Although this column focuses on Close Calls, many incidents that were covered over the years resulted in the injury or death of firefighters. It’s always the goal to learn from those events to honor those who were hurt or who gave their life.
No one was hurt in the incident that’s profiled in this month’s column, but that outcome didn’t happen just by accident.
My sincere thanks to East Farmingdale, NY, Volunteer Fire Company (EFFD) Chief of Department Joseph Iuzzini for his support in allowing this incident to be shared. Additional thanks to Jason Frankel, Duane Welliver and former Captain Frank Leeb for their assistance and to Paul Mazza of Zone2Photo.com for his excellent photography and assistance. Lastly, thanks to all of the members who responded from both East Farmingdale and the mutual-aid departments, including dispatch personnel. Your training and operational discipline made this an incident that ended positively.
Note: Some departments in the New York metro area use numbering designations for the sides of a building (i.e., 1=Alpha, 2=Bravo, 3=Charlie, 4=Delta).
Fire, then collapse
Tragically, in just the past 20 years, many firefighters lost their life because of a fire-related collapse. In some cases, the collapse wasn’t predictable. However, in many cases, the collapse could be anticipated, but the understanding of the building, of the fire conditions, of the collapse zone and of a disciplined fireground was lacking or disregarded.
The EFFD operates three all-volunteer firehouses. More than 170 members protect 16 square miles of residential, multifamily and rail about 35 miles east of New York City; members of the department respond to commercial and industrial building fires, as well.
On Sunday, Jan. 26, 2020, at 2:30 p.m., the EFFD was dispatched to a working fire in a commercial building under the command of Iuzzini. (It came in as a verbal by an EFFD captain who was passing the building.) The EFFD dispatcher acknowledged and advised numerous phone alarms for the same fire.
The one-story brick building housed two occupancies. Drawing on information that was in the department’s database, responding units were aware that they were responding to a 130 x 100 commercial structure that had a truss roof and a gypsum deck.
Knowledge of the district and that it was a Sunday afternoon led to a more cautious approach by the commanding officers, because the occupancy might have been closed since at least the day before and, thus, might have been burning for an extended period of time.
Upon arrival, smoke was seen pushing under pressure from around the roof level on all four sides of the structure, and cracks could be seen on the Exposure 2 and 3 sides. In the rear, a bay door was discovered in the open position, feeding the fire all of the air that it needed to quickly expand beyond the capabilities of handlines. This also indicated that there was the possibility that occupants still were within the structure. After quickly locating occupants and confirming that all were accounted for, the priority shifted to an exterior defensive attack.
Under the direction of the rear operations chief (Frankel) and front operations chief (Welliver), units were ordered to establish collapse zones. Additionally, collapse fire line tape was set up in the rear, and the walls were monitored by incident safety officers.
Early into the operation, a collapse occurred on the Exposure 2 side toward the rear. Minutes later, collapses also occurred on the Exposure 3 side (rear) and front side of Exposure 2. Because collapse zones were established, respected and enforced, all of the members safely were outside of the collapse area, and no members were injured. The run started at 2:30 p.m., and companies were back in quarters at 11:24 p.m.
Account from Jason Frankel
Upon arrival, I was directed to report to the rear of the building and give a size-up. At this point, the first engine pulled up and established a positive water source. EFFD command (who subsequently assigned an operations division) was notified by employees that the building was occupied, but all of the occupants were evacuated and accounted for. This was transmitted over department radio, so all units knew that there wasn’t a life hazard.
We were dispatched to this same building numerous times recently for automatic alarms, so we knew that there were two occupancies in the one common building, both of which had separate entrances at Exposure 1.
The dispatcher transmitted over the air the pre-plan information regarding a truss and gypsum roof to responding units.
The Exposure 1 had gray smoke coming from the roofline across both occupancies. I made my way down Exposure 2 to Exposure 3, where at the corner of Exposure 3 and Exposure 4, I found a bay door that had a good amount of thick, black smoke coming out.
I notified operations to have the first line report to that location; this was a better tactical way to get water on what I believed to be the main body of fire.
As the first line (2½-inch, 300 feet) off EFFD Engine 1-5-6 was brought to the rear, the engine officer called for an additional 200 feet to make the stretch to the bay door. I observed slight cracks of the Exposure 3 wall about midway between Exposures 2 and 4. At 2:39 p.m., I notified operations via radio of the same and suggested exterior, defensive operations, which he agreed and transmitted to all operating and responding units. We switched to a defensive operation, established collapse zones, and started positioning ladders and master streams. In addition to the command post (at the Exposure 1-4 street corner), operations (at Exposure 1) and rear sector chiefs, there was a safety officer in place from the onset to monitor conditions at all four exposures.
Urgent message
At 2:48 p.m., numerous urgent messages were transmitted for a roof collapse in the rear. Within a minute of that collapse, I observed and transmitted a brick façade collapse of Exposure 2/3 corner. Shortly thereafter, the rest of the Exposure 2 brick façade collapsed. The entire wall of Exposure 4 collapsed shortly after that.
The height of operations involved six handlines, two tower ladders and two ladder pipes.
Practical/defensive-minded firefighting operations were applied and followed by all operating units.
