Close Calls

Normally, we use this column for "close calls" involving actual emergency responses. That is the intent of this column and will continue to be. Unfortunately, though, we receive numerous e-mails and letters from readers advising us of "another" training activity that resulted in the near injury, near death or death of a firefighter. We felt that our time this month would be well spent reviewing a close call that occurred during a training detail to remind readers that, in our opinion (and we hope yours too), there is no excuse for injury - or worse - while training.

This account is provided by a reader. Chief Goldfeder's comments follow.

We were at a training fire at a house donated to the department by a local builder. It was an older one- story, single-family dwelling, of Type V construction, with a full basement and a cistern on side A, which was also the front porch. A door had been cut into the cistern, which was used as a storage room. We had taken the time to pull up all the carpet in the house and place all potential hazards, such as paint and solvents, in the cistern. The plan was to not do any burning in the basement.

My officer started a fire in the bathroom of the house, which was on side C. Another firefighter and I advanced a 13/4-inch line through the front door and radioed the officer that we had located the fire, which was very small, and were going to knock it down. The officer told us that we were to wait until it was bigger and then knock it down.

We waited and waited, but the fire got smaller. The only problem was that the smoke conditions were worsening. My partner then radioed the officer to report the worsening smoke conditions. The officer advised that we had a small amount of drop-down in the basement that was creating the smoke and he would tell us when to knock down the fire. The smoke continued to darken and bank down on us until my partner, who was only a foot away, was no longer visible. We again radioed that we were going to knock down the fire and get out.

Water was put on the small fire and extinguished. The smoke was so dark and thick that we could no longer see our exit. We followed the line back to the door and began to feel the intense heat of the floor. The closer we got to the front door, the hotter and more intense the floor became. As we reached the front door it was so hot that I had to jump through the door just to get out. When we finally got out, the officer was in the backyard advising us to pull the line out and bring it to the back of the house. We were told to take the line in the basement and put out the fire.

Lo and behold, what had happened was that the officer threw a flare into the cistern and lit up the contents of the room. "That would explain the intense amount of heat at the front door," I said to my partner. After the fire and smoke cleared, we went in the basement to assess the fire damage. The cistern had acted as a giant oven and forced all the flames out the door and directly onto the floor joists and sub-floor, directly below our exit. I feel that my partner and I are very lucky to have gotten out that day. As for our officer, no actions were taken for his dangerous actions.

These comments are based on Chief Goldfeder's observations and communication with the writer:

We definitely don't have to look hard or far to find training incidents that have gone bad. In most cases, it appears that we just get lazy or comfortable, and function with a "no big deal" attitude - and that's what gets us hurt or killed. Before we go any further, let's take a look at this specific incident.

1. First of all, there is no mention of National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 1403 being followed. Why not? Because it wasn't. Now, please don't start whining to me or anyone else that "those NFPA standards are unfunded mandates," because that is only half true. Yes, they are unfunded, but so what? This standard costs nothing and can save a lot. No, they are not mandates, and you don't have to follow any NFPA standards. But like most things, you must be prepared to face the consequences of your actions - or inaction.

Simply put, NFPA 1403 makes sense. No firefighter has ever lost his or her life when NFPA 1403 was properly followed! How's that for insurance? And it was not written by some people wearing suits. It was written by firefighters who do the same job you do.

So, what is NFPA 1403? NFPA 1403 is the standard for "live fire training evolutions in structures" and although not in full detail shown here, highlights of 1403 include:

• Training burn buildings shall be properly and legally procured and prepped, including a full inspection of what is inside and what will burn.
• An adequate water supply and space for all equipment, personnel and apparatus.
• A pre-burn briefing session.
• Use of fuels that have known, controllable burning characteristics.
• Presence of a seasoned, trained and qualified safety officer.
• Use of a fireground communications system, a realistic and usable accountability system, a building evacuation plan, backup safety and replacement personnel, EMS (on scene) and a pre-burn search.
• Use of full personal protective equipment (PPE).

Fire departments need to look seriously and do comparisons between daily operations and training evolutions. Fire departments should consider the differences between your training and your fire scene operations. So often, the way we train and the way we actually operate look nothing like each other. Sometimes we have few procedures followed during training, while at other times we are stricter at training and laid back at an actual run. Other times, we have plenty of staffing at a training, but far less at an actual response.

Why set yourself up? Train to resemble your actual and realistic operations. In this case, the fire officer failed to do so. An actual fire response would have brought additional officers, companies and overall supervision.

2. In this training the officer chose to "wait until it was bigger," but it didn't get bigger. And when it didn't, without the slightest consideration for firefighter safety and related communication, command, control and personnel accountability (all missing from this detail), the "officer threw a flare into the cistern and lit up the contents of the room."

What level of performance accountability applies here? We remember training burns in the 1960s and '70s like that, but it is 2003 and anything less than following NFPA 1403 could be considered blatant and intentional disregard for firefighter safety. Why wouldn't anyone feel that way? How badly do we really want all firefighters to remain safe?

3. These firefighters made it out safely by accident. Why by accident? Because by all rights, this was an uncontrolled "arson" fire (you be the judge - when a fire is set outside of the standards where firefighters' lives are endangered, is it arson? Webster defines arson as, "The willful or malicious burning of property, as a building, especially with criminal or fraudulent intent.") Did the officer toss the flare without regard to his personnel? I guess it all depends on how serious you are about making sure firefighters don't get hurt at a training detail.

