On The Job - Alaska

"Houston, we have a problem!" Those ominous words were not an astronaut's transmission from outer space but signaled the beginning of a catastrophic wildland fire near the small Alaskan town of Houston, a fire that would consume 37,336 acres, destroy 433 structures and require 1,650 firefighters to contain.

Photo by Tom Dean/Division of Forestry The Miller's Reach 2 Wildland Fire burned more than 37,000 acres and destroyed over 430 structures. This photo was taken on Big Lake Road at 1 A.M. on June 4, 1996.

The blaze, which has come to be known as the Miller's Reach 2 Wildland Fire, would rank among the worst 10 wildland/urban interface fires in the nation, costing well over $15 million to extinguish. And its impact on the 820-square-mile Matanuska-Susitna Borough (of which Houston is a part) and its 55,000 residents is immeasurable.

June 2, 1996, began as a typical late-spring Sunday in Houston, a day for salmon fishing, boating and playing with fireworks Houston is the only city in Alaska that permits the selling of fireworks (setting them off, however, is illegal). Residents had no way of knowing it would be a day that would go down in Alaska history.

Matanuska-Susitna ("Mat-Su") Borough is a bedroom community 50 miles north of Anchorage. It has everything from small house trailers to elaborate, 6,000-square-foot homes. Most of the houses are built of wood, and nearly every one of them had at least one 100-pound propane tank and one 300-gallon fuel oil tank, which added an extra hazard in trying to protect them from fire. There also are many commercial buildings.

The area is protected by nine separate volunteer fire departments with 460 fire and EMS personnel. They respond to about 1,200 fire calls, 600 rescues and 4,000 medical emergencies each year. Water supply is a major factor in most of the borough. Firefighters rely largely on drafting, tanker shuttle and portable tank operations.

The terrain is flat, consisting of black spruce, birch, aspen and willow trees with wet grassy areas along the many lakes.The black spruce would caused the most trouble, with its low moisture content and branches touching the ground. Spruce trees grow very close together, have many limbs and are not very tall. The hardwood stands usually slow fires but they were so dry from the lack of moisture that they would burn just like the conifers. The tundra consists of dry moss and averages 16 inches in depth.

The Alaska Division of Forestry had predicted a busy wildfire season for 1996. The winter of 1995-96 had brought little snowfall and the spring had brought very little rain. Lynn Wilcock, fire management officer for the Mat-Su region, told officials, "With the conditions brought to us by the weather, the forest could fuel a major wildland catastrophe." In May, the area produced a wildfire that burned 300 acres and destroyed three homes.

Photo by Norm McDonald A busy 1996 brushfire season had been predicted for the region. A total of 1,650 firefighters were needed to control the blaze that broke out on the afternoon of June 2.

At 4:20 P.M. on June 2, heavy smoke and fire were reported off Miller's Reach Road around mile 57 of the Parks Highway in Houston. Division of Forestry firefighters responded with two engines and a "heli-tack" crew led by Forestry Technician III Mark Bertels. When Bertels arrived at the scene, he saw seven to eight acres burning in the black spruce with little crowning and light winds (7-8 mph). He established command and ordered an air tanker, two forestry firefighting crews and seven "Smokejumpers" to respond. The Mat-Su Borough paged out the Houston, Big Lake, Meadow Lakes and Willow volunteer fire departments.

Fueled by densely packed black spruce, the fire grew to 54 acres by 7 P.M. On the west side, the fire stopped at the Little Susitna River, where crews placed three portable pumps to supply handlines. Crews worked well into the night to contain the east flank, laying over 1,000 feet of hose with 100-foot laterals every 200 feet. Two loads of retardant were dropped by the area's 1,500-gallon air tanker. Bertels projected containment for Monday at 10 P.M., depending on the weather.

Bucket work continued into the night by the forestry helicopter. Mat-Su Borough apparatus were released from the scene at 1:37 A.M. and scheduled to return at 9 A.M. Monday brought more dry, hot weather; daylight hours are almost around the clock at this time of year in Alaska. With very little sleep, the Mat-Su and the Copper River forestry crews worked to contain the fire throughout the day and local fire departments were released at 4 P.M. The crews had a line all around the fire.

