Talking about fire service line-of-duty deaths (LODDs) is both difficult and interesting. Difficult because none of us really likes to discuss or talk about death. Death itself isn’t an attractive topic, and firefighter LODDs are even less attractive. However, we also all know that if we examine and take a critical look at firefighter LODDs, there almost always is a lesson to be learned that will prevent another similar LODD in the future.
Knowing the current process of categorizing the cause of an LODD is worthwhile.
When a firefighter is killed at a fire or any other type of activity, there almost always is an investigation. These investigations are conducted most commonly by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). The report that results is quite detailed and includes many things, including a list of the contributing factors to the firefighter’s death. These factors can be any issues that played a role in or contributed to the death of the firefighter, such as lack of an incident command system, lack of or insufficient training of the involved firefighter, insufficient staffing or personnel operating, improper or insufficient hoseline selection for the incident, and lack of accountability.
These reports make for great training tools, and the contributing factors are excellent teaching points.
Beyond ‘cause of death’
The issue that I feel compelled to discuss here is the “cause of death.” Now, there isn’t anything that’s incorrect about the terms that are used in the reports, but I do believe that another “cause” factor must be included.
Let’s consider a fictitious report to see how we can add to it to make it a little more descriptive and helpful in making the issues that are involved clearer:
A team of two firefighters enters the first floor of a two-story private dwelling to conduct a primary search on the first floor. A hoseline is advanced into the house behind them by another team of two firefighters, and additional units arrive at the same time. The initial two firefighters separate in the hallway to locate the fire more quickly, and each enters different rooms off of the hallway. After completing the search of one of the rooms, one of the firefighters returns to the hallway and calls for his/her partner. There is no answer, and after a few more calls, a mayday is transmitted. Eventually, the firefighter who didn’t respond to calls is located by the RIT and removed to the hospital. There, the firefighter is declared dead.
On the NIOSH report, the “cause of death” is listed as “carbon monoxide poisoning,” and it’s correct. An autopsy was conducted, and the medical examiner concluded that carbon monoxide killed this firefighter. Again, no argument. However, sometimes, the technical medical cause of death of a firefighter doesn’t contribute to the full tactical understanding of why a firefighter is dead. So, what can be added? How about a “tactical cause of death?”
What went wrong tactically?
When a firefighter gets lost inside of a burning building and runs out of air, becomes unconscious and dies from carbon monoxide poisoning, the tactical cause of death would be “became lost inside of burning building.”
When a firefighter ventures out onto a flat roof over a burning store and falls through the roof and into the fire area and suffers severe burns that result in death, the cause of death might be listed as “burns,” but the tactical cause of death could be “operated on weakened roof over fire area.”
When a team of two firefighters enters a commercial building fire with a 1¾-inch attack hoseline and suffers fatal burns as a result of a flashover, the cause of death might be listed as “thermal burns,” but the tactical cause of death should be listed as “deployed insufficient size hoseline for fire conditions.”
Whether or not these tactical causes ever are used in reports, firefighters, officers and instructors should make that mental jump to try to translate the actual injury or cause of death into a tactical lesson that can be used to prevent future firefighter fatalities.
John J. Salka Jr. | Battalion Chief
JOHN J. SALKA JR., who is a Firehouse contributing editor, retired as a battalion chief with FDNY, serving as commander of the 18th battalion in the Bronx. Salka has instructed at several FDNY training programs, including the department’s Probationary Firefighters School, Captains Management Program and Battalion Chiefs Command Course. He conducts training programs at national and local conferences and has been recognized for his firefighter survival course, “Get Out Alive.” Salka co-authored the FDNY Engine Company Operations manual and wrote the book "First In, Last Out–Leadership Lessons From the New York Fire Department." He also operates Fire Command Training, which is a New York-based fire service training and consulting firm.