Account from Duane Welliver
I was the operations chief at this fire. Chief Iuzzini and I arrived on scene at the same time. He established command, and I started directing operations from Exposure 1. As stated, Chief Frankel was assigned to the rear sector. We assigned one of our ladder companies to the rear and the second due to the Exposure 2 side because of wires that were in the front of the building.
Our district mostly is commercial, so we normally stretch 2½-inch hoselines to commercial fires. The first-due engine crew and crews from our heavy-rescue stretched both an attack line and backup to the rear of the structure. This was to be our primary attack. This was a team effort in that I was receiving numerous reports from the rear sector chief, company officers and safety officers about the worsening conditions of the structure. From my vantage point, I saw cracks form in the Exposure 1/2 corner, as heavy smoke pushed out.
Chief Frankel notified me that, based upon his evaluation from the rear sector, we should go to an exterior defensive attack. Reports from Deputy Chief Walter Buser (of the Farmingdale Fire Department, who responded on the mutual-aid request) advising of fire conditions “front to back” made it very clear that the plan of attack would be defensive. Our safety officers quickly established collapse zones with fire line tape, and the collapse started not long after that. No members were in these danger zones when the collapses occurred, fully respecting our orders.
Assigning Frankel and Buser to divisions made directing operations and communications smoother. Besides the aerial devices, we used several Blitzfire (ground monitor) devices around the structure, which kept our members from being overworked. All departments, officers and crews worked great together.
Another important aspect was the rehab division. Our neighbors from Wyandanch-Wheatley Heights Ambulance responded as per our mutual-aid plan for working fires. They set up tents and chairs for rehab along with triage for any injuries. They were a great asset throughout the fire.
A few hours into the fire, it was determined to get a grapple from the Babylon Department of Public Works to move walls and sections of the roof. After the collapses, we had pockets of fire under sections of the roof that we couldn’t reach with the master streams.
Lessons reinforced
Collapse zones must be established not only for civilians but for firefighters, too. Fire scene tape and members assigned to monitor collapse zones ensure that members have visual and, sometimes, vocal reminders of the potential hazard. Firefighters who are operating at an incident might not recognize the collapse potential, particularly when they’re laser-focused on a mission.
Dispatch information for responders gives firefighters a tactical advantage upon arrival. In this case, responding firefighters knew that the structure had a truss roof and a gypsum deck. (Truss roofs are susceptible to early collapse. Tactics must account for this, particularly when an advanced fire is encountered upon arrival.) As size-up was conducted, a great deal about the structure and how it was likely to behave under fire conditions already was known.
The brick exterior of the structure was single course placed in front of a thick piece of insulation, with cinder blocks behind. This type of wall is prone to collapse, because the outside layer “delaminates” and collapses, pulling down large sections of brick.
When establishing a collapse zone, an area of one-and-a-half to two times the height of the structure must be established.
Chief Goldfeder comments
The EFFD had a similar incident to this one back in September 2010—with a different outcome. It came in at 3 a.m. as a verbal radio report of a fire in a one-story commercial building.
As the members of the first engine stretched the initial handline to this 2010 fire, the brick façade collapsed, injuring three members, one critically. Thankfully, all of them survived. Although they are no doubt an aggressive/interior operations department when applicable, they have drilled, discussed and used that fire as part of their approach to operations.
In this most recent fire, the outcome is clear:
- an impressive two-minute response time;
- just 18 minutes from receipt of alarm until multiple collapses occurred;
- members displayed operational discipline without freelancing;
- ongoing communications between the incident commander and divisions were excellent; and
- no injuries.
The outcome was positive because of the EFFD’s planning, training, experience, respect for command/divisions and respect for the building. Unfortunately, in some areas, that isn’t the case.
So, consider the following:
- What is the history of your department’s turnout time? Typically, how many members (qualified, trained interior firefighters) turn out, and how quickly?
- Based on the predictable “fire flow,” through pre-planning, how many members would be needed to turn out or to be available for a similar fire and structure in your community?
- If your volunteer or career staffing is questionable—and be honest—what’s the plan? Do you use mutual aid or, better yet, automatic mutual aid (on the first alarm) to assure the minimal number of firefighters that’s required to handle all tasks? For example, think about water supply; apparatus operators; three firefighters on each line at minimum; firefighting teams to search (larger-area building); rescue; throwing ladders; smoke management/ventilation; firefighter rescue; and command, division supervisors and safety officers. Before the run comes in, consider what buildings in your area require what fire flow and what staffing.
- If you participate in automatic or regular mutual aid, how often do you train with them, and is everything from hose threads to radios compatible?
- Collapse zones must be planned early. Determining the predictable risks allows for a better outcome. Understand simple tips, such as the fact that corners on a structure often are better areas to operate than walls, which can be gained through reading/studying.
- How do you pre-plan, and is the information up-to-date and made available easily and simply?
In the end, this was a bad situation that went well. Very well. There was a loss, but no member or civilian was hurt or worse.
The EFFD knows their response area and what they are responsible to protect, and their actions reflect just how seriously that they take their responsibilities. By making training, pre-planning, a well-established and disciplined command system and positive relations with their mutual-aid partners priorities, the EFFD delivered a success story that we can all learn from.
