On The Job - Alabama

Photo by Dennis L. Rubin Among the key elements of the incident action plan were decontamination and member rehabilitation.

After months of planning, the Olympic Torch was to travel to "Hub of the Wiregrass" on its way to Atlanta for the Summer Olympics. The fire-rescue service was put at the highest level of staffing and preparedness as 25,000-plus visitors would soon arrive for a glimpse of history.

Every detail of crowd management was discussed and addressed. Primarily, the fire department's focus was on the prevention and treatment of heat-related injuries.

Then, 20 miles away, disaster struck in the form of an escalating hazardous material emergency that would require a regional response to control. This article will discuss the tactical operations and lessons learned at the large-scale alarm.

In the small town of Slocomb, AL, sanitation workers had just picked up a half dozen sacks of "spent" material discarded at a feed-and-seed store. As the workers continued on their pickup route, smoke was observed in the back of the garbage truck. The decision was made at about 8 A.M. to meet the local volunteer fire department in the Town Hall parking lot so that the suspected trash fire could be extinguished. The sanitation workers thought they must have collected some hot barbecue coals, and that that's what had started the fire after all, it had happened once or twice in the past. In fact, the sacks picked up at the feed-and-seed store contained aluminum phosphide.

The Hazardous Material

Information about the material was immediately obtained from the Cameo Chemical Report, the Material Safety Data Sheet and Chemtrec. Aluminum phosphide is a dark gray or yellow crystalline, dry, solid material that is a powerful agricultural pesticide. It reacts with moisture to give off phosphine, which is a poisonous and flammable gas. Phosphine will spontaneously ignite in air.

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 704 system classifies the product as having a health risk rating of 3; flammable risk rating of 4; reactivity risk of 2; and the special hazard panel indicates that no water is to be used. Fire extinguishment requires the use of dry chemical extinguishing agents. Personal protection demands the use of fully encapsulated, chemical-resistant suits.

The Operation

The fire department met up with the smoking truck behind the Town Hall complex. As water was applied, the smoke production intensified. Next, the contents of the garbage storage area were emptied into the parking lot. The situation escalated and in a very short time three firefighters began realizing the effects of the toxic smoke that they were now inhaling. Mutual aid assistance from Fort Rucker Army Base Fire Department (FRFD) was requested as well as medical care and transportation for the injured members.

Photo by Dennis L. Rubin Members were placed in a 15-minute-work/45-minute-rest cycle that was monitored by the safety officer.

Fort Rucker's response included its on-duty hazmat team, heavy rescue truck, command vehicle, several command officers and various support units. Fort Rucker is home to the "Flat Iron" unit, which is the Army's aeromedical helicopter service. The helicopters assisted with crew rotation and provided EMS standby service.

FRFD made a reconnaissance entry to size-up the incident and update the action plan. Quickly, the product was identified and it was determined that the fire would be extinguished with a dry chemical agent. Next, evacuation and isolation ranges were ordered and enforced with the help of the Geneva County Sheriff's office.

The location of the makeshift dump site forced the closing of the Town Hall complex, which included the police station and volunteer rescue squad building. The size-up and incident action plan proved to be effective and the incident was beginning to stabilize. Due to the location of this very hazardous material, the decision was made to remove the paper sacks. That would let officials reopen the Town Hall complex and the community's major highway.

At noon, after three hours of difficult work under extreme weather conditions (97 degrees Fahrenheit with the humidity at 83 percent and the road surface temperature measured at 126 degrees F), the FRFD incident commander requested additional mutual aid from the Dothan Fire Department. A hazmat unit, three engine companies, a command vehicle and three support units with a total staffing of 30 members would soon arrive to help at this regional disaster. A unified command process was established upon Dothan's arrival and the incident action plan once again updated.

