Fire Studies: The Four C’s of Incident Mitigation/Management

Many factors affect emergency operations. Managing the four C’s is a key ingredient and a definite requirement for success. These are command, control, communications and coordination. They are four simple words, but they can have far-reaching implications. 

Command

Leadership goes a long way toward ensuring that actions at an emergency scene will prove to be effective. Someone must be in charge.

At an incident scene, success or failure is entrusted to the incident commander (IC). The IC must be the most visible function at every incident. The title of IC as defined by the National Incident Management System (NIMS) encompasses many responsibilities and duties, of which the primary is taking command of the overall situation while ensuring everyone’s safety.

The position of command should be established by the first-arriving company officer. As other officers arrive, those who have a higher rank than that of the first officer on scene have the option of assuming command or of allowing command to remain with the current IC.

To command an incident scene takes preparation and development on the individual’s part. It is a demanding, autocratic position. The urgent nature of the emergency scene doesn’t allow decisions to be made by committee. There can be only one person in command (the exception being if a unified command is established). That one person’s actions will ensure success or failure at an incident scene.

How an IC conducts him/herself influences the conduct of all who operate at the incident. Leaders who exhibit confidence gain the trust of their subordinates. This characteristic can be referred to as “command leadership” or “command presence.” The need for command presence is magnified at emergencies. High-stress situations demand it. Time constraints that are placed on the IC in life-or-death situations require that his/her orders be specific and forthright. When arriving at an incident, time can’t be wasted. Immediate action is required.

Command must address the immediate problems by giving the most serious matters precedence. A thorough size-up helps to determine the problems; the experience of the IC comes into play here.

Research has identified that experiences that are gained from actual responses and training become benchmarks for a fire officer to assist in decision-making. The brain reacts to events by automatically associating with these past incidents or training. Without attempting to consciously compare these events, our brain realizes the similarities and focuses on how these incidents were handled in previous situations and leads us to initial actions that need to be taken. Likewise, as events continue to unfold, we will see whether adjustments need to be made and what additional things need to be done.

If the fire officer has no experience with the specific type of emergency, the possibility of selecting the proper method to solve the problem might be faulty or impossible, which seemingly would challenge his/her ability to command.

For example, consider a response to a fire in a gasoline tanker on the highway that was involved in an accident. A fire officer who never was confronted with this type of incident could find him/herself in a quandary. The officer’s brain would lack the database to recall how to handle the situation. An officer who fought this type of fire before, whether at an actual incident or in a realistic training exercise, can:

• recognize the potential of the situation
• know how to best protect the life safety of the driver and occupants of any of the vehicles that are involved as well as other individuals
• address firefighter safety
• know the type of extinguishment that’s needed
• consider how to control any potential runoff
• identify the possibility of an explosion
• establish hot, warm and cold zones
• identify the need for additional resources and what role they would play

The experience of the IC prompts the request for the required apparatus, personnel and equipment to address the problems. Obtaining a sufficient number of resources might be a concern. A lack of resources might force the IC to adjust or change strategy and tactics to accommodate the reduced response.

Fire departments often need to “make do” with fewer resources than needed because of:

• minimal staffing in career departments
• awaiting the recall of off-duty career members
• the effect that the time of day has on the availability of members in volunteer departments
• the pending response of additional volunteers
• distant mutual-aid assistance in rural areas

Prioritizing is part of the decision-making process and of the demands that are required of the IC. A fire that could be handled in an offensive mode with sufficient personnel might need to be fought defensively if few members are on scene. Similarly, a limited number of personnel can restrict the ability to timely place hoselines and to secure a continuous water supply to control and extinguish a fire and might delay rescues.

A fast-moving fire or volatile situation might demand the need to write off parts of a structure or entire buildings. Circumstances such as these become frustrating when the IC knows that a structure could be saved but is lost because of an inadequate number of resources.

Incident analysis by the IC involves not only analytical skills of firefighting but recognition of the competence of the fire officers who perform the various tasks and their request for additional resources. Some officers minimize a situation. For example, an officer who hears various requests for resources from other units and knows that there are limited resources might believe that his/her area is of less importance and might not want to compound the IC’s problems by requesting help. On the other hand, some officers sensationalize.

