Elizabeth Fire Department
Chief Frank LaSpata
Personnel: 252 paid firefighters
Apparatus: Seven engines, three ladder trucks, one rescue
Population: 150,000
Area: 16 square miles
On June 20, 1997 at 5:40 A.M., the Elizabeth, NJ, Fire Department responded to an unknown-type fire in an electrical switching yard of Public Service Electric & Gas (PSE&G). The impact of the fire reached far beyond the switching station itself. Because the yard was de-energized, Elizabeth and surrounding communities - as well as Newark International Airport - lost all electrical power. Elizabeth, in fact, was forced to declare a state of emergency.
Photo Courtesy of Public Service Electric & Gas The fire involved an electrical switching yard, causing loss of power to Elizabeth, surrounding communities and Newark International Airport.
A full assignment was dispatched, consisting of three engines, two ladders, one rescue, a deputy chief and a battalion chief. Enroute, Acting Battalion Chief Dan Campbell observed a large plume of black smoke in the distance. All companies were ordered to stay off the property until power was secured and the initial size-up completed. First-in companies found a large body of fire emitting from a metal container and a ground fire 40 feet in diameter. Acting Deputy Chief Dave Lechner assumed command and assigned Campbell as operations officer. Size-up revealed the fire was in a large transformer and being fueled by a flammable liquid in the transformer and on the ground. The fire was threatening other oil-filled circuit breakers and switches within the complex.
As companies waited for representatives from PSE&G to arrive and secure the power in the switching station, a foam operation was laid out. Engine Company 1, under the command of Acting Captain Mike Taylor, responded second due on the first alarm. Engine 1 is a 1,500-gpm/55-foot TeleSqurt equipped with an around-the-pump foam system, 200 gallons of AFFF/AR-type foam concentrate, a 500-gpm foam nozzle for the boom, a low/medium expansion nozzle for 1 3/4-inch line, a low expansion 1 1/2-inch and a low expansion 2 1/2-inch nozzle.
Engine 1 was ordered to prepare to connect to a yard hydrant 100 feet off the main road (from a six-inch main) and put its master stream to work for a quick knockdown and containment. Engine 2 was staged in case a secondary water supply was needed.
PSE&G employees de-energized the entire site except for the high-voltage transmission lines at the front and rear of the yard. These lines were not threatened by the fire nor were they an immediate hazard, but they could not be shut down without major impact on the PSE&G system. PSE&G personnel locked out all switches on-site, then double-checked all equipment with a voltage indicator to assure all power was off.
Engine 1 was ordered to begin the operation. Within minutes, the first of several problems arose. The hydrant to which Engine 1 was connected was unable to deliver enough water to flow the 500-gpm tip. Engine 2 obtained a second water supply. As this was happening, a PSE&G representative informed command that the ground fire was threatening a trifurcator coming out of the ground - if the fire reached the trifurcator and damaged the steel pipe, the oil contained in it would leak out and fill the entire yard.
Engine 1's crew stretched a 1 3/4-inch handline with the low-expansion nozzle and contained the fire that was advancing to the trifurcator. Rescue 1 stretched 200 feet of 2 1/2-inch hose with the low-expansion nozzle to apply 250 gpm of foam solution on the transformer. When the secondary water supply was completed, Engine 1 began flowing its boom on the transformer. Enough of the fire was knocked down to permit a more detailed size-up, which revealed a second transformer involved in a more intense fire. Rescue 1 was ordered to reposition the 2 1/2-inch foam line on the main fire of the second transformer. The fire in the second transformer was so intense that a flow of 250 gpm did not meet the required application rate.
This was a full-scale foam operation requiring command to activate the mutual aid system requesting:
- A Port Authority of New York and New Jersey crash truck from Newark International Airport.
- A foam pumper from Merck Pharmaceutical.
- A foam pumper from the city of Linden.
- A foam nurser from Tosco Refinery.
- A 1,500-gpm pumper with large-diameter hose from the City of Union.
Photo Courtesy of Public Service Electric & Gas Each transformer held 21,000 gallons of mineral oil.
The crash truck and Merck were ordered to set up for a master-stream operation in the rear of the transformers. Linden set up near Engine 1 to utilize its handline capabilities, and Union was requested to set up a long-distance relay using a large-diameter hose to supply the Merck pumper and replenish the crash truck. The strategic plan was to have the crash truck apply the required application rate of flow, reduce the intensity of the fire, and contain the fire with Merck's master stream and handlines while the crash truck re-supplied itself with water.
