Close Calls: Smoke Explosion in Multi-Family Dwelling

March 1, 2017
Billy Goldfeder offers the play-by-play of a smoke explosion in a multi-family dwelling where search crews had just evacuated the building.

One of the cool things I get to do (and love to do) is travel around North America and spend time with gung-ho firefighters, because the un-gung-ho firefighters are normally hiding or at home. Be it meetings, conferences or seminars, the opportunities, stories and laughter never fails.

That was the case in November when I was invited to northern Minnesota to spend time in Hibbing. While there I had the chance to meet with some very gung-ho firefighters, including many from the City of Virginia, MN. Little did I know that not long after that meeting, they would experience a close call that would end up in this column.

The following section is an account of the incident from Virginia Fire Department (VFD) Battalion Chief Kevin Poffs and Chief of Department Allen Lewis.

The incident

On Dec. 19, at 1305 hrs, a first-alarm assignment was struck in Virginia by St Louis County 9-1-1 for a report of a fire in an apartment at the 700 block of 5th Avenue South. There were many apartments in this one building.

Virginia Fire responded from a rapid-intervention team training session with six personnel in Squad Co. 1, two staff in Medic 6, one staff in Medic 2 and one staff in squad 150. Mt. Iron and Eveleth fire departments also dispatched at this time on the box alarm system. 

Squad 150 (an engine company) with Fire Marshal Chris Clark was the first unit to arrive on scene. He was unable to complete a 360 but did report a wood-frame building with smoke showing from the alpha side of the structure on multiple levels. Medic 2 and Squad 1 arrived next. Battalion Chief (BC) 432 (Chief Poffs) arrived in Medic 2 and began a 360 and size-up of the building while Squad Co. 1 worked on securing a hydrant. The hydrant was in the front of the building on the corner of 5th Avenue and 6th Street South.

The size-up revealed a two-story, most likely a balloon-frame structure, with no apparent or obvious evacuation in place. Smoke was noted on the first floor from the Alpha side but not a large volume. 

While on the way to conduct a 360, BC 432 was met by a party in the front yard near the hydrant who told him he lived in a basement apartment and that the fire was in his apartment. He stated that the only access was through a door on the Charlie side of the structure. BC 432 asked if everyone else was out of his apartment and he stated yes. He guided BC 432 to the Charlie-side door entrance, and this information was relayed to Captain Joel Martinson, the Squad Co. 1 officer that day.

Further size-up revealed other occupants of apartments were evacuating from the rear, but it was unknown if all occupants were out. Smoke was noted on both aboveground levels of the structure in the rear but, again, not a large volume. The smoke was brown in color and not turbulent at this time. This was deemed an offensive attack and preparations were made for entry into the basement. 

Chief Lewis arrived on scene at 1310 hrs and assumed overall incident command, and operations was given to BC 432. Fire Marshal Clark was put in charge of staging at the intersection of 5th Avenue South and 7th Street. 

A 1¾-inch crosslay was pulled and being put in service for the initial attack. Squad Co. 1 crew under Captain Martinson started to advance to subdivision 1 from the Charlie-side entrance. They were able to get to floor level but were unable to make any gainful advancement into an apartment or put water on any flames. This was due to light smoke conditions that became heavy smoke conditions very quickly. The amount of materials inside delayed access. The owner of the structure told command that he had warned this particular tenant about his hoarding just the week prior and had instructed him to clear the area of items that were stacked along both sides of the wall. This made it difficult not only to see but also to crawl over stacked items that fell into their pathway to the fire. The unfamiliar layout made it even more difficult to advance, and the crew was eventually forced to exit out the Charlie side entrance.

All staff was accounted for. They regrouped and again tried to advance on the fire from the same location. After descending the staircase, smoke conditions got worse very quickly. The smoke was building up quickly, it was very dark, and had more volume and speed than the first attempt. With no immediate positive change after steadily flowing water, operations ordered the crew to evacuate. The crew exited from subdivision 1 with all staff accounted for. Again no gainful advancement had been made on the seat of the fire.  

Ladder 1 staff responded from City Hall and arrived under the direction of Battalion Chief Erik Jonassen. This company was assigned primary search of as many apartments as possible. This was a multiple-apartment building, and they were starting on the Alpha/Bravo side of the complex. Jonassen was able to use his company and captains Mikell Ruedebusch and Dustin Erickson who had arrived in Medic 6 earlier. 

Primary search was beginning on both levels simultaneously, with Chief Jonassen coordinating the searches. Meanwhile, operations directed Captain Martinson's crew to break out the basement windows and spray large volumes of water into the basement to try and suppress the fire enough to keep it contained to allow for a primary search of the structure.. Squad Co. 1 crew was assigned this task. Water was being sprayed from both the Alpha and Charlie divisions through the basement windows. While doing this and searching, command and BC 432 noted smoke conditions continuing to deteriorate. 

