DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FIRE AND EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT
Fire Chief Otis J. Latin Sr.
Personnel: 1,272 career firefighters
Apparatus: 32 engines, 16 trucks, three heavy-duty rescue squads, two fireboats, one hazardous materials unit, two foam units, two twinned-agent units, one air unit, one Metro Support Unit
Population: 606,900
Area: 61 square miles
At 4:15 P.M. on Dec. 8, 1995, a civilian banged on the doors of Engine 12's quarters in Washington, D.C., to report a fire in a tire warehouse a block and a half away. This was the start of a third-alarm fire that would take 36 hours to put out and require a fire watch for another 36 hours.
Photo by David Purcell The tire fire required the response of 14 engines, seven trucks, two foam units, a rescue squad and a hazardous materials unit.
Extinguishing the fire would require 125 firefighters, 14 engines, seven trucks, two foam units, a rescue squad, a hazardous materials unit and an excavator. Two firefighters and a civilian would be injured.
"This incident severely taxed the resources of the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department, as well as disrupting the normal pattern of life in this mixed light industrial and residential area," Deputy Fire Chief Donald Edwards reported. "A large volume of smoke was produced by the burning content of the building. However, the prevailing winds carried most of these products of combustion away from the immediate area."
Engine 12 is housed with the Hazmat Unit, Battalion Chief 1 and Medic 17. At the time the fire was reported, Engine 12 was on a medical call, so members did not respond to the tire fire until after the second alarm. The fire occurred at 2101 5th St. NE, one and a half blocks south of the fire station. The afternoon was clear and the temperature was around 40 degrees Fahrenheit but before the incident was concluded it would drop to the teens.
At the same time the civilian was banging on Engine 12's doors, the fire department's Communications Division was receiving numerous calls for a warehouse or a garage fire at 5th Street and V Street NE. The Hazmat Unit and Battalion 1 also notified the Communications Division of the fire by telephone, then responded to the scene. (The Hazmat Unit does not normally respond on the initial alarm for building fires but did so this time because the engine company was out and the fire was so close.)
Box Alarm Sounds
At 4:16 P.M., a box alarm was sounded for the tire fire. Engines 4, 6, 17 and 26 responded along with Trucks 4 and 15, Battalion 1 and Rescue Squad 2. Captain Damian A. Wilk was the acting 1st Battalion chief and responded as Battalion 1. Wilk and the Hazmat Unit arrived to find a two-story reinforced-concrete warehouse, measuring 45 feet by 105 feet, with fire showing on the first floor and heavy smoke coming from the second floor. A car was burning in front of the building.
Photo by David Purcell Two foam units were requested. AFFF was applied to the fire and had no effect.
No people were in the building, in which hundreds of thousands of used tires were stacked from floor to ceiling on both floors. The building was on the corner of two 30-foot-wide streets and set back 25 feet. To the west (side 1) was 5th Street and to the south (side 4) was V Street. A vacant lot was to the north (side 2) and a one-story U.S. Postal Service warehouse was to the east on side 3, about 10 feet from the fire building.
There were three bay doors on the first floor and windows on the second floor of side 1. The center and south bays had closed wooden roll-up doors; the north bay had been framed in for use as a pedestrian entrance. Side 2 only had three small openings in it. Side 3 had windows on the first and second floors, and side 4 had a loading dock and windows on the first and second floors.
Fire was coming from the framed-in bay door and heavy smoke was coming from the front third of the second floor. Wilk established Command 1 and requested a "working fire" dispatch, consisting of Engine 2, Battalion 6, Metro Support Unit (air cylinders), Car 43 (fire investigator), Medic 17 and Ambulance 25. Deputy Chief Donald Edwards responded as Division II deputy.
Wilk parked on 5th Street just south of V Street. This afforded a good view of sides 1 and 2 of the fire building and of all the streets where apparatus would be positioned. The Hazmat Unit parked on 5th Street north of the fire building and its crew assisted with handlines, then began to take care of safety and hazmat concerns. Engine 26 laid out from the hydrant on a 10-inch main at 5th and W Streets, supplied by Engine 6, and its crew went to the front of the building.
