear was given, Engine 17 withdrew and assumed a defensive position on the A side. Battalion 2 Chief Landon Stallings was assigned to the west division, which consisted of everything west of the collapsed stairway and landing, including Engine 4 and Engine 10. At that time, Truck 14 arrived and was instructed by command to start laddering the building for access.
West division advised Engine 10 to pull a two-inch handline and Engine 4 to pull a 1¾-inch handline and, proceeding from an unburned apartment, to breach a wall and contain the fire. The intent was not to extinguish the fire with two handlines, because there was not enough gpm, but to halt the fire's progress in the attic. After laddering the front windows with a 15-foot and a 24-foot ladder and the roof with a 35-foot extension ladder, Truck 14 was assigned to search uninvolved apartments in the west division. Once an all-clear was given, Truck 14 helped breach party walls to let handlines advance after the master stream knocked down the main body of fire.
The four units (two on the first floor and two on the second floor) on the far eastern (D) side of the building had been written off by that time, and all efforts concentrated on cutting off the extension of the fire, which was headed toward the west division. The west division contained eight units uninvolved in fire and, after conducting primary searches and giving an all clear, personnel implemented an offensive/defensive strategy for confinement. To stop the fire's extension in the common attic, handlines were placed in two second-floor units and extinguishment was achieved by close coordination with an elevated master stream, which was then redirected to the east side of the building. Handlines were advanced after the structure was deemed stable. Stallings had ensured the location and function of all interior crews prior to directing the elevated master stream operation, and the coordinated effort included monitoring the conditions within the building during the master stream operations. He placed Engines 10 and 4, along with Truck 14, in position, and he maintained constant communication with all personnel inside the structure, as well as the operator of Quint 17.
The second-alarm assignment consisted of Battalion 4 Chief Robert Barton, Battalion 5 Chief Richard Ward, Engine 5, Engine 22, Engine 3, Quint 21 and Squad 2. Ward was assigned to the east division. Engine 5 was the first-on engine of the second alarm. Command assigned Engine 5 to boost the hydrant supplying Engine 17. The second-in unit on the second alarm, Engine 22, was instructed to find another hydrant and supply Engine 10 in case Engine 17 had another equipment failure. Engine 3 was third on scene and established staging on a street outside the complex to avoid congestion within the complex. Quint 21 and Squad 2 staged with Engine 3, followed by Barton, who created an EMS division to care for the injured. Engines 29 and 36 responded to provide relief and assist with overhaul.
Two factors were key in the successful outcome of this incident — command and communications. The first-arriving engine company established command. Less than a minute later, Quint 17 arrived, assumed command and requested a second alarm. Establishing command from the beginning is critical to the success of any operation, and the incident command system was used throughout the incident. Three separate divisions were created for the fire, all of which reported to command.
Communication was another key to success, regarding the tactics and strategies used. Normally, interior and exterior operations should not be attempted, but with a solid command structure, specific personnel assignments, and clear and precise instructions delivered both in-person and by radio, the operation was organized and effectively deployed. All crews stayed together, with no reported freelancing.
The Patients
Command faced not only a major fire, collapse and an injured firefighter, but also civilian injuries. After a bystander reported a civilian injury to Barton (EMS division), he asked the officer from Engine 22, whose crew had just finished connecting Engine 10 to its supply line, to have a firefighter check the area for injured civilians. Engine 22 Firefighter Jarrod Pavlechko located the patient and five others with injuries ranging from cuts and scraps to severe burns. Unable to radio his officer due to heavy traffic from suppression activities, he made the 50-yard walk to inform his officer that more help was needed.
One family, whose dwelling was located above the apartment of origin, sustained six of the seven civilian injuries. Upon discovering the fire, they attempted to flee via the front door, but a wall of flames blocked their exit, leaving a second-floor window their only means of escape. All six, including a woman of 70 and a year-old girl, jumped from the window, resulting in injuries due to impact, cuts from broken glass and burns from the flames through which they jumped. One additional civilian suffered smoke inhalation and impact injuries.
Once Engine 22's officer notified Barton of the need for more help, Engine 5's remaining crew was assigned to assist with patient care. All patients were moved into the breezeway of a separate building to shield them from smoke that drifted in their direction. Barton notified command of the multiple patients and requested a separate radio channel for EMS operations. Three patients required air ambulances as a result of their injuries.