At 7:04 P.M., winds began gusting out of the north at 25 to 40 mph. Three spot fires flared up 100 feet from the perimeter of the burn area and over a 1,000 feet from the nearest road access. Again, Mat-Su departments were paged out but because the fire was so far from the road Bertels radioed that they were not needed at that time.

Houston Fire Chief Tim Casper ordered his units to stand by until he investigated. The Copper River crew extinguished the first two fires by tapping into the existing hose lays. When 20-year veteran Smokejumper Tom Boatner reached the third fire, he informed Bertels it was the size of a pickup truck and growing fast. Knowing the types of fuel in that area, Bertels immediately called for two air tankers and the chopper. But by the time they were set up, the fire blew up, crowning and heading south.

Photo by Jonathan Burns Mat-Su Borough Fire Chief Jack Krill (center) leads a debriefing session at the end of another long, hot day for the firefighters.

As the air tanker arrived, its pilot radioed, "Houston, we have a problem!" Bertels said, "The fire sounded like a jet engine ripping through the forest it moved five miles in 36 minutes." That night, the relative humidity dropped to the 20s with a temperature of 72 degrees Fahrenheit. Bertels ordered the entire Mil-ler's Reach subdivision evacuated at 7:30 P.M. Retardant drops were hampered due to heavy shifting winds.

The Mat-Su Borough emergency services chief, Kevin Koechlein, responded at 8:13 P.M. and ordered units to stand by until he arrived. Koechlein ordered Fire Chief Jack Krill and Deputy Chief Andy Posti-shek of the Central Mat-Su Volunteer Fire Department, Fire Services Trainer John Murdock and EMS Coordinator Mel Vostry to respond.

Postishek recalled, "I knew this had to be something big. I had never seen that size of white smoke plume with black smoke all around it, growing as fast as it did."

Krill established a command post and staging area at the Meadow Wood Mall, assigning Postishek, Big Lake Fire Chief Bill Gamble and Lon Greenough of the Division of Forestry to the operations and reconnaissance sections. Krill asked for an additional five engines and six pumper-tankers to respond from both ends of the borough. All roads into the Big Lake area were ordered closed and residents were to be evacuated.

"This is the biggest thing to happen since the '64 earthquake," Krill told firefighters at the command post. "Most of us will never see an incident like this again."

The Anchorage Fire Department dispatched a battalion chief, three tankers, five engines and two brush trucks at 9 P.M. The Chugiak Volunteer Fire Department sent three engines and a battalion chief, and Fort Richardson and the Kulis Air National Guard base also sent apparatus.

Photo by Jonathan Burns A command post and a staging area for firefighters and apparatus were established at the Meadow Wood Mall shopping center.

At 9:30 P.M., command requested that the entire electrical grid in the Big Lake area be shut down. The fire had created its own storm cloud, producing wind and radiating heat. Strong columns of smoke were creating turbulent whirlpools of air. Winds carried embers and sparked fires five miles away. Experts in fire behavior contended this was the most erratic fire they had seen the black spruce trees exploded, releasing sap resin vapor in an mushrooming form.

The fire front was moving quickly toward the Big Lake Community, disintegrating everything in its path. This is one of Alaska's busiest tourism and recreation sites, with restaurants, marinas, hotels and a large fish hatchery. The command post received a request to recon the fish hatchery. Postishek responded and immediately requested a team to try to save the structure. Firefighters tapped into the facility's two 10,000-gallon water tanks and made the save.

Water supply was a major concern with a large number of apparatus. The borough has a limited number of hydrants, and none in this area. Krill was notified that Big Lake crews had established two fill sites with portable pumps, so he then ordered Central Mat-Su to set up a drafting operation.

The initial plan was to send out recon patrols to survey the travel of the fire, triage structures and send strike teams as directed. Engine companies were told they would be in a defensive mode, no interior attacks. As the wall of flame hit residential areas, the strike teams battled the blaze from street to street, stopping one structure from burning and driving past those that were too involved.