Search crews were evacuated out of the structure without primary searches completed of all the apartments due to the heavy smoke conditions. Within a short time after evacuation of search crews, a large smoke explosion occurred. A PAR report was requested and all crews were accounted for. This was now deemed a defensive fire with no fire personnel entering the building for any further operations. 

At this point, approximately 30 minutes into the fire, efforts were directed at keeping the fire contained to the building of origin, with an emphasis on protecting the Bravo exposure due to close proximity to a neighboring building. Aerial ladders from both Virginia and Hibbing (20 minutes away) were used for this along with ground master streams and handlines. Span of control was divided up for a total of four division officers:

  • Alpha officer was Captain Scott Fredrickson
  • Bravo officer was Battalion Chief Jonassen
  • Charlie officer was Captain Martinson
  • Delta officer was Captain Erickson

Battalion Chief Poffs remained as operations, Fire Marshal Clark remained staging officer, and Chief Lewis remained incident commander with the aid of Hibbing Fire Chief Erik Jankila. On his arrival, Fayal Fire Chief Steve Shykes was appointed incident safety officer. Crews were rotated out of each division and back to staging/rehab as needed. This continued throughout the operation.

Multiple departments used multiple hydrants throughout the operation with no major water supply issues encountered. Virginia Public Utilities had disconnected all electrical lines to the structure. Crews were reminded numerous times to be in defensive mode and to go slow and be safe.

We did accomplish our goal, and the fire was contained to the building of origin, including isolating most of the fire to the Delta end of the structure. Further, throughout the operation, incident command and all involved law enforcement officials were able to determine through phone calls and other means that all residents were out of the structure and accounted for. The apartment building owner was able to help with this information.  

Once the fire had vented through the roof, meaningful extinguishment was able to take place using exterior streams. The north side of the structure was the side that received the majority of the damage along with the roof burning away on the northern half of the structure.

Operations was able to muster several fire crews to make entry again to aid in salvage and overhaul. This helped with extinguishing the fire to some degree, but due to holes burned in the floor in multiple apartments, crews were not able to get to every area of the building. With the efforts from defensive streams, aerial tip operations and limited interior operations, the fire was deemed completely extinguished at 2032 hrs. No firefighter injuries or civilian injuries were reported. 

At 1640 hrs, incident command was passed from Virginia Fire Chief Lewis to Hibbing Fire Chief Jankila. Numerous media crews had arrived on scene, and Chief Lewis then changed his role to public information officer. Chief Jankila remained the incident commander for the remainder of the fire incident. 

Mutual-aid departments on this fire included Eveleth Fire Department, Mt. Iron Fire Department, Gilbert Fire Department, Fayal Fire Department, Hibbing Fire Department, Biwabik Township Fire Department, Buhl Fire Department, Pike Sandy Britt Fire Department, along with Virginia Police, the American Red Cross and the assistance of the St Louis County 9-1-1 Fire Communications personnel. 

Observations from Chief Goldfeder

One of the challenges I noticed when visiting Virginia is that while they have full-time staffing, there is significant potential in that staffing being reduced due to an EMS assignment. Not only do they handle all EMS, but they also handle inter-facility non-emergency transports. I asked about this, and while, yes, it can reduce staffing, they supplement their fire/EMS staffing with some EMS-only staffing to help compensate for the loss. They also have auto-aid and recall on structural fires, making the VFD an example of them doing everything they can (considering the dollars they are provided annually) to ensure good staffing for when “that” fire call comes in.

I also noticed some significant fire load as well as unusual fire load in their community. From old construction to new and unusual challenges, such as bridges and mines, they really have to be an “all-hazards” response department because based on where these unique challenges are located, it’s going to be a while before additional help can arrive.

It was clear to me when visiting the VFD that everyday IS a training day, in between the 10 to 15 runs the crew will make daily. It’s a busy place!

Based on my discussions about this fire with Chief Lewis, I wanted to share some additional lessons learned and lessons reinforced. 

First-alarm and working fire dispatch staffing

Know the capabilities and probable staffing levels of neighboring departments. For example, some volunteer agencies have very limited staffing at various times and plan for that well before the next fire. Another example, if you are a volunteer department and your staffing has proven to be barely adequate in the past, what can you expect based upon the history of using your neighboring departments? This is a question best asked before your next fire, not after headlines are made.