We have all read about the tragic results and fallout from "training details gone bad." These issues force serious thoughts and discussion regarding direct and overall responsibility. Naturally, the question of responsibility comes up of those "in charge" and operating at these scenes, but what about the big picture? What happened well before these particular events? What organizational preparation was done before any training burns were planned for or authorized? Who approved the plan? Where were the second and third opinions at the burn site by a chief level officer overseeing the detail? Or was it a case where no one other than the training officer even really gave a damn about the training until it got ugly? In the above scenario, it was a company officer who was doing the burning, the supervising and the commanding.

A recent "training burn gone horribly bad" in Florida resulted in a company officer being terminated. It is easy for a local government to give the appearance that it has fixed a problem by firing an officer. It is not uncommon for local government to take that kind of action in an attempt to protect itself. On the other hand, if a fire department and its system with regard to policies, procedures and the complete following of standards wasn't in place, that takes into consideration the fact that live-fire training isn't just a company-level officer responsibility. Where does the responsibility for tragic results start and end?

NFPA 1403 along with organizational policy, procedures, preparation, approval, verification, safety, site inspection, oversight and supervision well above and beyond a company officer seems to be where the real focus for any fire department doing live-fire training needs to be. Chiefs, that means your oversight and supervision of the plans before the actual detail, as well as your attendance at the detail, because the responsibility lies with you, no matter what. The last few years provided numerous horrible examples of training details resulting in the critical injury and/or death of firefighters in Delaware, Florida, New York and other states.

Recently, we were informed of a less than tragic training incident - but it still has all the indicators of poor planning. In this case, a firefighter fell through a skylight of a warehouse during a training exercise being conducted without the knowledge of the business!

A local fire department was holding a drill in the evening when a young and inexperienced teenage firefighter didn't see a corrugated fiberglass skylight and stepped on it. The firefighter was not seriously injured by his fall through the building.

"Without lights on inside the building, you couldn't even see it," an officer said. "It was just a little darker than the rest of the roof. Everybody at the drill learned something."

The firefighter fell about 20 feet into the warehouse, hitting a small wooden workbench on his way to landing on the concrete floor. He was treated and released from the hospital quickly. An employee said the business had not been told about the training exercise beforehand and had not given the fire department permission to use its roof. It is clear now, but at the time the fire department didn't give much thought to the fact that it cannot simply use any building for training. No, it wasn't "live fire," but safety and legal considerations were not part of the plan.

If there is any common denominator in many of the "training details gone bad," it is that at nearly every single one, a comment is made such as "it was just a routine training" or "things turned ugly, out of nowhere," to "we never thought it would happen here" and "everybody at the drill learned something."

Think about the comments that are heard after almost every tragic training event. It all relates to preparedness, thinking ahead and seeing the big picture. Sometimes we just don't think. What was that officer thinking when he tossed that flare? What was the fire department thinking when a teenage firefighter was sent to the roof of a building that the department didn't have authority to train on? The intentions are almost always good, but there are times when our thinking may not be.

We have all seen it and odds are we have all done it. Do you remember the fire department years ago that had hundreds of citizens (including kids) at its open house ... and the fire department lit a small shed on fire ... and the firefighters responded to show the public the job they do ... and the shed burned more heavily ... and the firefighters, on their knees, headed right into the flames and caught on fire? That image was "burned" into the memories of those of us who have seen the video, not to mention the people at that open house.

As firefighters and fire officers we must maintain a constant and conscious state of expecting the unexpected, whether on an emergency scene or a non emergency training detail. It is the only way to minimize the unexpected. When people ask "What were they thinking?" in most cases, they (or we!) were not. To minimize "training details gone bad" we must have:

• Training scene discipline. We must function as if this is the "real thing."
• Written, easy-to-understand live-fire training policies. NFPA 1403 is very easy to understand. We just have to read it and, as they say, "just do it."
• Fire training instructors. Supervision is critical at a training detail and one officer is inadequate.
• Command and control at all times during a training detail. An organized, strict and disciplined fire training scene using the incident command system and personnel accountability is the foundation to minimizing anything "going wrong."

So often and especially during training, we become laid back or narrow focused and fail to look at the big picture. That can result in a tragic outcome. Expecting the unexpected is a state (or attitude) that we have to be trained into; it won't happen naturally. If you have been reading this column for any period of time, we have all come to realize that almost every close call occurred when "we weren't expecting it" and "without warning" as well as "this started off as a routine run."

Take some time now to prepare your crew for a training detail or an actual response to minimize risks to yourself and to your firefighters. These close calls allowed "someone else" at "some other fire department" to have a really bad day so you and your crew don't have to. Take advantage of their close call and learn from it.

Readers are asked to share their accounts of incidents in which firefighters found themselves in dangerous or life-threatening situations, with the intention of sharing the information and learning from one another to reduce injuries and deaths. These accounts, in the firefighters' own words, can help others avoid similar "close calls." We thank those firefighters who are willing to share their stories. We invite readers to share their experiences. We will not identify any individuals, departments or communities. Our only intention is to provide educational information and prevent future tragedies.

We thank Contributing Editor William Goldfeder for compiling these reports. You may send your reports to him at [email protected].