Engine 17 laid out from the hydrant on a 10-inch main at 5th and V Streets and was ordered by Wilk to go to side 4 and take an attack line into the loading dock. It was hoped the fire could be attacked from this direction and pushed out the front of the building. Engine 4 supplied Engine 17 but because the tires were stacked from floor to ceiling Engine 17's crew could not enter the building. All efforts were then directed to attacking the fire from the framed-in bay door on side 1. The Engine 26 crew had to extinguish the burning car before it could get access to the building. The other engine companies also brought their handlines to this area. Truck 15 placed its apparatus in the vacant lot on side 2 and laddered the roof.
Photo by David Purcell Hundreds of thousands of tires were stacked from the floor to the ceiling on both floors.
Truck 4 vented the side 4 windows. Rescue Squad 2 parked on 5th Street north of the fire building and its crew began to work on the two roll-up bay doors. When the squad cut away enough of the door to see that tires were piled against the door, Lieutenant Timothy Gerhart had his crew stop this operation. If the doors were opened, an avalanche of tires would have fallen on the firefighters.
At 4:22 P.M., fire was showing from the second floor of side 1 and Wilk requested a second alarm, consisting of Engines 11, 14, 16, 18 and 24, Trucks 3 and 9, Battalion 4, the Mobile Command Unit and the Canteen Unit, to stage at 5th Street and Rhode Island Avenue. The firefighters on the handlines were having difficulty advancing into the building due to the tires being stacked to the ceiling. Since there was no life hazard, and the building contained only used tires, Wilk ordered everyone out of the building and a defensive position was taken at 4:23 P.M.
A minute later, Edwards arrived on the fireground and soon assumed command. Wilk became the operations sector leader. Battalion Chief Carlton Ford (Battalion 6) arrived and was assigned to be logistics sector leader. Soon after, Captain David Zollars (Battalion 4) arrived and became staging officer. By now, fire was coming through the elevator penthouse and a roof vent. All units were ordered away from the building and heavy-duty operations were begun.
At 4:33, Edwards requested the Foam Unit Task Force. Foam Units 1 and 2 responded along with Engine 13. A few minutes later, he requested Tower 10. Also at this time, the safety officer, Captain Charles Williams, joined with the Hazmat Unit to operate the safety sector.
Ford, Wilk and Zollars began positioning the second-alarm trucks and tower. They also worked to get engines to supply them. This was difficult because the water mains nearest the building were only 10 inches in diameter. A 16-inch main two blocks south was broken, so lines had to be laid another block to get to a usable 16-inch main. The nearest 30-inch main was on the other side of a heavily traveled street two blocks away.
At 4:48, Fire Chief Otis Latin Sr. reported to the command post. He evaluated the tactics being used and convened a strategy meeting with Edwards and Assistant Chief Joseph Quander. In accordance with department policy, Edwards remained incident commander. Battalion Chief John McDonald arrived from Fleet Maintenance to handle fueling, repairing and re-supplying of apparatus. Battalion Chief Clarence Galloway, the professional standards officer, was assigned the safety sector. The public information officer, Battalion Chief Alvin Carter, set up a media sector.
As second-alarm units were being taken from staging, Edwards ordered the Communications Division to refill staging with units so that there would always be two engines and one truck there. Eventually, Engines 9, 12, 21 and 22, Trucks 6 and 7, and Naval District of Washington Foam Units 1 and 2 would be dispatched to staging, making the fire the equivalent of a third alarm.
At 4:57 P.M., the fire reached all the way to the rear of the first floor. Engine 17 and Truck 4 were repositioned farther east on V Street so that they were in front of the postal warehouse. At this time, Engine 26 lost pressure due to mechanical problems and was removed from service. Wilk moved the chief's unit to the sidewalk across the street so Tower 10 could set up bucket operations at the corner of 5th and V Streets.
At 5:03, fire was throughout the second floor. Both foam units were brought to the front of the building. Heavy-duty operations were shut down while both units flowed their aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF). The foam had no effect, however, so heavy-duty operations resumed.