At about 10:30 P.M., at mile 2.4 of Big Lake Road and five miles from the fire's origin, it was reported that the fire was not far from the road and that all available companies should respond. Sixteen pieces of apparatus lined the road. As the fire approached the road, flames were up to 300 feet tall and over a half-mile wide. The intense heat and smoke made it impossible for crews to stay.

"We threw everything we had at it and it still wouldn't stop," Gamble said.

With erratic winds hurling embers ahead of the flames, the fire crossed the road. At this point, most of the teams diverted to various subdivisions to protect more homes. Radio traffic was overwhelming because most teams were using the same channel. Helicopters, under the direction of Tom Dean of the Division of Forestry, dropped buckets of water to protect homes. These proved most valuable for several reasons the Big Lake area has an abundance of lakes, so the turnaround time was minimal, plus the choppers could reach areas inaccessible to apparatus.

Photo by Allen Swett A drafting operation was set up at Big Lake to supply water to firefighters.

As the fire spread into the night, firefighters from Big Lake knew their homes were in danger but did not leave their positions; only later did they learn that nine firefighters had lost their homes. At 2:30 A.M., it was reported that residents were trapped. Central Mat-Su Captain Mahlon Greene was sent to Burkshore Marina to take the Big Lake fireboat to assist in evacuating residents; later the boat was stolen but found five days later.

Central Mat-Su Engine 621 was drafting from a lake when it became stuck in the tundra (to draft from this lake the engine had to drive into the tundra; luckily the apparatus was in position to draft). About three hours later, the fire was heading toward the crew. Captain Steve Josten notified command that they had ample water to hold off the fire. The fire had burned all around the water-soaked perimeter; nothing was damaged.

The heavy smoke produced by the fire turned Alaska's long days into a gloomy darkness. It was somewhat of a war zone feeling people fleeing with truckloads of belongings, their horses tied together, a look of disbelief on the people's faces as the fire engines roared by.

Explosions were a major hazard through the night. It had been 26 hours since the start of the fire, and a decision was made to upgrade the fire from Type 3 (local) to Type 1 status, meaning that there was a major threat to lives and property and that federal resources would now be available. The command post was moved to Houston High School to prepare for the arrival of the federal Type 1 team, headed by Dave Liebersbach of the U.S. Bureau of Land Management. With him came one-third of the nation's Hot Shot crews more than 300 firefighters from New Mexico to Montana, along with all available apparatus on the Alaska road system. The Division of Forestry ordered a burn ban until further notice in the South-Central Region.

The fire had consumed 11,000 acres with zero percent containment; it was now 18 miles long and 15 miles wide, being fought by more than 300 firefighters, 60 engines, five air tankers, and four helicopters. Air attack efforts were hampered by local aircraft flying too close to the fire area. Wind had pushed the fire toward the new command post; a ladder truck was used in supplying handlines and foaming down the cedar shingle roof.

A portable tank operation was set up to supply the operation. The Chena Hot Shots, from north of the borough, went into the woods to back burn and cut fire breaks, stopping the fire about 30 yards from the school. A 100-foot firebreak was also made around the staging area with a bulldozer. As the day went on, the fire burned back through some of the areas already protected and homes that had been saved the day before now burned. By 9:30 Tuesday night, most of the crews had been on scene for 29 hours or more, so command ordered all crews to rest up before resuming work the following day.

Morning came fast. As apparatus from Valdez to Fairbanks pulled into the staging area, it looked like a parade lineup. A unified command was set up by the Type 1 team, and consisted of Liebersbach, Koechlein and Captain Don Savage, commander of the Palmer Alaska State Troopers post. There was a slight delay as command was transferred to the Type 1 team. The new operation was setting up division supervisors to direct task forces, made up of two to three "strike teams," each with two engines and three pumper-tankers.

"This fire is out of control," Liebersbach said at that time. "This is the most destructive wildfire we have ever seen in Alaska, and it's probably going to get bigger."

