Editorial: Learning From A Sad Chapter

March 1, 2000
It took tremendous work and cooperation to fight the fire, recover the firefighters, plan for mutual aid coverage, perform all the associated work for two weeks at the fire scene, plan the Memorial Service and hold six separate funerals.

We present an overview of the Worcester tragedy, beginning on page 36. It took tremendous work and cooperation to fight the fire, recover the firefighters, plan for mutual aid coverage, perform all the associated work for two weeks at the fire scene, plan the Memorial Service and hold six separate funerals. We don’t have all the facts and figures, and don’t know if we will ever have all the answers, but we thought this multi-page tribute would let those firefighters who could not come to Worcester see what it was all about.

Last month, I discussed the possibility of changing fireground tactics for a variety of reasons to try and reduce the deaths of firefighters. Since then, it was pointed out that there are really three main categories in which we can place firefighter deaths: responding to and returning from alarms, operating at the fireground and heart-related incidents.

It seems we may have some control over one of these three criteria, according to Mike Wilbur, our contributing editor on Emergency Vehicle Operations: firefighters responding to and returning from alarms. In 1999, this continued to be one of the leading causes of line-of-duty deaths, trailing only to deaths by heart attack and occurring on the fireground. In fact, if you delete those firefighters who died of heart attacks in 1996, more firefighters died responding to and returning from alarms than in performing the actual job of firefighting itself.

According to preliminary and unofficial statistics, 111 firefighters died in the line of duty in 1999; of those, 27 died while responding or returning or by being struck by motor vehicles. The four leading causes in that category were heart attacks (nine), fire apparatus rollovers (seven), operating on or near highways (five) and personnel vehicle responses (four). This resulted in about 25% of the line-of-duty deaths for 1999. As of Feb. 10, we received reports of 10 line-of-duty deaths that occurred this year: three firefighters died while responding or returning; three died of heart attacks; two died while training; and two died on the fireground.

Reviewing the last decade, this percentage has not changed much as responding and returning deaths make up 25% to 30% of firefighting fatalities annually. Since 1989, 224 firefighters have died responding to and returning from alarms, yet very few within the fire service are willing to make this a national issue or priority. Ironically, of all the line-of-duty deaths, this is the most preventable because we tend to have the most control. But like so many issues, those in control must recognize that there is a problem before we can begin to solve it. To bring light to these issues, Mike Wilbur will provide in-depth coverage in upcoming issues on apparatus rollovers, personal vehicle response, and operating on and near highways.

For added fire service education and information, we are co-sponsoring “Vision 2000,” a regional training conference in Seattle in conjunction with the Seattle Fire Department Officers Association March 28-31. The Fire Rescue West conference runs April 3-6 in San Jose, CA. Last but not least, we have prepared the preliminary program for the Firehouse Emergency Services Expo in Baltimore July 20-23; pre-conference sessions take place July 18 and 19. Hope to see you there.

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