At 5:14, Deputy Chief Alexander Bullock was assigned the operations section and Wilk remained with him. At this time, Tower 10 was getting into position at 5th and V Streets. Truck 6 and Engines 9 and 16 were working on putting Truck 6's ladder pipe in service.
Fireground Injuries
Firefighter James Seavey was in charge of Engine 16 and had his company lay a four-inch supply line to the rear of 2115 5th St. When Truck 6 proceeded to Engine 16's position in a school bus parking lot, Seavey was on 5th Street, next to the entrance of the parking lot. At 5:35 P.M., as Truck 6 maneuvered through the close quarters, the supply line became entangled in the truck's dual wheels. Before the truck could stop, the hose pivoted on its side and became airborne. The flat part of the hose struck Seavey on the back and threw him into the air. A security guard in the bus lot also was also hit by the hose.
Photo by David Purcell A vital part of the efforts to control the fire was periodic monitoring of the atmosphere by the department's hazardous materials unit.
"When I landed on the ground, I didn't know what happened," Seavey recalled. "It was like I'd been hit by a Mack truck. When I realized I couldn't move anything, I thought that I'd be viewing fire trucks from a wheelchair for the rest of my life."
An ambulance took Seavey to the trauma center at the Washington Hospital Center. Seavey was paralyzed from the neck down for 16 hours. He spent 25 hours in the trauma center before being transferred to the regular hospital, where he stayed until Dec. 12. He returned to duty on Jan. 17, 1996. The security guard was treated and released.
Also during the fire, Firefighter Michael Hansford of Engine 17 suffered from a reaction to the smoke. He too was transported to the hospital, treated and released.
At about 5:40 P.M., the wall on the southeast corner of the fire building began to crack. Soon, explosions were heard on the south side. At this time, Tower 10 went into service supplied by Engines 12, 13 and 21. Engine 21 was hooked to a hydrant on a 16-inch main at 4th and T streets. Tower 10 had water pressure problems and eventually received an additional line from another engine. Engine 22 hooked up to a hydrant on a 16-inch main at 4th and W streets and supplied another line to Engine 24.
At 5:50, Edwards removed Wilk from the operations sector and had him rotate crews back to Engine 12's quarters for rehabilitation.
Lieutenant John Lee and his hazmat crew notified the Environmental Protection Agency and the Coast Guard of the fire. Storm drains in the area around the fire drained into the sewer system, with any overflow going into the Anacostia River. The sewage treatment facility was notified to activate its scrubbers and Fire Boats 1 and 2 were dispatched to monitor the river.
Booms were placed in front of the storm drains to filter any heavy deposits in the runoff of water being used on the fire. There was little runoff due to the large amount of fire compared to the water being delivered. The sewer system handled all the runoff and there was no overflow discharged into the river.
"A vital aspect of our efforts to control this fire was the periodic monitoring of the atmosphere by the Hazmat Unit," Edwards reported. "This atmospheric monitoring was done with the assistance of several other agencies to include the Environmental Protection Agency, District of Columbia Office of Emergency Preparedness and the District of Columbia Department of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs. Fortunately, this continuous monitoring revealed that the atmospheric level of pollution never reached dangerous levels."
Chemtrec was contacted in reference to information contained in the publication, Guidelines for the Prevention and Management of Scrap Tire Fires, prepared by the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) and Scrap Tire Management Council. According to the guidelines, 50,000 cubic feet of tires require a water flow of 1,000 gpm for six hours. The proper flow was available for the amount of tires involved but because of the construction of the building and the stacking of the tires, the water could not reach the fire. Fog streams were recommended over straight streams but, again, the building construction and stacking of tires prevented following the guidelines. Fog streams could not penetrate through security screens and the labyrinth of tires.
Protecting Exposure
From around 6 P.M. on, protecting the postal warehouse became the main priority. Truck 6 flowed water on the roof of the warehouse. Engine 17's wagon pipe and a monitor nozzle directed streams into the windows on side 3 of the fire building. Truck 4's ladder pipe was available if needed. Personnel from Engine 6, Truck 4 and Squad 2 entered the postal warehouse and moved stored materials away from the wall facing the fire building. Edwards had Engine 17 use a water additive with its monitor nozzle because it reduced the radiant heat from that part of the fire. Efforts were made to keep the fire within the rest of the building but extinguishment was not a strategy.
