On Jan. 5, 1995, four Seattle firefighters died when the ground floor of a downtown building collapsed, dropping them into the fully involved basement. The unusual arrangement of the building made it appear to be a fairly modern single-story warehouse from the front, while the rear view revealed a much older two-story structure.
The first-alarm companies believed that they had a major exterior fire at the rear threatening to enter the building. The initial attack was through the front, advancing lines to stop any penetration of the fire into the interior. A concrete topping over the wood floor insulated the fire that had been set in a large basement storeroom directly below the attack teams. The concrete floor also reinforced their perception that they were in a single-story warehouse without a basement.
Companies that were sent to the rear were instructed to protect exposures but not to interfere with the attack that would be coming through the interior toward them. Not realizing that the attack crews had entered on the upper floor, the companies at the rear located, but did not attack the main body of fire on the lower level. With the exterior flames knocked down and no major penetration to the upper level, the operation appeared from most vantage points to be successful in controlling the fire.
When a section of the floor collapsed without warning, three firefighters dropped into the basement and a fourth fell into the hole while trying to escape. At least six others were burned as they narrowly escaped from the flames erupting from the basement to involve the upper floor.
Seattle's passport accountability system quickly identified the missing members and their last known location. Valiant attempts were made to rescue them by crews that entered the burning basement but they could not be reached.
The floor that collapsed was supported by heavy wood timbers that should have been able to withstand a fire for several hours. When the building arrangement was altered many years previously, the upper floor level was elevated and one end was supported by an assembly of two-by-four-inch wood members that collapsed after about 30 minutes of fire exposure.
Case history: Pittsburgh, PA
On Feb. 14, 1995, the captain and two firefighters from Pittsburgh's Engine Company 17 died when they ran out of air inside a single-family dwelling. This incident was remarkably similar to the one in Seattle in several respects.
The wood-frame house was also built on a slope and revealed only two floors at the front but four at the rear. This was also an arson fire and, similar to Seattle, the fire was set in the basement. Suspects are in custody and have been charged in connection with both incidents.
Engine 17 was the first company to arrive and the three members entered the house with a 1 3/4-inch line through the front door, leaving the pump operator outside. They went down the interior stairs to the level between the basement and the street-level floor. Other companies arrived and went to work performing routine tasks. The fire was extending up through the balloon frame walls from the basement to the attic.
A firefighter who was following their line down the stairs fell through into the basement, where the fire had weakened the stair supports. He was able to get back up the basement stairs to the floor where Engine 17's crew was operating and was in the smoke-filled room with them. They began to run out of air and were unable to find a way out while the fire coming through the gap in the stairs burned through their hoseline.
A crew operating outside broke a window into the room for ventilation and heard the firefighter who had fallen through the stairs. He was rescued and was able to tell the rescuers that more firefighters were still inside and in trouble. While this was occurring, two more firefighters had fallen through the hole in the stairs, then helped each other out of the basement and crawled to the same window. They were rescued and everyone outside assumed that they were the ones reported by the first firefighter. All three were transported to a hospital and the incident commander was informed that everyone was accounted for.
The three dead firefighters were located in the room about 40 minutes later during the overhaul stage. All three had died of asphyxiation and had no other injuries. Their personal alert safety system (PASS) devices were turned off and two of them had portable radios; however, no requests for assistance were heard or recorded by the radio system logging recorder.
Since this incident, the Pittsburgh Bureau of Fire Bureau has placed a major emphasis on incident command procedures and accountability. A designated company is dispatched to perform safety functions at every working fire.
Case history: San Francisco, CA
A lieutenant died and a probationary firefighter was critically injured in a San Francisco house fire when they were trapped in the garage of a burning house. The fire originated on a porch at the rear of the house and the alarm was delayed while the homeowner tried to fight the flames. When the first-due engine company arrived, the fire was being pushed through the interior of the house by a gale force wind.
The three crew members entered through the open door of the attached two-car garage. Their plan was to attack from the unburned side through a doorway into the main part of the house but when they opened the door the wind drove the heat and smoke directly at them. After a brief stand-off at the doorway, they retreated back into the garage, which was now filled with smoke. Attempting to find their way out, they discovered that the electrically operated overhead door had closed behind them.
The lieutenant and two firefighters were trapped for several minutes pounding on the inside of the heavy wood door, while crews outside struggled to lift or cut through it. By this time the wind-driven heat and smoke were making it almost impossible to work on the door and the fire was threatening the exposures. By the time they were rescued, the lieutenant and the probationary firefighter were burned and had run out of air. The probationary firefighter was critically injured and permanently disabled due to burns and smoke inhalation. This incident could easily have claimed three lives.
J. Gordon Routley, Reade Bush and Jeffrey Stern are employed by TriData Corp., which contracts with the U.S. Fire Administration to conduct the annual analysis of line-of-duty deaths and to develop reports on individual major incidents. They are active members of fire departments in Prince George's, Arlington and Montgomery counties, respectively. The reports are available through the U.S. Fire Administration in Emmitsburg, MD. Part 1 of this article was published in the July 1996 issue.