Have a system that gets the right amount of staffing and equipment en route quickly. What is the “right” or “correct” staffing? Figure it out by building or neighborhood where the building or hazards are similar. Here are some “minimal” thoughts:

  • Calculate the fire load for the structure or neighborhood if all structures are similar (NFA or ISO models each work well).
  • Determine how you will meet that fire load (handlines, master streams, etc.).
  • How many firefighters per line? Generally a 1¾-inch line would be three. Threes lines would equal nine firefighters.
  • How will water be supplied? Is it a hydranted or rural area? If hydranted, one firefighter on the hydrant and one firefighter pumping. If rural, you require many more based upon the fire flow, the fill locations and the dumpsite needs.
  • Force entry/search/rescue per floor: two firefighters.
  • Ventilation: two firefighters.
  • Firefighter rescue/RIT: three firefighters minimal.
  • Command: two firefighters (one in the rear).

The above is just minimal “food for thought” and needs to be increased if it’s a working fire, a larger building, exposure problems, multiple victims, etc. But it’s a start. What is your department guaranteed staffing on your first alarm, and what is their turnout and response time? 

Thoughts on command

Have a second chief officer at the command post (inside a vehicle in this case) to assist with monitoring radio communications and entering CAD notes on significant fireground activities and benchmarks. Also, use and expand the Incident Command System as needed to meet the needs of the incident by maintaining proper span of control. Finally, require 10-minute time checks from dispatch to ensure that you do not lose track of time and are always aware of the time an interior crew has been inside the structure on air.

Tactical considerations

Smoke doesn’t lie. Chief Lewis knew the interior attack crew had not reached the seat of the fire before they told him on the radio due to the volume, velocity, color and density of the smoke, which had continued to grow. There must be EXTERIOR eyes on the incident. If the IC cannot see the structure from the command post, ensure that division officers are assigned quickly, covering Alpha or the primary operating side and all divisions/360 when realistic and possible. 

When a direct attack on the fire fails (due to hoarding conditions in this fire, which blocked access), regroup and try a different tactic, such as opening up the basement and conducting exterior operations. Don’t keep trying an approach that has failed. The goal is to not run out of house.

Where and what type of master streams are available in your first-alarm assignment and how quickly can your personnel get them in service, flowing water? This could be a deck gun “up on top” or one mounted elsewhere, such as the tailboard. No matter where it is, drill, drill and drill to determine what’s best for your department to get the big water flowing when you need it.

Follow your gut instinct, which is actually a combination of knowledge, training and experience. The fire gave numerous warning signs through its behavior, which prompted the withdrawal of all crews. 

In sum

There were several factors that created challenges for the Virginia firefighters. From the hoarding conditions upon arrival interfering with their ability to do a complete search to the smoke explosion, they had their hands full. Fortunately, their training, fire scene awareness, initial and continued size-up, disciplined accountability/no freelancing and good communication from command to the various divisions allowed for a bad situation to not get any worse.

Our sincere thanks to Chief Lewis, the Virginia firefighters along with all those mentioned in this article for sharing their close call, so that we can all learn.

Sidebar: About the Virginia, MN, Fire Department

Virginia, MN, is a city of about 9,000 people located approximately 90 miles south of the Canadian border and 60 miles north of Duluth. It’s located in Saint Louis County, on the Mesabi Iron Range.

Formed in 1890, the City of Virginia Fire Department (VFD) is a 30-member career fire/EMS department consisting of 27 Minnesota-state Firefighter II-certified firefighter/paramedics and two EMT-basics.

A career department since its inception, VFD members currently operate out of one firehouse that was originally built in 1903. Its members responded to nearly 4,000 EMS/fire/rescue calls last year. The all-hazards department handles high/low-angle technical rope rescues, confined-space rescues, SWAT medics, hazardous materials response and auto extrication. They have many shuttered open pit mines and Minnesota’s largest off-highway vehicle recreation park, which creates the opportunity for many technical rescue calls and challenges. The department also works cooperatively with six surrounding fire jurisdictions, and acts as the hub of fire training for the area, planning and hosting many regional training events every year. 

The VFD is often the first-due on the box alarm system for fire protection for surrounding cities and provides fire protection for three taconite (iron) mines and production plants. These facilities are major providers of steel to the United States and the world. 

It is common for VFD EMS crews to be out of quarters and handling long-distance transports. This obviously impacts their ability to provide full staffing in the event of a fire. Because of this, VFD has an aggressive first-alarm assignment system using automatic mutual aid from both career and volunteer fire departments, as well as automatic recall of off-duty members on that first alarm.  

VFD EMS crews are the ALS providers of their region and provide ALS and critical care inter-facility patient transports statewide as well as over a 640-square-mile EMS primary service area, with local fire departments first responding. 

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