The crash truck operated for approximately two to three minutes, applying 1,800 gpm of foam solution, while the Merck engine applied 500 gpm of foam solution through its master stream. The crash truck depleted its water supply and had to be shut down to refill. The handlines were ordered to begin applying foam for containment. Through the size-up process, it was recognized that the foam was not penetrating the metal enclosure of the transformer.
The crash truck was instructed to set up operations on the exposure 4 side of the transformers, where the cooling fans were located. As the crash truck proceeded with the second of four attacks, the fire began to darken down. This operation continued for a third attack, enabling the handlines to advance on the transformers and apply foam in any openings in each enclosure. The fourth attack by the crash truck was for cooling of both transformers to prevent re-ignition.
At 10:50 A.M., the fire was placed under control and companies remained on the scene for three days while the transformers were being dismantled to extinguish any fire that existed.
The Specifics
The switching station receives its power from high-voltage lines in excess of 138 kilovolts. The station takes electricity from the high-voltage lines and runs it through transformers to break it down to lower voltages, then sends the power out to substations in other municipalities.
Photo Courtesy of Public Service Electric & Gas A combined large-caliber and handline foam attack controlled the fire inside the transformer and spilled oil outside.
Each transformer had three separate copper windings that were kept cool by exterior-mounted fans and more than 21,000 gallons of mineral oil that encased the windings inside the enclosures. The first transformer failed violently, causing its oil content to spill on gravel. The second transformer was intact, but it appeared to ignite from the ensuing ground fire from the first transformer. In essence, what firefighters faced was more than 21,000 gallons of oil burning in an intact enclosure and no way to apply foam to the seat of the fire and the more than 21,000 gallons of oil that had spilled on the ground from the first transformer.
The trifurcator is the termination for a set of three transmission cables that run underground from the switching station to a substation located a few miles away. These cables are kept cool by a separate supply of mineral oil that is pumped into the entire length of the run.
The Impact
The impact of this fire reached far beyond the switching station itself. Because the yard was de-energized, Elizabeth and all surrounding communities lost power. Elizabeth declared a state of emergency with full power loss. County police and sheriff's department officers manned intersections throughout Elizabeth to try to move traffic, as close to 300,000 people occupy the city on a normal work day. This was a traffic nightmare. For a few hours before the officers gained control of the traffic, the city's inner roads were a parking lot. Emergency vehicles had trouble responding to the incident. Two hospitals had to rely on emergency generators to keep their lifesaving equipment in operation.
Newark International Airport was forced to delay and cancel a large number of flights because its emergency generators did not supply power to their refueling pumps; therefore, airplanes could not refuel. It took the airport well into the next day to recover from the power outage and return to normal operation.
Approximately 330,000 PSE&G customers were without power and the prompt action of the Elizabeth Fire Department allowed most customers to be back in service within five hours.
Lessons Learned
- Pre-fire planning cannot be stressed enough. Meet with utility company representatives and have them conduct tours through their facilities, pointing out all potential hazards. A well-organized pre-fire plan will reveal many unforeseen hazards such as those encountered during this incident.
- Call for additional resources early. The time that is needed to de-energize the yard could be used to call for resources to respond to the staging area to be used when needed.
Do not under estimate the potential of a transformer fire. This fire started out as a class C fire (live electrical) and was changed to a class B fire (flammable liquid) when the power was turned off. A lot of foam is needed in order to contain and extinguish a fire of this magnitude. Have your foam resources respond early. You can always send them back if not needed.
- Contain the fire but do not waste foam. You will need large flows to extinguish this type of fire. Handlines and the 500-gpm tips were good for putting out the ground fire and final extinguishment, but they were not effective on the main body of fire. This required a flow of 1,800 gpm from the crash truck to knock down the intensity of the fire so the handlines could move in and be effective at the lower flows.
- Do not have tunnel vision. Many hazards existed that were not obvious initially - overhead steel framework was exposed to high heat; heated ceramic insulators shattered when struck by foam streams; other sealed, oil-filled devices were exposed to intense heat and flame, causing them to overpressurize; the possible sudden failure of the transformer shell, releasing the burning oil; accidental reactivating of power within the switching station; and tripping hazards included concrete pads and hoselines, as well as possible open manholes covered by foam.
- Watch for oil soaking into the ground. This limited the amount of oil visible, but still endangered personnel operating in the area.
- Consider possible PCB contamination and the downdrafting of a smoke plume by TV news helicopters.