More personnel were allowed to rotate into the rehabilitation area at Engine 12. Most of the apparatus and hose had to stay in position in case the fire flared up but only the units in the front and rear were putting water on the fire. This was because of the large openings in the front wall and the exposure problem in the rear. Engines 9 and 26, Trucks 3 and 9, Rescue Squad 2 and all four foam units were returned to service. Most of the chief officers had gone back in service. At 3:43 A.M., Edwards went in service and Wilk became incident commander again.
For several hours, the fireground became very quiet. Fewer than 20 firefighters were up and about at a time. Snow began to fall, leaving a light dusting on the fireground. Things began stirring again around 6:30 A.M. when the oncoming shift began to arrive. Wilk had Lieutenant Michael Best and his oncoming hazmat personnel take positions on the perimeter of the collapse zone to make sure that crews unfamiliar with the fireground were safe.
Oncoming 1st Battalion Chief Thomas Herlihy had to take care of staffing assignments for the day and did not arrive on the fireground until after 8:30 A.M. After walking the fireground and being briefed by Wilk, Herlihy took over as incident commander at 9 o'clock Saturday morning. Eighteen hours after it had started, the fire was still burning freely throughout the building.
An attempt was made to extinguish the fire in one part of the building, then move to another part of the building. This was unsuccessful and efforts were returned to keeping the fire within the building. It became obvious that the building was not going to collapse on its own, so Herlihy requested demolition equipment.
At 6 P.M., an excavator (a power shovel) arrived from the Department of Public Works. The operator began knocking down walls and pulling out burning tires. Over 24 hours after it began, the fire at last was being extinguished, not just contained.
The building consisted of reinforced concrete floors and roof. It was supported by large concrete columns. Brick curtain walls were hung on this sturdy frame. The excavator operator knocked away the curtain wall and pull the burning tires out to where they could be extinguished. This operation went on until 2 A.M. Sunday and nearly cleared the second floor of tires, although the first floor had a pile of tires running down the middle of its because the knuckle on the bucket arm could not clear the second floor. This prevented the bucket from reaching into the middle of the first floor.
After midnight, the temperature dropped below freezing and would eventually fall to the teens. Wilk ordered companies to start rolling up any unused hose but by that time some of the hose had become frozen.
By 3 A.M., the second floor was extinguished and all visible fire was gone from the first floor. Some more units were returned to service. A hose stream was used to flood one area until all smoke disappeared, then moved to another area. Soon, smoke would reappear in the original area. These piles were not large but the smoldering fires were persistent.
After an hour, most of the piles stopped smoking. The fire reached a point where it could be considered out. At 4:41 A.M., all units were returned except for one engine left as a fire watch. The fire that started Friday afternoon was extinguished 36 hours later, on Sunday morning. A fire watch was required for another 36 hours.
Lessons Learned
- The use of heavy construction equipment is necessary in this type of fire. Not only can excavators move the tires, they can knock down walls so the tires can be reached.
- Consideration could be given to not using water streams on this type of fire right away. This would prevent pushing of the fire and buy more time for the arrival of heavy-duty construction equipment.
- Proper storage of tires would have made this fire easier to control. The tires in this warehouse were stacked to the ceiling and against all the doors. There were no aisles or open areas. While the original fire produced a great amount of smoke, it was relatively small and near a doorway. If several large-diameter handlines had been able to advance from behind this fire, it could have been pushed out the front door. Even an attack from the front door may have had a chance of succeeding if the lines could have been moved more than a few feet into the building.
- The injuries sustained by the two firefighters and the security guard show that any fireground can be dangerous. Not only is advancing a handline into a burning building dangerous, routine handling of hoses, tools and apparatus is hazardous.
- When freezing weather is expected, unused equipment and hose should be packed away. Under normal conditions at a multiple alarm, packing hose is done by relief crews or after a rest has been taken. When temperatures are dropping, this work should not be delayed.