The key elements of the plan would include the continuation of the evacuation zones, hazard mitigation, decontamination, accountability and member rehabilitation. Work/rest cycles of 15 and 45 minutes were instituted and managed by the safety officer. Next, general service equipment had to be procured and prepared for use. Two dump trucks were double-lined with plastic sheeting to include a makeshift top cover. A back hoe was pressed into service to load the material into the dump trucks.

Photo by Dennis L. Rubin Equipment for decontamination, the washing of protective gear and tools, and capture of decon water is set up and ready to be utilized.

The next entry team consisted of four members (two from each fire department) in disposable Level A suits. The safety officer doublechecked and verified the suit compatibility with the confirmed product. Two team members were assigned to drive in the first dump truck and the back hoe into the "hot zone," while the other two members carried in hand tools. Operating these vehicles was cumbersome and clumsy at best.

Additional air-monitoring equipment was placed in the hot zone. Toxic readings indicated a range of product of five to 12 parts per million (ppm). The immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) for phosphine is 2 ppm. This incident was the real deal the one that firefighters had been training to handle for years.

The process of loading the material into the dump trucks was slow and relied on much manual effort. It would take nearly seven hours to load all of the material from the dump site. The next step was to seal the two dump trucks. This required several entries, which consumed the remaining available members qualified to make Level A entry.

In conjunction with the 15/45-minute work/rest cycles, members were allowed to make only two entries each into the hot zone. Even with these control measures, the personnel were drained. Once the dump trucks were decontaminated, they were moved to a remote, safe and dry location to await final removal by a private, licensed cleanup contractor.

The demobilization and recovery plan was a significant effort. All contaminated tools and equipment had to be accounted for, over-packed and sent with the dump trucks for proper disposal. A final set of vital signs was taken and recorded for each member who made entry. They were directed to wash all clothing worn at the incident and shower immediately upon returning to the station. Various air samples and litmus tests were performed before releasing the Town Hall parking lot and allowing the evacuated residents to return to their homes. The decon water was cleared for release into a sanitary sewer.

The recovery phase required the replacement of about $20,000 of equipment for both departments. Most of the expendable equipment was ordered through local vendors on an emergency-purchase basis to limit the downtime of the regional hazmat response teams.

Incident Critique

A formal incident critique was held a few weeks after the event. The following is the highlighted list of lessons learned or reinforced:

• Remember to expect the unexpected! Always consider and look for clues of the presence of hazardous materials. Consider a fire that originates in any type of trash receptacle as having a high potential for hazmat involvement.
• Limit exposure and risk whenever possible. If the "garbage" fire would have been handled in a remote, unpopulated area, this entire incident could have been avoided.
• Call for help early and often. The Slocomb and Fort Rucker fire departments followed this rule and minimized the danger to their personnel and the community.
• The FRFD implemented the incident command system upon arrival. This made the task of accountability, tactical operations and incident escalation simple.
• Establishing an incident safety officer minimized and most likely avoided more firefighter injuries.
• During operations conducted in extreme temperatures, set up a rehab sector in an appropriate location. Under these circumstances, an air conditioned building should have been located and utilized.
• There is a great need to improve the regional communications system. At times, it was difficult for the three departments to communicate because they were on three different radio frequencies.
• Regional training must be initiated and take place on a quarterly basis. Although this incident was handled smoothly, joint-jurisdiction drills would enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of responders.
• Because the emergency responders worked with the local office of the Alabama Emergency Management Agency (EMA), several problems were handled. EMA representatives did the research work for contracting and paying the cleanup company. They took the lead in obtaining actual cost recovery for all involved agencies. And they coordinated the evacuation and isolation process with other state and local agencies.
• Future hazmat training should include practicing the operation of general-service equipment (such as dump trucks and back hoes) while wearing Level A protection.

Regional Response Tested

This was a very difficult incident to bring under control. Eight firefighters were injured, with all being treated and released by nightfall.

The regional response system, the incident command process and the mettle of about 100 emergency responders were tested that day. Once again, dedication, training and hard work paid big dividends.