Each team leader held a safety briefing for crews to go over personal protective equipment (PPE), apparatus positioning and hazards such as falling trees, downed power lines and fuel tanks. The crews then proceeded to protect structures and identify hazards. Each crew was using one-inch and 1 1/2-inch forestry hose for attack and three-inch lines for supply.

Late in the day, the fire crossed the main highway between Anchorage and Fairbanks. State police troopers had to close an 11-mile stretch of the road because of poor visibility and to let the firefighting operations continue. Choppers and hand crews contained this in a day and a half.

By evening, the fire had burned 37,000 acres. Thirty-thousand gallons of retardant had been dropped that day; 328 firefighters were on scene and 416 were on the way. The National Guard set up checkpoints on all roads going in and out of the fire area to assist in the evacuation and check out reports of looting.

(At this point, firefighters found the remains of Lizzy, a Dalmatian who belonged to Big Lake Deputy Fire Chief Roger Cobb, in the ashes of her owner's home. Lizzy had participated in many fire prevention programs, so she will be missed by the firefighters.)

By Thursday, the winds lessened, relative humidity rose to 23 percent and temperatures were in the mid-60s. The mode shifted from protecting homes to containing the fire. Residents were given passes that allowed them to return home (a few of them, angered about being forced from their homes, threw rocks at engines; one resident reportedly took a swing at a firefighter). Electricity was turned back on in most areas.

At this point, President Clinton declared the fire a major disaster. Damage assessment teams began to survey the burn area, as the fire line improved to 15 percent contained with 100 percent containment expected by 9 P.M. Monday. A dozen Smokejumpers were released to respond to new fires reported in the interior.

By Friday morning, 37,330 acres had been affected. The fire was contained on June 10 at 9 P.M. and declared under control five days later. Forestry choppers used infrared cameras to pick up hot spots and crews had been working ash pits with bulldozers and backhoes, and utilizing local tankers to supply water.

"We had an ash pit 50 feet around and 15 feet deep," said Big Lake Fire Captain Dave Stone.

On June 6, after the fire origin area had cooled, Chris Olson, a fire prevention officer for the Division of Forestry, and State Fire Marshal Greg MacDonald began an investigation. From evidence found at the suspected origin area, they concluded the fire had been started by fireworks.

"The pattern suggests intent," MacDonald said, "and the incendiary device located at the scene was most probably fireworks."

An arson investigator from the U.S. Forest Service was then called in; his conclusions were the same. The investigation was turned over to an Investigative Task Force comprised of personnel from the Alaska state troopers, the state fire marshal's office and Division of Forestry. Later, it was determined the fire initially was started by fireworks but several spot fires were deliberately set; in some cases, residents set their homes on fire in hopes of collecting insurance money.

The erratic behavior of the fire brought to mind the deaths of 14 wildland firefighters in Colorado in 1994. "I was amazed nobody got killed," Forestry Technician George Coyle said. In fact, the only reported injuries were serious burns suffered by five firefighters who fell into ash pits. And although 433 structures were lost, firefighters saved another 1,079.

Incident Recap

Among problems encountered and the lessons learned:

• Some freelancing occurred. If an engine crew saw a house in danger and they had enough water, they would stop; if they needed more water, they'd call for it on the radio.
• Fire departments that responded from outside the borough didn't carry radios with the local fire frequency, which made communications difficult. Some out-of-town units had to be given hand-held radios with the local frequency.
• During the first few days of the fire, engines with of pump-and-roll, or "run-and-gun," capability were effective. The time savings and the large volume of water that could be delivered by roof-mounted turrets made a difference.
• Several contract water tenders ranging from 2,000 to 8,000 gallons were sent but most of their fittings were not compatible with fire apparatus. They had to dump their water supplies into portable tanks from which fire apparatus could draft. It was not until later in the fire that adapters were made available.
• The only equipment lost were some hand tools and sections of hose that were burned up when teams had to evacuate.
• Apparatus sustained lots of scratches as well as heavy wear and tear caused by the area's roads, which are not paved and are very rough.