Wildland & WMD: More In Common Than You Think

Sept. 1, 2003
I spent the week of July 4 just north of Tucson, AZ. I was there to "observe" the operations at the Aspen Fire in the Catalina Mountain range, most notably Mount Lemmon. My host, Battalion Chief Gary West, M.Ed., of the Northwest Fire Department, arranged for me to see the command and control of an 80,000-acre incident.

The Northwest Fire Department is located on the outskirts of Tucson. This progressive fire organization handles all regimens of fire protection. All of its members make a choice after their probation to be involved with hazmat, technical rescue or wildland firefighting. They then continue training with this regimen for the duration of their career, not dependent on their rank. This ancillary duty is in addition to their fire/EMS responsibilities.

The chief assigned Captain Denise Landry to keep me out of trouble and handed me off to Brian Lauber, district forester/fire management officer. Ironically, it was Brian and this overhead team that went to New York City after 9/11.

I cannot express how much my respect and admiration grew for the teams of firefighters on the lines. These men and women labor in conditions of pure hell. The fire can jump a canyon in minutes or rush at them with flame heights in excess of 100 feet and moving at unbelievable speeds. Still, they hold their lines, laboring for 12-plus hours a day for 14 days, then back to base for two days and back up to the lines again for 14 more days. Each night, maybe they get back to a camp for hot food and a cot, but most often it's "coyoteing" - sleeping in place with perhaps a sleeping bag up on the lines.

The choreographed ballet involving the movement of retardant and water by the flight crews and the air boss with the tenders and pumpers was awe inspiring. The ambient temperatures were hovering above 100 degrees Fahrenheit. The potential for injury was everywhere. Strike team leader Dennis and strike team leader trainee John showed me where a block of homes had been lost despite their two days of work because they were built in the same type of topography as the disasters of Mann Gulch and South Canyon had occurred. Both of these men were experienced, knowledgeable and credentialed. I went with a hazmat recon team, Tim and Chris, who explored the gutted sites for potentially dangerous remnants of people's lives.

The command post was located in a high school complex. The "base" was a hotbed of activity. Units were reporting in, showering, doing laundry and all of the other functions involved with mitigating a campaign event. Because this was a unified command, all of the many players were situated in classrooms performing their tasks - all connected by briefings, phones, radios, etc.

Brian sat me down in the planning section. He immediately showed me laptop computers fully loaded with incident command system (ICS) forms suitable for annotation. These are available by government contract. He had also showed me caches of radios sent out by the National Interagency Fire Center in Boise, ID, headquarters for wildland activities. He showed me many other resources, including staff personnel sent in from all over. These were data takers, people who make copies of operational plans, inventory specialists, etc. All of these folks also had credentials. I immediately began thinking of the many departments starving for resources should a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) event occur.

This overhead team came in from Texas, Arizona, Montana and New Mexico, among other areas. They had already proven their prowess after 9/11. They can also handle natural disasters. This was truly proof that the ICS system as taught at the National Fire Academy is indeed all-risk. But as I listened to briefings conducted by the planning chief and his staff and also the interaction between the incident commander and the other members of the general staff I was more than a little embarrassed. In my 30 years of involvement with structural firefighting, I had never before witnessed a complete staff of educated, experienced and credentialed commanders mitigating an incident.

All of these people had license to be there. The discussions became testy at times, but all of the players had valid concerns. The toughest thing I find is to argue with people who don't have a clue as to what they are talking about, but they are adamant that you are wrong. None of that occurred here. Before the hue and cry commences, remember that these folks have already proven that the system of credentialing works. Unfortunately most of the time, in the world of structural fire departments the incident commander and staff are there ex officio - they were on duty at the time or they are the currently elected group. No one should automatically assume they possess the knowledge or skills to command the incident.

A recent development in our arena is that investigators from the responsible agencies and the lawyers are looking into commander's portfolios when firefighters have been killed on the fireground, and charges are being brought for gross negligence. Questions are being raised about what it takes to be an incident commander. I agree with this concept.

In my opinion, if you want to be a chief officer, then you must possess the required education and practical requirements to put people in harm's way, and if people are killed under your command, you should be held accountable. Many departments, both large and small, have competent and educated chief officers, but too many have chiefs whose only ticket in their possession is the members-only tag where they are put into position because they are part of the handpicked, politically correct or otherwise self-proclaimed gurus for their department. Some possess absolutely no training or education and the identities of the departments would amaze you.

When the wildland people put their credentialing process into place, they did in fact "grandfather" individuals who possessed the degrees, experience and training required to perform the job. We could do the same with structural. This would, however, require cooperation between all of the alphabet groups - IAFF,IAFC, IAVFC and others. If these groups wanted, I'm sure the National Fire Academy could act as the platform with added funding from Congress so that in the case of a major WMD incident more of our commanders could be better equipped to command.

Oklahoma City was a domestic terrorism event. In 1993 and 2001, New York City was hit by international terrorism. But we've had too many other incidents where a bombing or arson was used as a weapon. We also experience natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes and tornadoes and still no credentialing process has surfaced regarding the structural world of fire command.

The military requires its commanders to be ready and the wildland folks require their commanders to be ready. It's time the commanders of structural departments are made ready also. The firefighters who are going down the halls or responding first due at these incidents deserve the best - it's time to give it to them. Stay safe!

Michael L. Smith, a Firehouse® contributing editor, is a 30-year veteran of the District of Columbia Fire Department, currently deputy chief/suppression and shift division commander, commanding all fire, EMS, hazmat, special operations and special events activities in the District on shift. He is a 30-plus-year fire service veteran and is a graduate of the Executive Fire Officer Program at the National Fire Academy. Smith is a Certified Municipal Manger (CMM) from George Washington University and has degrees in fire science, construction management and public administration. He holds a journeyman's card with United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, and lectures nationwide on fire service topics, including management, command, rapid intervention, building construction, and strategy and tactics for all types of buildings.

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