Photo by Dennis L. Rubin Rescuers stage at the 70-foot level of the 104-foot-high elevated water storage tank.
On that afternoon, an employee of the Southern Corrosion Co. was working inside a elevated water storage tank. The tank, located in the Walnut Hill section of the city, was being repaired when the incident occurred. During the inspection phase, a welded anchor point gave way, causing a worker to fall 25 to 30 feet. The fall left the man with a possible skull fracture, disoriented and in great pain.
The 911 Center received the call for help at 2:24 P.M. Upon arrival, the officer on Petersburg Fire Department Engine 4 assumed command and began a size-up. He was met by the Southern Corrosion supervisor, who provided initial information that allowed operations to start. Within a short time, Battalion Chief Thomas H. Barrett arrived and took over as incident commander. The size-up determined that the tank was 104 feet high with a small opening at the top. The injured worker was semiconscious and fellow employees had begun attempting a rescue.
Command requested a regional tactical rescue response, netting mutual aid assistance: Henrico County's Engine 1, Truck 1 and Battalion 1; Chesterfield County's Engine 14, Rescue 14 and Battalion 4; and the Virginia Department of Fire Programs' equipment trailer and a technical advisor. During the course of this alarm, other specialty units were requested, such as Med-Flight 1 (a paramedic helicopter) for rapid patient transportation. Six jurisdictions eventually were called and worked together to bring the incident under control.
A significant command structure was developed to support the incident. Accountability of personnel was critical due to the inter-jurisdictional response to the incident. Also, landing zone, lighting and rehabilitation sectors were utilized. And the news media would be on location from the initial request for mutual aid assistance until the victim was removed, so a public information officer was assigned. The incident command system would once again prove its worth and flexibility at this campaign incident.
It was necessary to handle the incident as a "permit-required confined space rescue." Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) Regulation 29CFR1910.146 (Permit-Required Confined Spaces) defines a confined space as an area that meets three criteria:
- Large enough so an employee can enter.
- Limited or restricted entry or exit.
- Not designed for continuous employee occupancy.
Additionally, the regulation stipulates that it any one of following conditions are met, a permit must be completed before the entry occurs:
- Contains a hazardous material.
- Contains a material that may engulf a person inside.
- Has an internal shape that could trap or asphyxiate a person (such as inwardly converging walls or a floor that slopes downward and tapers to a smaller cross-section).
- Contains any other recognized safety or health hazard.
This water tank met all three criteria for a confined space and three of the four indications for a permit-required entry.
Command then quickly assessed the rescue effort being made by the injured man's co-workers. The company's supervisor had planned to lower the man down the center utility shaft but the equipment on hand and the workers' training were questionable at best. Command recognized the potential danger of this well-meaning effort and terminated it immediately. Two Petersburg firefighters went to the top of the tank, where they made entry and ordered the company's operation shut down. They then began patient care and provided Command with continuous progress reports.
Photo by Dennis L. Rubin A significant command structure was developed to support the incident. Accountability of personnel was critical.
Mutual aid assistance was now arriving on location. With the additional resources, Command was able to develop and implement an action plan. The two firefighters inside the tank, designated Entry Team 1, were assigned to stabilize the patient and remain with him to provide emergency medical care. They requested advance life support (ALS) care providers be sent up next.
Because of the highly technical requirements of this rescue, Command established an Operations Section led by Chesterfield Captain Steve Parrott, due to his training and experience in technical rescue.
The next team deployed was designated Entry Team 2. One of these two qualified rescue technicians was a firefighter/paramedic. Once inside the tank, Paramedic Greg Jones assumed patient care. He initiated ALS protocols while the other rescue members continued stabilization, communications and lighting support.
Command had established that the tank's incoming supply line was blocked out, ensuring that the members and victim inside would not be engulfed during this operation. A liaison was established with Southern Corrosion, in the likes of the Petersburg Water Department director. This was helpful when information was needed about the patient and previous entry procedures. Also, atmospheric monitoring had been ordered prior to Team 1's entry. The first readings indicated that the oxygen concentration was 20.8 percent; 0% flammability; 0 ppm of carbon monoxide (CO); and 0 ppm of hydrogen sulfide (H2S). The atmosphere inside the tank was continuously monitored and readings were recorded approximately every 30 minutes. This information was added to the permit as a permanent record.
One aerial ladder, Petersburg Truck 1, was positioned to reach the tower's platform deck area, at about the 70-foot mark. This deck area served as a staging area for equipment and personnel. Henrico Truck 1, a 75-foot tower ladder, was moved into position to support the staging area, providing lighting, electricity and a means of access. This action freed up the Petersburg ladder truck, a 100-foot, tractor-drawn aerial. This ladder was positioned to be the anchor point that would be used later for the removal of the victim.
Command's primary action plan was to rig hoisting lines from the top of the tank connected to a retrieval device. Once packaged, the victim would be removed from the tank. At that point, the Petersburg aerial ladder would handle the lowering from the top of the tank to the ground. Although this sounds simple and straightforward, it would take about 60 members four hours to complete this evolution safely.
A secondary plan was to cut a hole in the tank and lower the victim directly to the ground. This option would be equipment intensive, due to the construction and elevation of the tank. Also, there was a fear that the cutting process could deplete the oxygen concentration to below the 19.5 percent mark required by OSHA to operate without breathing apparatus. A third option considered was to use fire department equipment and lower the man down the utility shaft. Due to the narrow dimensions of the shaft, however, this option would be used only as a last resort. Fortunately, the patient's condition did not diminish to the point of that extra risks of the second and third plans would be justified, allowing time to complete the most appropriate action plan. The operation was brought to a successful conclusion in about four hours. The injured worker was transported to a hospital and released within five days.
This incident highlighted the importance of training, experience and equipment to safely complete specialized rescue efforts. The following items were developed during the post-incident analysis:
- An inter-jurisdictional response requires a lot of coordination, particular with communications.
- Provide scene lighting early and often.
- Make sure that all lighting used inside a confined space is intrinsically safe.
- Confirm lock-out procedures.
- Consider closing air space.
- Provide fall/retrieval protection for all entry members.
- Don't overwork fatigued members.
- Support ventilation efforts at confined space incidents.
- Consider the need for two or more safety officers.
- Safety officers must focus on safety issues only, stay out of tasks.
