Doing It Your Way: Utilizing The Fireground General's Personal Style

Incident commanders are like generals. And no two generals will fight a battle or mitigate an incident in exactly the same way. The flamboyant George S. Patton, who just kept pushing forward, said he did not believe in defending captured positions because he didn't want to pay for the same real estate twice. Douglas MacArthur, imperious and brilliant, was a more subtle strategist who could be devious at times. Dwight D. Eisenhower was a masterful organizer and a strong advocate of delegation, while Omar Brad-ley, "the G.I.'s general," was a hands-on leader. The practical and taciturn Ulysses S. Grant and military genius William Tecumseh Sherman both commanded superbly for the Union Army from different temperaments and philosophies, yet they were avid admirers of each other's campaigns.

All of these legendary commanders studied the same military textbooks and followed their government's rules and regulations (its SOPs, if you will). They, nonetheless, varied considerably in both their military tactics and in their personal styles of command. Fire administrators who believe there is only one proper way to accomplish any objective are the ones who would impose a rigid SOP that outlines every detailed facet of a fire operation. They would attempt to force the above individuals to fit, however poorly, into the same restricting mold.

While this practice may have some benefit in helping to keep an irresponsible incompetent in line, I like to think that there cannot be too many of those who have risen to the incident command level. Unfortunately, rigid control also ties the hands and stifles the creativity of those knowledgeable and resourceful incident commanders who, given half a chance, will accomplish the most difficult jobs for you.

The fire chief who wishes to take full advantage of the individual and varied talents of his firefighters is more flexible. He would:

• Identify proven standard tactics to be used as a guideline (a commander who steps far outside these guidelines might be asked to justify the deviation).
• Set safety and strategic parameters from which none may stray (turning the big guns on one's own troops would be a definite no-no).
• Allow wide latitude within those parameters and, whenever practical, follow George Patton's advice: "Tell your men what you want done but not how to do it. You will be surprised at their resourcefulness."

Should the fireground general fight a particular fire offensively or defensively? All incident commanders I know want to fight fires offensively. The so-called "defensive" attack, although frequently necessary, can leave a bad taste of defeat. The trick, of, course, is knowing which fires we can fight aggressively and which we must defend against.

We have all known incident commanders who send firefighters inside in obviously hopeless situations, needlessly endangering them. This is the "blood-and-guts" school of thought which allows a commander to boast about fighting to the last drop of his crew's blood. And then there are those who don't give their firefighters the chance to make a stop on the borderline fires, tending to play it super safe.

As with many human endeavors, the best way usually lies somewhere between the two extremes: Be cautious but get the job done. It comes down, finally, to understanding the fire, correctly evaluating the capabilities of your resources, and knowing yourself.

Whether to hold back reserves in staging or to commit these additional companies in support of an all-out attack is another common argument among fireground generals. The books say you should always have additional companies immediately available. They don't tell you where to get them.

In larger cities, you keep assigning your staged companies as they are needed and keep replenishing your staging area with greater alarms. In communities where resources may be limited at times, and no effective mutual aid system can be fully depended upon, the status of your reserves becomes critical. For one thing, committing your last company to the fire may leave the remainder of your city or town virtually unprotected. On the other hand, you know you have a major fire that requires greater resources if you are to extinguish or contain it - instead of allowing it to burn itself out. And you don't know that a simultaneous fire will occur. In such a community, holding back reserves on a large fire that is threatening exposures must depend on whether or not you have enough committed resources to at least control it.

There are many other important fireground decisions we must make that are not always covered by SOPs:

• Should we allow a dangerous primary search at a well-involved vacant structure on the chance that vagrants might be occupying the structure and trapped inside? (My answer: Only to the extent that handlines will be sufficient to protect personnel.)
• Will that old fire escape withstand the advancement of a line to an upper floor? (In the absence of evidence or justifiable suspicion to the contrary, assume it will, always being careful to avoid overloading.)
• Will the weakened roof permit ventilation at a good cockloft fire? (If there is no truss assembly involved, if flames have not penetrated the roof and if the space below does not exceed 50% fire involvement, go ahead and cut the roof using all safety precautions.)
• When should we place a company above a fast-moving fire in a non-rescue situation? (Only when the main body of fire is controllable by the line or lines holding it.)
• Should we commit the majority of our forces to rescuing the large number of visible, marginally threatened victims or should we assign priority to the search for those who might be in greater peril out of sight? (Those victims known or strongly suspected to be in the most critical danger shall be rescued first, with further priority given to children, the aged and the infirm. In short-handed situations with many people endangered, take actions -which might include extinguishment or ventilation - that will do the greatest good for the greatest number of people.)
• How should we change from an inside attack to an outside attack and back again? (This procedure must be done in a prescribed orderly manner with sufficient training devoted to the practice to ensure a smooth transition. An undue lag between the two attacks could result in the unchecked fire flaring up dangerously. First, get the master streams set up and ready. Back your interior lines out all the way or to a safe location. Get radio reports that all companies are clear and accounted for. Then flow the big guns. To reverse the procedure, get your handline crews in position - outside the collapse zone - and ready to go before shutting down.)
• When should we combine engine companies in laying in that first crucial line? (This is especially necessary in long, arduous lays on fast-moving fires that are still controllable. Two companies working together can make the difficult stretch to get water on the fire quicker than they can when pulling independently. After this is accomplished, the second line can be laid in.)

If playing God doesn't particularly appeal to you or if you wish to be consistent in your decisions and not rely upon your mood of the moment (a practice your people will doubtless appreciate), you should consider beforehand what your decisions in these situations will be and make them a part of your own personal policy. Pre-planned and well-thought-out policies help make your decisions (particularly the life-and-death calls) less personal - and therefore less emotional. And having your answers to these questions ready saves you the difficult, time-consuming and potentially dangerous process of inventing policy on the fireground. What's more, you will find that your firefighters will eventually become familiar with your style and will enjoy the spirit of close teamwork and confidence that comes with consistency.

Doing it your way can, of course, open a commander to criticism - especially if the results are something less than perfect. Sometimes, that criticism comes from respected fellow commanders or even the boss. The prudent (and sensible) approach is to avoid innovation for its own sake and to stay with the standard tried-and-true guidelines so long as they will get the job done.

Don't be afraid to improvise, however, based upon solid experience. Being unafraid to do the right thing is, after all, why our customers pay our salaries. And tough decisions come with the gold badge and white helmet.

Charles R. Angione is a retired deputy chief of suppression operations for the City of Plainfield, NJ, Fire Division. The 25-year line veteran is a longtime student, proponent and practitioner of the incident command system. He holds a Fire Science Technology certificate and is a state-certified Fire Service Instructor II and fire marshal.