Squad 2 was assigned to designate a landing zone for three helicopters. Squad 2's officer, Lieutenant Mike Lugo, set up the landing zone across the street from the apartments, in the parking lot of a high school. EMS division requested three additional ambulances for the remaining patients, and patient care continued until the helicopters landed. At that time, all three critical patients were loaded into waiting ambulances and taken to the landing zone, while the remaining patients were loaded into the ambulances and transported to area hospitals.
Any civilian injury can complicate an already dynamic situation. By placing an unassigned officer, regardless of rank, in charge of EMS, command could concentrate on the task at hand. It is not wise to use an assigned company to deal with new problems. By advising command that an EMS division was necessary, Barton effectively situated EMS as a separate incident, and requesting a dedicated EMS channel freed up valuable air space for suppression operations. Suppression activities operated on channel 2, EMS operated on channel 5 and staging operated on command channel 8, and not a single on-scene company complained of not being able to "get through."
The Collapse
How long the fire burned prior to Engine 17's arrival is unknown. However, the structure was heavily involved on arrival and due to construction and wind direction, the breezeway functioned as a tunnel, creating a blowtorch effect. The staircases, which had been replaced a month prior to the incident, were straight-run stairs, with steel carriage beams, concrete treads, and no risers or soffits. Four five-inch lag bolts connected the staircase to the landing. At the bottom, two smaller concrete bolts connected the stairs to the concrete paving, and one additional wood screw connected the inside carriage beam to the building.
The landing was supported by two-by-10-inch boards on 16-inch centers, and two-by-10s were doubled at both ends, into which the five-inch lag bolts supporting the stairs were screwed. Metal joist hangers connected the two-by-10-inch supports to the building, and these hangers connected to another two-by-10-inch board that ran down the length of the building. The board was attached to the building with wood screws. Fiberboard functioned as a soffit on the underside of the landing, and two inches of concrete sat atop the two-by-10-inch supports.
Wind blowing through the breezeway fueled the flames from the ground-floor apartment, intensifying an already intense fire, which burned through the thin fiberboard soffit and the two-by-10-inch board supporting the metal joist hangers. Also, the fire appeared to have entered the wall structure behind the two-by-10-inch support board.
The support board was attacked from both sides, and the northeast corner appeared to fail first, which broke the support board (to which the joist hangers were affixed) in half. The southeast corner of the landing failed next, as evidenced by the twisted joist hangers that remained on the east wall of the breezeway. Once the east side of the landing dropped, the entire west side collapsed. The metal joist hangers remained attached to the two-by-10-inch supports, but the entire support that was attached to the building gave way, causing a teeter-totter type collapse, with the east side hitting first, followed by the west side. While the straight-run stairs remained attached to the concrete base, the connection to the landing failed on both the north and south stairs.
Fortunately, no companies were below the landing. Due to the weight of the concrete, the two-by-10-inch supports and the steel carriage beam, anyone caught below would have perished. Any company caught atop the landing would have had a brief but harrowing ride down and resulting injuries, a near certainty, although probably not life-threatening.
When the pump failed, Lieutenant Jerry Strider saved his life and those of his crew - O'Neil and Stapp - by backing out until the problem was corrected. Also, he didn't position his men beneath the landing, because it was too close. Yet, their placement was intended to save lives. Because no one stood outside the structure when they arrived, because it was nighttime and because the conditions of the two front ground-level apartments presented the possibility that residents might still be inside, they felt it necessary to protect the units, despite the risk, until both apartments could be searched and any occupants could be rescued.
Conclusion
This incident had the potential to go south in a hurry. With five major components (major fire, collapse, multiple victims, firefighter injury, and joint offensive and defensive operations) the fire was as complex as it gets. Yet, due to the calm and professional demeanor of everyone on-scene, the fire went as well as any fire could.
No lives were lost, damage was contained, patients were treated and transported in a timely manner. The incident command system performed flawlessly, and personnel completed assignments, without fail, providing an exemplary model for fighting fires.
LARRY MANASCO has been with the Fort Worth, TX, Fire Department for 11 years and has served as a lieutenant for the past three years. He holds the classifications of Fire Officer I and Hazardous Materials Technician. Manasco may be contacted at [email protected].