Control

Effective incident scene control dictates the timely implementation of strategies and tactics. Time management ensures that sufficient time is relegated to the performance of those strategies and tactics.

To prevent the IC from becoming overloaded and to allow the proper handling of important assignments require the delegation of tasks while maintaining a manageable span of control.

There are guidelines for span of control, but it will vary depending on the organizing skills of the one who does the delegating, the experience of those who receive assignments and the complexity of the tasks to be performed. The greater the number of complex assignments that require close monitoring, the lesser the number of people who can be supervised successfully.

The IC at a major incident becomes a manager. He/she must allow decisions on tactical issues to be made by those who are delegated that responsibility. Specific, point-by-point orders become counterproductive. They allow no discretion by the person who receives the orders, and if the task can’t be performed exactly as dictated, additional questions frequently are necessitated.

Control also means having a handle on the situation, a feel for an operation. Control also is changing an order when something isn’t working. Continuing with a plan that is failing or no longer is needed because of changes on the fireground is a sign of lack of control—hence, poor leadership.

Communications

The free flow of information up and down the chain of command keeps everyone informed. Sharing the overall strategy and tactics should come from the IC. The feedback from those who implement the tactics keeps the IC abreast of changing developments that can affect the overall incident or a specific segment. It also permits the IC to maintain a stationary position at the command post, making him/her accessible and easily found.

Communication is the lifeline of units who operate at an emergency. There is a variety of communication modes available; each type has benefits and drawbacks. The preferred method when a change of command occurs at the incident scene is to exchange information face-to-face. Once assignments are made, radios allow information to be quickly transmitted to the necessary units. This rapid dissemination of data from unit to unit as well as from the command post to a unit can assist in:

• locating a trapped person
• placing hoselines at critical locations
• removing firefighters from a dangerous situation if a problem is discovered
• keeping both the IC and units informed of ongoing operations at the incident

The National Fire Academy (NFA) utilizes radio communications in courses where simulations are used. They found that the long-standing method of saying the call letter of the sending unit first (for example, Engine One to Command) caused some confusion. Because units often are engaged in a variety of activities, they monitor their radio by listening for their call letters. Often, they fail to hear which unit is calling them. This leads to additional radio messages to clarify who is trying to contact them. The NFA found that a better method is to reverse the messages (for example, Command from Engine One). As soon as a unit hears their call letters, they become attuned to the radio messages and are alerted to listen to which unit is calling them. This method saves time and reduces unnecessary radio messages. I have found that many fire departments adopted this method and find it to be a successful transition.

Some fire departments utilize cellphones to supplement their communication systems. The cellphone provides a communication link that is relatively unmonitored and permits some privacy to discuss sensitive areas. (An officer might hesitate to give a sensitive message that involves specific injuries or deaths or to make suggestions to the IC for major changes in tactics on an open radio channel.)

Large buildings, high-rises and sprawling complexes offer an opportunity to implement the local phone system to assist in operations. A telephone hook-up from the operations section chief to the command post can be a consideration on extended operations at these facilities where house phones or other hardwired systems are in place.

Coordination

Without coordination at an incident, freelancing might occur, and chaos can result. Units will determine their own objectives, which leads to an unprofessional operation that has the potential to endanger civilians and firefighters.

Coordinating operations can be like fitting the pieces of a puzzle together. The proper sequence of events must be followed, so the right job can be done at the right time. Line placement, forcible entry, search and rescue, and ventilation require teamwork. The hoseline crew relies heavily on support from the ventilation crew, while search and rescue depends on fire control to permit a search above a fire area.

Once segments of an incident are delegated, the IC still needs to monitor how these delegated operations proceed. This is accomplished by monitoring communications, by visually observing operations from the command post and through progress reports. The overall timing of tactical operations must mesh smoothly or confusion can result. Oversight of an operation will ensure that it’s being properly performed.

The foundation

Know your strengths and weaknesses. Continue to build on your strengths and work on weak areas to develop them into strengths. Recognize what is possible. Consider the resources that are available and their capabilities. Don’t underestimate the incident scene.

By building on the four C’s, we can have a positive effect on emergency incidents. Operations will be better organized. Assignments will be well-defined. Communications will flow both up and down the organizational structure. Each member will know what is expected of him/her. Problems will be recognized and addressed, and a strong emphasis will be placed on firefighter safety.