- Initiate the incident command system. There are so many functions that needed to be performed that if the incident command system was not in place it would have been difficult to coordinate all the operations.
- The decontamination of equipment and protective clothing may have to be performed on the fireground.
- The rotation and rehabilitation of operating personnel are essential. The temperature and humidity added to the stress level.
- The incident command system permitted multiple agencies to perform many functions and coordinate their operations effectively.
Hammonton Fire Department
Chief Jack Donio
Personnel: 80 volunteer firefighters
Apparatus: Four engines, one tanker, one aerial, one air unit, two brush trucks
Population: 13,500
Area: 44.5 square miles
Multi-Alarm Fire Levels New Jersey Restaurant
A fast-moving, multi-alarm fire destroyed a landmark restaurant in Hammonton, NJ, on Jan. 7, 1998. Twenty-six fire companies responded to the scene and three others covered Hammonton's two empty stations.
Photo by Dennis C. Sharpe First-in companies found heavy fire showing from the building's roof.
At 9:26 P.M., the Hammonton Volunteer Fire Depart-ment was summoned to Lamberti's Restaurant on Route 30 for a report of a structure fire. First-arriving units noticed heavy fire showing from the roof of the restaurant. The building was situated in front of a U-shaped motel and the fire was emitting tremendous radiant heat.
The first-in pumper, Engine 98, dropped a 400-foot length of five-inch supply line from a hydrant on Route 30, then proceeded to the rear of the building followed by Ladder 9, a 100-foot midmount aerial. Engine 98 stretched two three-inch lines to the ladder and both units put master streams into operation.
The fire building measured 100 by 200 feet and was constructed of brick with a truss roof that was open from end to end. The wood-frame interior was partitioned to include dining areas and lounges, a kitchen and storage rooms. This was the fifth fire at the restaurant in several years; two were determined to have been intentionally set and the others were accidental.
Chief Jack Donio arrived behind Ladder 9 and ordered Engine 97 to be positioned in front of the building on Route 30 and begin a master-stream attack. Engine 95 reverse-laid a five-inch supply line to another hydrant west of the building on Route 30. Donio was advised of poor hydrant pressure from the water mains on Route 30 and he advised communications to notify the water department to increase the water pressure. Until this was done, Donio would need to augment the master-stream attack on the out-of-control fire. To accomplish this, the Atlantic County Tanker Task Force was activated at 9:35 P.M., bringing a mix of tankers and pumpers from throughout Atlantic County. A tanker from the Elm Volunteer Fire Company in Camden County and a tanker from the Indian Mills Volunteer Fire Company in Burlington County responded to the fire.
The tanker from Elm dropped an 800-foot length of supply line from a hydrant east of the fire building to augment the water supply to Engine 98 and Ladder 9. Two tankers from nearby Mullica Township in Atlantic County arrived and set up dump tanks on Route 30 next to Engine 97's position. This enabled Engine 97 to draft from the dump tanks and maintain a master-stream attack on the front of the building. While the dump tanks were being set up, Hammonton Tanker 9 was positioned on Route 30 at the A/D side of the building, where it supplied Engine 98 with its 6,000 gallons of water.
Photo by Dennis C. Sharpe Twenty-six fire companies responded to the scene and three others covered Hammonton's two empty stations.
At 9:50 P.M., Donio requested a ladder from the City of Egg Harbor, which set up its 75-foot ladder at the A/D side of the building and put its master stream into operation. Shortly after the Egg Harbor ladder was put into operation, firefighters from the Borough of Folsom were put into service on the D side of the building with a handheld master stream.
With a good supply of water being provided by the tankers and a now sufficient flow from the hydrants, the fire began to darken down. At 11:30 P.M., all master streams were shut down and handlines were put into operation for an interior attack of several hours.
An investigation revealed that there was a delay in notifying the fire department. Several patrons and kitchen helpers noticed a fire in the ceiling of the kitchen and attempted to fight the fire until it got out of hand. The cause of the fire was determined to be electrical.
Dan Campbell is a captain and acting battalion chief in the Elizabeth, NJ, Fire Department.
Dennis C. Sharpe is a fire subcode/construction official for the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs, Bureau of Local Code Enforcement. He is a 22-year member of Farmington Volunteer Fire Company 4; second vice president of the Atlantic County, NJ, Firefighter's Association; and New Jersey coordinator for the International Association of Fire Photo-graphers. Sharpe, the countywide fire photographer for the Atlantic County Fire-fighter's Association, has been a professional fire photographer for 10 years.
